People v. Pearl
| Decision Date | 01 April 1971 |
| Citation | 66 Misc.2d 502,321 N.Y.S.2d 986 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Harry PEARL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term |
Michelman & Michelman, New York City (David I. Caplan, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. (Bennett L. Gershman and T. James Bryan, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
Before GOLD, J.P., and QUINN and LUPIANO, JJ.
As the District Attorney concedes, the evidence was insufficient to warrant the conviction for violating Penal Law § 240.20(5). Something more than the temporary inconvenience caused to pedestrians by the demonstrators' blocking of the west crosswalk, requiring them to enter the roadway to get to the other side, was required to sustain a conviction for obstructing pedestrian traffic (People v. Nixon, 248 N.Y. 182, 187--188, 161 N.E. 463, 465--466; People v. Carcel, 3 N.Y.2d 327, 332, 165 N.Y.S.2d 113, 116, 144 N.E.2d 81, 84).
However, under the circumstances shown, the continued blocking of that crosswalk by the demonstrators became an offense under Penal Law § 240.20(6), when they, including this defendant, refused to comply with a lawful order of the police officer to move on to the east side of the street, where barricades for that purpose had been set up (People v. Nixon, Supra, 248 N.Y. at pp. 188--189, 161 N.E. at p. 466; People v. Galpern, 259 N.Y. 279, 284--285, 181 N.E. 572, 573--574; People v. Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325, 328--329, 310 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305--306, 258 N.E.2d 711, 712--713).
There is no unconstitutional infringement of the rights of free speech and assembly when governmental authorities regulates by reasonable, appropriate and non-discriminatory measures the time, place and manner of use of the streets for public assemblies in the interest of manner of use of the streets for public assemblies in the interest of maintaining public order and keeping the streets open and available for movement (Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554--558, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed. 471).
The facts here are to be distinguished from those shown in People v. Anderson, Suffet and Lee (NYLJ, Oct. 30, 1969 (App.Term, First Dept.)). There the protest demonstration took place in the early hours of the morning, with no interference whatever to vehicular or pedestrian traffic, and the police order would have remove the demonstrators to a place removed from the target of the protest. Here there was some obstruction of pedestrian...
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Mediavilla v. City of N.Y., 14–CV–8624 (VSB)
...measures the time, place and manner of use of the streets for public assemblies...." People v. Pearl , 66 Misc.2d 502, 321 N.Y.S.2d 986, 988 (1st Dep't 1971) (per curiam) (affirming disorderly conduct conviction of demonstrator who was blocking crosswalk); see also Cox v. Louisiana , 379 U.......
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...involving the unavoidable interplay between freedom of speech and disorderly conduct charges (see e.g. People v. Pearl, 66 Misc.2d 502, 321 N.Y.S.2d 986 [App.Term, 1st Dept.1971] ). Even at the trial court, both sides addressed the First Amendment. Defense counsel submitted a 48–page Memora......
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Papineau v. Parmley, Docket No. 05-1830-cv (L)
...permit punishment only where the conduct at issue does more than merely inconvenience pedestrian or vehicular traffic. People v. Pearl, 66 Misc.2d 502, 321 N.Y.S.2d 986, 987 (1st Dep't 1971) ("Something more than the temporary inconvenience caused to pedestrians by the demonstrators' blocki......
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Collins v. City of N.Y.
...is a constitutional restriction on the time, place, or manner of protesting since at least 1971. See People v. Pearl , 66 Misc.2d 502, 321 N.Y.S.2d 986, 987–88 (App. Div. 1971) (per curiam). Moreover, "[u]nder New York's disorderly conduct statute, an order to disperse is lawful unless ‘the......