People v. Pease

• Decision Date: 25 May 1966
• Docket Number: Cr. 5190,5191
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ethel PEASE, James R. Valentine and Manuel B. Mattos, Defendants and Respondents. PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ethel PEASE, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 448

51 Cal.Rptr. 448

242 Cal.App.2d 442

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ethel PEASE, James R. Valentine and Manuel B. Mattos, Defendants and Respondents.

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ethel PEASE, Defendant and Respondent.

Cr. 5190, 5191.

District Court of Appeal, First District Division 1, California.

May 25, 1966.

Rehearing Denied June 15, 1966.

Hearing Denied July 20, 1966.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Derald E. Granberg, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for appellants.

Edward T. Mancuso, Public Defender, City and County of San Francisco, James G. Magee, Deputy Public Defender, San Francisco, for respondents.

SULLIVAN, Presiding Justice.

These are appeals in two separate cases. In 1 Crim. 5190 defendants Ethel Pease, James B. Valentine and Manuel B. Mattos were charged in an information with possession of a narcotic (percodan). (Health & Saf.Code § 11500.) Their motion to set aside the information was granted (Pen.Code § 995) ¹ and the People appeal. In 1 Crim. 5191 defendant Ethel Pease alone was charged in an information with two counts of receiving stolen property (§ 496). Her motion to set aside the information was granted (§ 995) and the People appeal. All of the offenses were charged as having been committed on January 6, 1965, arose out of the same incident and can be set forth in a single statement of facts. ² Basically both cases present a single issue: Whether on the occasion in question the forcible entry by the police was legally made and the evidence thereafter seized by them legally secured.

At the preliminary hearing San Francisco Police Inspector Yasinitsky testified that on January 6, 1965 he and Inspector Webb went to the premises at 1845 Bush Street, San Francisco, because they had received information from fellow officers Hurley and Dickson that William Bert Schindler, a wanted felon for whom they had two arrest warrants, was living in room 5 of the flat there located. They rang the front doorbell and knocked on the front door but did not receive a reply. They went around to the back, climbed the stairs to the second floor, knocked on the door and declared they were police. There was no reply. They then returned to the front door, rang the doorbell and knocked loudly on the door. Although they could hear footsteps above them they received no reply. Once more they proceeded to the back door where they heard footsteps and voices. They declared they were police, demanded entrance and threatened to break down the door if they were not admitted. There was still no reply.

The officers then tried to gently nudge the door open. They 'heard what sounded like running, hastily walking, hasty footsteps' and so Yasinitsky hit the door with his foot and caused it to open. The door was barred with a 2 4 on the inside but the officers made their way into the flat.

From the back porch they entered into the kitchen where they saw defendant Mattos standing by the sink. Defendant Ethel Pease was also in the kitchen area and shortly thereafter Valentine also entered that area from another room. The officers heard a toilet being flushed. They identified themselves and asked where Schindler was.

Inspector Yasinitsky further testified that he continued through the kitchen to the living room while Webb passed into an adjacent corridor. Immediately upon entering the living room Yasinitsky saw in plain sight on a table an eye-dropper with a hypodermic needle attached, a honing stone, a magnifying glass, alcohol, a tong, a spoon with a charred bottom and other narcotic users' paraphernalia. On the table top was a residue of a yellowish paste 'which looked like it was wiped off'; some of the residue was also in a waste paper basket. The above articles and yellow substance were not immediately seized for the officers, hoping to find Schindler on the premises, continued to make a search for him. They were later advised that he had moved from the flat that morning.

Unsuccessful in finding Schindler, Yasanitsky and Webb proceeded to seize the paraphernalia on the living room table. Yasinitsky wiped off the yellow residue and picked up the paste from the waste paper basket. Webb gathered up the refuse from the toilet where it was still swirling around because that fixture was defective.

The officers then made a thorough search of the premises, uncovering the following: two yellow pills (stipulated to be percodan) found in a case behind a vase in the living room; a case 'with a couple of bindles in it' found in the corridor; several hypodermic needles found in closets; 'some matter that looked like marijuana seed,' burned spoons and hairthin wires used to clean hypodermic needles, all found in a room near the back porch. Only the cache of seed was seized from that room, however. In addition, the officers seized certain cancelled checks, business cards, an address book and a checkbook belonging to two victims of auto boostings. These items were found scattered throughout Mrs. Pease's bedroom. The officers then placed defendants under arrest.

