People v. Potter
| Decision Date | 11 January 1858 |
| Citation | 5 Mich. 1 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | The People v. William Potter |
Heard January 6, 1858 [Syllabus Material]
On exception from Wayne Circuit.
The prisoner was indicted for the murder of Michael Walsh and convicted of murder of the first degree.
It was proved, on the trial, that Walsh and the prisoner had been working together for some time before the 25th of October 1857, and were on friendly terms; that, on the evening of October 24th, the prisoner and Walsh went to the theater in Detroit, and left about ten o'clock, in company with two or three other persons; that they had been drinking some in the course of the evening, and immediately after leaving the theater drank together three times, each treating the other in turn, and were soon badly intoxicated; and that, in company with others, they went up Third street to a public-house. The prosecution then offered to show, by persons who accompanied them from the theater to the public-house, that when the prisoner was passing along Third street he said he had been reading "Jack Rand," and he should not be surprised if he should turn highway man sometime, for he had struggled with poverty long enough; and that, at the time he said this, he had an open dirk-knife in his hand, and said if any man piled on to him, he would stick him. To the introduction of which evidence the counsel for the prisoner objected that it did not tend to show that the prisoner committed the offense for which he was then being tried, but only a general disposition to commit crime. The court overruled the objection, and permitted the evidence to be given; and defendant's counsel excepted.
It appears from the evidence, that, immediately after this statement, the prisoner handed his knife to one of the witnesses, who shut it, and handed it back to the prisoner and prisoner then put it in his pocket; that, up to this time, there had been no difficulty or unkind words between prisoner and the deceased; that the prisoner did not threaten Walsh, or any one else, when he flourished his knife; that, after arriving at the public-house, Walsh treated, the prisoner drinking with him; that Walsh and the prisoner left the public-house about a quarter before twelve that night, alone, up to which time there had been no difficulty between them, and they seemed to be fast friends; that the prisoner returned to the public-house about one o'clock, and stayed all night; and that Walsh was found next morning, a short distance from said public-house, badly cut, and died soon after. It was proved by the government that the prisoner said the next day he had killed Walsh; that Walsh seized him, twitched him around, threw him down, and got him by the throat, and that he thought one or the other must die, and when Walsh had him down, holding him by the throat, he stabbed him and killed him in self-defense. The evidence showed Walsh to have been a much larger man than the prisoner. There was no other testimony to show under what circumstances the act was done, and no proof tending to show that the prisoner had any other motive to kill the deceased.
The counsel for the prisoner asked the court to charge the jury that, to constitute murder of the first degree, under the statute, something more was necessary than was necessary to constitute murder at the common law; that, to constitute murder of the first degree, the murder must be preceded or attended by facts and circumstances not necessarily an ingredient of murder at the common law; that, if the government sought to have the jury convict the prisoner of murder of the first degree, the burden of proof was on the government, to show that the murder was committed in the perpetration, or in the attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, or by poison, or by lying in wait; or to prove such facts in addition to the act of killing as made the killing murder of the first degree. The court refused so to charge, but did charge the jury that if the act of killing was proved, the presumption of law was that it was done with malice afore-thought; that the burden of proving that the killing was not done with malice aforethought rested upon the prisoner; that, unless it appeared by testimony introduced by the prosecution, the prisoner, to overcome the presumption of law, must either introduce sufficient testimony to satisfy the jury that the act of killing was not done with malice aforethought, or he must make a sufficient showing to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury as to whether the act was done with malice aforethought or not; that it was not necessary that a premeditated design to kill should have existed any particular length of time before the act of killing; that, if the jury believed that Walsh first assaulted the prisoner, twitched him around, threw him down, and clinched him by the throat, and the prisoner believed, and had good reason to believe, that Walsh was about to take his life, or to do him some great bodily harm, and he struck the fatal blow to save his own life, or to prevent Walsh doing him some great bodily harm, it would be a case of excusable homicide; but the burden of proof was upon the defendant to show that it was done in self-defense. To which refusal of the court to charge as requested, and to the charge as given, defendant's counsel excepted.
New trial directed.
Burt & Maynard, for defendant:
1. The evidence of the statement of defendant, that he had been reading the life of "Jack Rand," etc., was improperly admitted. It did not tend to prove the issue, but only a general disposition to commit crime: 2 Russell on Crimes, 772-781; 1 Phil. Ev., 178-181; Wharton's Cr. Law, 234, 884-5; Kinchelow v. The State, 5 Humph. 9; 10 Pet. Abr., 509; Dyson v. Mississippi, 26 Miss. Rep., 384; Cole v. The Commonwealth, 5 Gratt. 696; State v. Reenon, 15 N. H., 169; People v. Thurston, 2 Park. Cr. R., 131.
2. The refusal of the court to charge the jury as requested, was erroneous: Pennsylvania v. Lewis, Addis., 282; Mitchell v. The State, 5 Yerger 340; Dale v. The State, 10 Yerger 551; Dains v. The State, 3 Humph. 439; Commonwealth v. O'Hara (cited in 1 Russ. on Cr., 482).
J. M. Howard, Attorney-General, for the people:
The admission, by the court below, of the statement of the prisoner that he had been reading the life of "Jack Rand," etc., was not error. It is true that it was not competent for the prosecution, on the trial of a criminal case, to introduce evidence which tends only to prove a general disposition to commit crime, but this evidence could not, we apprehend, have been offered for that purpose. The facts of the case show that this remark was made in the course of a conversation, during an interview which was concluded by the homicide for which the prisoner stands charged with murder, and at which the prisoner stands charged with murder, and at which the deceased was present. Had it been...
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