People v. Prysock
| Decision Date | 18 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 4051 |
| Citation | 180 Cal.Rptr. 15,127 Cal.App.3d 972 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Randall James PRYSOCK, Defendant and Appellant. |
Appellant, Randall James Prysock, aged 16 at the time of the offenses charged herein, was found guilty by jury of first degree murder of Iris Donna Erickson as charged in count one of an amended information. The jury also returned special findings that the murder was (1) willful, deliberate and premeditated, and was personally committed by appellant during the commission of a robbery; and (2) was willful, deliberate and premeditated and personally committed by appellant involving the infliction of torture. The jury also found the charge of using a deadly weapon in the murder was true. (Pen.Code, §§ 187, 190.2, 1 12022, subd. (b).)
The jury also returned verdicts of guilty on the following charges: count two, robbery of Iris Donna Erickson with the use of a dangerous weapon (Pen.Code, §§ 211, 12022, subd. (b)); count three, burglary of the residence occupied by Iris Donna Erickson and accompanied with the use of a deadly weapon (Pen.Code, §§ 459, 12022, subd. (b)); count four, auto theft (Veh.Code, § 10851); count five, escape from a youth facility (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 871); and count six, destroying evidence (Pen.Code, § 135). Mark Danley, appellant's coparticipant and also a juvenile, was found guilty of the same charges in a later trial, including the special findings and an additional charge not relevant here.
The court sentenced appellant under count one to state prison for life without possibility of parole. The sentences on counts two and three, and their related enhancements, were stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Additionally, the sentences for counts two through six were deemed to "merge into" and to run concurrently with the life sentence, and the execution of the sentences were stayed pursuant to then Penal Code section 669.
This is the second time this case has been before this court. On December 5, 1980, we reversed the trial court and ordered a new trial because of what we considered to be Miranda error (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) in that the warning given to appellant concerning his right to consult with a free lawyer before police interrogation if he could not afford to hire one was inadequate. After granting the respondent's petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held the Miranda warnings were adequate as a matter of federal law, reversed our decision and remanded the case to us "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." (California v. Prysock (1981) 453 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 2810, 69 L.Ed.2d 696.)
For the reasons to be explained, we conclude appellant's conviction should be affirmed on all counts with the exception of count six, destroying evidence in violation of Penal Code section 135. We also modify appellant's sentence on the conviction of first degree murder (count one) to life imprisonment as required by People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186 and Penal Code section 190 as it existed at the time of the commission of the instant offense. We also strike the special circumstances findings of the jury and remand for disposition of the Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b) count one (murder).
Brad Erickson, the victim's 16-year-old son, had reported a car theft of coparticipant Mark Danley some four months prior to the incidents in question. Danley subsequently Appellant testified to the following additional facts at trial after his unsuccessful motion to suppress his taped statement to the authorities on the night of his arrest. The appellant and Danley escaped from a juvenile detention facility during the evening of Saturday, January 28, 1978. Danley stole a vehicle in which the boys rode about in Tulare County on Sunday. Danley collided with a tree and set the interior on fire. The next day, Monday, appellant stole a Datsun pickup. Danley then drove it around the town of Porterville. He drove to his house to obtain clothing and food, but did not stop because his mother was at home.
made the boast that he was going to "take care of" Brad Erickson's mother, the murder victim. Appellant overheard this statement. Appellant had been (innocently) with Danley when he was arrested for this prior car theft.
Danley then drove past the victim's house several times, saying that he knew where they could get food and clothes. The victim's car was apparently known to Danley; on that date it was at a repair shop. The victim's son, Brad Erickson, had left in his pickup earlier to take some papers to a recycling center. The appellant and Danley stopped long enough to allow Danley to look in the garage. Danley made two separate telephone calls to an unknown number from a convenience store located near the house. According to appellant, there was no conversation over the telephone.
The pair then parked on a nearby street and walked to the rear of the house. Danley attempted to force entry by breaking out a window. When confronted by the victim, who was inside the house, both boys ran to the front of the house and entered through the front door.
When the victim announced that she was going to call the police, appellant hit her two or three times with a wooden dowel which he found near where he was standing in the living room. Danley then hit her with a metal fireplace poker, stabbed her in the back eight times with an ice pick to a consistent depth of one inch to one and one-quarter inch and eventually strangled her to death with a telephone cord.
After the murder, the boys stole a shotgun, food, money and tapes from the house. They also stole clothes which they changed into, subsequently burning the clothes which they wore at the time of the killing. Later that day, their vehicle, full of incriminating evidence, was spotted by the police resulting in a chase and their arrest.
Shortly after being taken to the police station, appellant was given a statement of his "Miranda" rights by Sergeant Byrd. Appellant declined to talk. The record does not reveal the exact content of the advisement.
Appellant's parents were called, and they came to the station. About 20 minutes after appellant had refused to talk, his mother entered the room where her son was located. She talked with him about 20 minutes. Appellant's mother exited and indicated appellant wished to discuss the events earlier in the day. 2 A few minutes after this Sergeant Byrd reentered the room where appellant was located; appellant's parents followed. Byrd took a taped statement from appellant which was admitted into evidence. The tape reflects the following warnings were given to appellant prior to any questioning:
At this point, at the request of Mrs. Prysock, a conversation took place with the tape recorder turned off. According to Sergeant Byrd, Mrs. Prysock asked if appellant could still have an attorney at a later time if he gave a statement at that time without one. Sergeant Byrd assured Mrs. Prysock that appellant would have an attorney when he went to court and "he could have one at this time if he wished one." 3
The United States Supreme Court ruled in California v. Prysock, supra, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 2810, that Sergeant Byrd ...
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People v. Thompson
....... An essentially identical argument was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Prysock (1981) 453 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696. Prysock was told that " '[y]ou have the right to talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have him present with you while you are being questioned, and all during the questioning.. [Y]ou have the right to have a lawyer appointed to ......
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People v. Sanders
...... During argument counsel may [221 Cal.App.3d 361] "comment on the credibility of a witness in light of all the evidence presented." (People v. Prysock (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 972, 997, 180 Cal.Rptr. 15.) That is what the prosecutor, by these relatively bland comments, was attempting to do. . Defense counsel had impeached prosecution witnesses by their inconsistent . Page 538 . statements to the police. The prosecutor ......
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