The motions to set aside the informations in both cases were heard and granted at the same time. Basically the court's action rested upon a determination that the inspectors lacked reasonable cause to believe that Schindler was on the Bush Street premises. The record discloses that in reaching this conclusion the learned trial judge specifically rejected the district attorney's contention that the fact that Inspector Yasinitsky had obtained his information about Schindler from fellow officers constituted per se reasonable grounds for believing Schindler to be in the flat and therefore justified their forcible entry. ³ The Attorney General renews the same contention before us. We have concluded that the trial court's rulings were correct and that the orders made in both cases should be affirmed.

Section 844 provides in pertinent part: 'To make an arrest * * * a peace officer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the person to be arrested is, Or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired.' (Emphasis added.)

The term 'reasonable grounds' as used in section 844 is the substantial equivalent of the terms 'reasonable cause' and 'probable cause' as used in constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the issuance of a search warrant (U.S.Const., 4th Amend.; Cal.Const., art. I, § 19; § 1525), an arrest without a warrant (§ 836), a commitment by a magistrate or an indictment by a grand jury (§ 995). (See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 478, fn. 6, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Draper v. United States (1959) 358 U.S. 307, 310, fn. 3, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327; United States v. Elgisser (2nd Cir. 1964) 334 F.2d 103, 109; People v. Morfield (1964) 41 Misc.2d 935, 246 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452.) ⁴ The standard or test of reasonable or probable cause applicable to all of the last mentioned situations, namely, to the issuance of a search warrant, an arrest without a warrant, a commitment by a magistrate or an indictment by a grand jury is approximately the same (People v. Aday (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 520, 532--533, 38 Cal.Rptr. 199, cert. denied 379 U.S. 931, 85 S.Ct. 329, 13 L.Ed.2d 343; Williams v. Justice Court (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 87, 94, 40 Cal.Rptr. 724; People v. Govea (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 285, 296, 45 Cal.Rptr. 253; Galena v. Municipal Court (1965) 237 A.C.A. 684, 689--690, 47 Cal.Rptr. 88, 92), ⁵ that is, 'such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.' (People v. Nagle (1944) 25 Cal.2d 216, 222, 153 P.2d 344; in accord: Jackson v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 521, 525, 42 Cal.Rptr. 838, 399 P.2d 374; People v. Ketchel (1963) 59 Cal.2d 503, 532 ⁶, 30 Cal.Rptr. 538; Perry v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 276, 283, 19 Cal.Rptr. 1, 368 P.2d 529; Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459, 462, 15 Cal.Rptr. 65, 364 P.2d 241; Robison v. Superior Court (1957) 49 Cal.2d 186, 188, 316 P.2d 1; Rogers v. Superior Court (1955) 46 Cal.2d 3, 7--8, 291 P.2d 929; Bompensiero v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 178, 183, 281 P.2d 250, cert. denied 349 U.S. 914, 75 S.Ct. 602, 99 L.Ed. 1248; Callan v. Superior Court (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 652, 661, 22 Cal.Rptr. 508.)

Where reasonable cause is predicated on information communicated by others, evidence must be presented justifying the conclusion that Reliance on such information is reasonable. (Willson v Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 291, 294--295, 294 P.2d 36.) Thus we said in People v. Brice (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 258, 265--266, 44 Cal.Rptr. 231, 236, 'It is settled that in the absence of a pressing emergency, an arrest without a warrant may not be based solely upon information received by the police from an informant not known to the arresting officers, or if known, not known to be reliable. (Citations.)' ⁷ In Galena v. Municipal Court, supra, 237 A.C.A. 684, 690, 47 Cal.Rptr. 88, 92 we discussed probable cause in connection with the issuance of a search warrant. In that case we said: 'It is settled law that the requisite probable cause 'may be based on information furnished by an informant if the supporting affidavit also recites facts indicating that reliance on the information is reasonable. (Citations.)' (People v. Keener, supra, 55 Cal.2d 714, 721, (12 Cal.Rptr. 859, 863, 361 P.2d 587, 590). (citations ⁸).) In other words, the magistrate's finding of probable cause may rest upon the hearsay statement of the informant 'so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented.' (Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 269, 80 S.Ct. 725, 735, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 707, 78 A.L.R.2d 233; (citations ⁹).)'

Just as in the foregoing situations, where an arrest is made without a warrant or...