People v. Peacock

• Decision Date: 05 February 1968
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Robert PEACOCK, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 166

287 N.Y.S.2d 166

29 A.D.2d 762

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Robert PEACOCK, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Feb. 5, 1968.

Aaron E. Koota, Dist. Atty. Kings County, for respondent; Rose Kraus, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel.

Robert Peacock, pro se.

Before BELDOCK, P.J., and CHRIST, BRENNAN, HOPKINS and MUNDER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered October 28, 1966, convicting him of burglary in the third degree and petit larceny, on a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal has brought up for review an order of said court dated June 16, 1966, which denied defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence.

Action remitted to the Criminal Term for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith; and determination of appeal held in abeyance in the meantime.

Defendant on February 11, 1966 was observed by a police officer to be in possession of a portable television set and a record player while standing at a street corner. He was asked by the officer for his identification and the source from which he had obtained the articles. He responded by saying that he had obtained them at a pawnshop; and he was unable to produce any identification. He was then taken by the officer to a station house for further investigation; after more interrogation he and two police officers went to the pawnshop, where it was ascertained that no record of any transaction involving the articles was in existence and that he was not known to the clerk. Upon return to the station house, defendant after further questioning admitted that he had removed the articles from an apartment. When the officers and defendant went to the apartment, it was found that the premises had been burglarized; and defendant said that he had broken into the apartment by use of a screwdriver. Later, the occupant of the apartment identified the articles at the police station as her property.

Defendant was tried on July 13, 1966, subsequent to the decision in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and hence his inculpatory statements, made without the warnings which Miranda requires, were inadmissible in evidence (Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882; People v. McQueen, 18 N.Y.2d 337, 274 N.Y.S.2d 886, 221 N.E.2d 550). In point of fact, defendant's statements were not used against him at the trial. He urges, however, that absent his statements the owner of the property (who testified at the trial) would not have been known and the identification of the articles seized could not have been made. In short, he argues that the proof against him at the trial was the tainted fruits of the illegally obtained statements.

If, indeed, defendant's admissions were the source of the proof against him, we would hold, consistent with the Rationale in the cases relating to the use of evidence proceeding from an illegal search and seizure, that the fruits of the unlawful conduct in eliciting the admissions without the mandated warnings were equally excluded (People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 286, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353, 356, 183 N.E.2d 651, 653; Smith v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 344 F.2d 545; United States v. Tane, 2 Cir., 329 F.2d 848; People v. Albea, 2 Ill.2d 317, 118 N.E.2d 277; People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658; see Ann. 41 A.L.R.2d 900).

The record before us, however, is unclear whether in fact the owner of the property came forward voluntarily and without knowledge of defendant's arrest and inculpatory statements. In such an event her subsequent identification of the property seized and her complaint of the burglary were not derived from the unlawfully obtained statements and defendant's argument is without foundation (cf. Wong Sun...