People v. Pier

• Decision Date: 21 March 1972
• Docket Number: No. 43904,43904
• Citation: 51 Ill.2d 96,281 N.E.2d 289
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert E. PIER, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 289

281 N.E.2d 289

51 Ill.2d 96

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert E. PIER, Appellant.

No. 43904.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 21, 1972.

John F. McNichols, District Defender, Illinois Defender Project, Springfield (J. Daniel Stewart, Springfield, Staff Atty., of counsel), for appellant.

William Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Basil G. Greanias, State's Atty., Decatur (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ronald L. Carpel, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for the People.

RYAN, Justice:

This is an appeal from the circuit court of Macon County which dismissed the defendant's post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant, Robert E. Pier, was convicted of burglary and placed on probation. Later he was charged with violating his probation, and a hearing was held on the charge. At the hearing the defendant admitted his violation of the probation order and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of from 2 to 15 years.

In his post-conviction petition the defendant contends that his admission of the violation of probation was induced by an unfulfilled promise by the State's Attorney to recommend a different sentence than that imposed. Attached to the defendant's petition is an affidavit by the public defender who represented the defendant at the probation revocation hearing. The public defender in his affidavit states that the State's Attorney represented to him that upon an admission of the probation violation by the defendant the State's Attorney would recommend a sentence of from 1 to 10 years. At the probation revocation hearing the defendant made the admission of the violation of his probation. However, the judge did not ask the State's Attorney for a recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed, and the State's Attorney did not make the recommendation which he told defendant's attorney he would make.

The State contends on this appeal that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 122--1 et seq.) does not apply to the review of probation revocation hearings. Section 122--1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 122--1), as amended, provides: 'Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his Conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both may institute a proceeding under this Article. * * *' (Emphasis supplied)

It is the State's position that since the proceedings here under review were not involved in the defendant's conviction but related to matters occurring subsequent thereto, any irregularities involved in the probation revocation hearing cannot be considered in a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.

The Criminal Code has not limited the meaning of the term 'conviction' to this extent. Section 2--5 of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 2--5) defines conviction as 'a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury.' Section 102--2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 102--2) adopts this definition for purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 100--1 et seq.) 'except when a particular context in this Code clearly requires a different meaning.' Nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to a post-conviction hearing (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 122--1 et seq.) indicates that a different meaning be given to the word 'conviction' than that given to this word in section 2--5. Under this definition a defendant may raise in a post-conviction petition issues of constitutional dimension that occurred not only in the proceeding which involved the determination of his guilt, but also those which arose in proceedings concerning the imposition of the sentence.

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act was designed to afford to the convicted an opportunity to inquire into the constitutional integrity of the proceedings in which the judgment was entered. (People v. Dale (1950), 406 Ill. 238, 245, 92 N.E.2d 761.) This court has liberally construed this statute to afford a convicted person an opportunity to present questions of deprivation of constitutional rights. (People v. Scott (1969), 43 Ill.2d 135, 251 N.E.2d 190.) In keeping with the purpose of the Act and the liberal construction which this court has given the same, the defendant in this case should have been given the opportunity to raise in a post-conviction hearing questions of constitutional dimension which occurred at a hearing to revoke his probation.

Plea bargaining is desirable in the administration of criminal justice. However, when a plea of guilty rests in any significant way upon a promise or agreement of a prosecutor so that the same can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, the promise must be fulfilled. A plea of guilty made in reliance on an unfulfilled promise is not voluntarily made by the defendant. People v. Williams (1970), 47 Ill.2d 1, 264 N.E.2d 697; People v. Washington (1967), 38 Ill.2d 446, 232 N.E.2d 738; McKeag v. People, 7 Ill.2d 586, 131, N.E.2d 517; see also Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747; Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427.

Prior to January 1, 1964 (the effective date of the Code of Criminal Procedure), the statute provided that appeals from orders changing, modifying, or terminating probation shall be to the appellate court (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, ch. 38, par. 798). This statute has been construed as denying this court jurisdiction to review orders revoking probation even though constitutional issues may have been raised. (People v. Gary (1963), 27 Ill.2d 362, 189 N.E.2d 286; People v. Kostaken (1957), 10, Ill.2d 549, 141 N.E.2d...