People v. Poole
| Decision Date | 24 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | KA 17-02025,686 |
| Citation | 185 A.D.3d 1529,128 N.Y.S.3d 745 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Erika H. POOLE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (SUSAN C. MINISTERO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JOSEPH V. CARDONE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ALBION (SUSAN M. HOWARD OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, WINSLOW, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her upon a jury verdict of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree ( Penal Law § 220.16 [1] ) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (§ 220.06 [5] ). Defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained following a traffic stop of a vehicle she was driving because the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the seizure of the vehicle inasmuch as a tip from a confidential informant (CI) did not satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test. We reject that contention. The testimony at the suppression hearing and Darden hearing established that defendant's parole officer received a tip from the CI that defendant was obtaining and distributing cocaine. The parole officer testified that the CI had given him information on at least three prior occasions, and the CI's information had been accurate. The CI told the parole officer that defendant would be returning to the area in a Nissan Altima with Connecticut license plates. After observing such a vehicle arrive near defendant's residence, the parole officer requested the assistance of local police in stopping it. Upon stopping the vehicle, the police found cocaine on the floor of the passenger side of the vehicle.
A search and seizure by a parolee's own parole officer is permissible so long as it is "rationally and reasonably related to the performance of the parole officer's duty" ( People v. Huntley , 43 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 371 N.E.2d 794 [1977] ; see People v. Reed , 150 A.D.3d 1655, 1655, 53 N.Y.S.3d 447 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1132, 64 N.Y.S.3d 683, 86 N.E.3d 575 [2017] ). Based on the testimony at the suppression and Darden hearings, there was " ‘credible information’ " that defendant was in violation of her parole because she possessed and was selling cocaine ( People v. Wheeler , 149 A.D.3d 1571, 1572, 52 N.Y.S.3d 799 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1095, 63 N.Y.S.3d 12, 85 N.E.3d 107 [2017] ; see People v. Sapp , 147 A.D.3d 1532, 1533, 47 N.Y.S.3d 565 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1086, 64 N.Y.S.3d 176, 86 N.E.3d 263 [2017] ). "The CI's basis of knowledge and moderate indicia of the tip's reliability were adequately demonstrated[ ] for the purpose of establishing reasonable suspicion" justifying the traffic stop ( People v. Porter , 101 A.D.3d 44, 47-48, 952 N.Y.S.2d 678 [3d Dept. 2012], lv denied 20 N.Y.3d 1064, 962 N.Y.S.2d 615, 985 N.E.2d 925 [2013] ; see People v. Hepburn , 189 A.D.2d 914, 915, 593 N.Y.S.2d 85 [3d Dept. 1993] ). Moreover, the seizure of the vehicle was reasonably related to the performance of the parole officer's duty (see generally Huntley , 43 N.Y.2d at 181, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 371 N.E.2d 794 ).
We reject defendant's further contention that the court should have suppressed a statement she made because she was subjected to custodial interrogation without being advised of her Miranda rights. Although defendant's statement was made when she was in police custody, it was not the product of interrogation or its functional equivalent. The transporting sheriff's deputy did not question defendant and did not deliberately elicit any statements. There was therefore no basis to suppress defendant's spontaneous statement (see People v. Lewis , 89...
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