People v. Quinn
| Decision Date | 20 December 1963 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 4280 |
| Citation | 36 Cal.Rptr. 233 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Samuel R. QUINN, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. |
Benjamin M. Davis, San Francisco, for appellant; George Franklyn Duke, San Francisco, of counsel.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen. of the State of California, Albert W. Harris, Jr., Edward P. O'Brien, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.
On this appeal from a judgment after conviction by a jury of armed robbery, unlawful possession of narcotics, and theft of an automobile, all of which offenses were allegedly connected in their commission, defendant raises a number of questions. In the separate discussion of each question we shall allude to the particular facts pertinent thereto. Preliminarily, however, we set out the following basic background facts.
On February 13, 1962, shortly before noon, two men wearing stocking masks over their heads, entered the College Pharmacy in San Francisco. One of these men, who was holding a revolver, stated and directed one Reay, a customer, to crouch behind a wrapping counter. This man remained with Reay, while the other man, who did not exhibit any gun, ushered McMichael, the owner of the drugstore, into the prescription room in the rear of the store. McMichael opened a drawer containing narcotics, and the man who accompanied him into the prescription room removed about one-third of the bottles in the drawer and placed them in a white sack similar to a pillow slip. McMichael recognized one of the bottles which contained A.P.C. and demerol. McMichael and this man returned from the prescription room, at which time McMichael observed Reay crouched behind the wrapping counter. The man with the sack walked past Reay toward the front of the store. The man with the revolver tried to open the cash register, but was unable to do so, whereupon he ordered McMichael to open it, and, upon its being opened, emptied the register of all monies excepting pennies and checks. While the money was being taken from the register, a bill dropped to the floor. The man with the revolver then stated, "We'll leave that for you poor guys"; and, as he was departing, said, "We know you have some more money, but we'll let you have that." The two men left the store whereupon McMichael immediately called the police. McMichael ascertained that $80 was taken from the register, and, by a subtraction inventory, determined that large quantities of morphine, codeine and demerol were missing.
Appellant, Samuel R. Quinn, Jr., and Richard Montero, who is not a party to this appeal, were accused of the aforesaid robbery by an indictment which charged them with violating Penal Code, section 211 (robbery), Health and Safety Code, section 11500 (possession of narcotics), and Vehicle Code, section 10851 (automobile theft). Appellant was arrested, and upon his arraignment pleaded not guilty to each of the offenses charged in the indictment. Thereafter, and by permission of the trial court, appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty to the robbery charge and entered a plea of guilty thereto. Pursuant to stipulation, the court set the degree at first degree, and thereupon the other two counts of the indictment were dismissed on motion of the district attorney. Appellant was arraigned for judgment at which time he interposed a motion for probation which was continued for hearing and determination. Thereafter, appellant, by permission of the trial court, withdrew his guilty plea to the charge of robbery. The trial court thereupon reinstated the narcotics possession and automobile theft charges which had theretofore been dismissed. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all three charges, and thereafter the cause proceeded to trial before a jury. Upon the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty against appellant on all three counts of the indictment and fixed the degree of the robbery as first degree. This appeal ensues upon the judgment entered upon said verdict.
No. The trial court admitted into evidence, over objection, appellant's withdrawn plea of guilty to the robbery charge. Appellant claims that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to overrule his objection. It is the rule in California that, in the absence of statute, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or an offer to plead guilty, is admissible upon the theory that such a plea or offer is an admission of guilt. (People v. Hamilton, 60 A.C. 51, 59, 32 Cal.Rptr. 4, 383, P.2d 412; People v. Wilson, 60 A.C. 85, 101, 32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452; People v. Boyd, 67 Cal.App. 292, 303, 227 P. 783 (); People v. Ivy, 163 Cal.App.2d App.2d 436, 438-440, 329 P.2d 505; People v. Clay, 208 Cal.App.2d 773, 777-779, 25 Cal.Rptr. 464; People v. Cooper, 81 Cal.App.2d 110, 117-118, 183 P.2d 67; People v. Sanderson, 129 Cal.App. 531, 532-533, 18 P.2d 982; People v. Russell, 77 Cal.App. 113, 120, 246 P. 110; People v. Snell, 96 Cal.App. 657, 663, 274 P. 560.) This rule was first declared in Boyd, where it was held that an offer to plead guilty to an offense charged in the information was an admission on the part of the defendant of the truth of the charge and was therefore admissible at the trial, the weight and sufficiency of the admission being proper subjects for the consideration of the jury.
Appellant urges that in view of the enactment of sections 1192.1 to 1192.4 of the Penal Code 1 (in 1955 and 1957), and in the light of the interpretations placed upon those sections by Himilton and Wilson, the rule has been changed in California so as to make a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, inadmissible. Section 1192.1 provides that if a defendant is charged with a crime divided into degrees, upon a plea of guilty, when consented to by the prosecutor in open court and approved by the court, the plea may specify the degree and the defendant cannot thereafter be punished for a higher degree. The same principle is made applicable to pleas of guilty before a committing magistrate by section 1192.2. In section 1192.3 it is provided that a plea of guilty may specify the punishment to the same extent as it may be specified by the jury in cases where the jury has the power to recommend, the discretion to impose, or the option to impose a certain punishment. Section 1192.4 supplements the foregoing three sections and provides: As stated in both Hamilton and Wilson: 'The obvious purpose of the section is to promote the public interest by encouraging the settlement of criminal cases without the necessity of a trial.' (Pp. 60 and 102, respectively of 60 A.C., pp. 8 and 55 of 32 Cal.Rptr., pp. 416 and 463 of 383 P.2d.) Both Hamilton and Wilson were called upon to interpret and apply section 1192.4. In Hamilton the defendant, who was charged with murder, had offered to plead guilty if arrangements could be made to assure him of a life sentence. In Wilson the defendant had first offered to enter a plea of guilty to manslaughter and later to second degree murder, if the same were acceptable to the prosecution. In each of the cases, the offers were rejected by the prosecution. Upon the trial of the causes, however, the offers to plead guilty were admitted into evidence. The Supreme Court held, in both cases, that it was error to admit these offers into evidence. 2 Although there is language in Hamilton that '[b]y virtue of the provisions of section 1192.4 the earlier cases treating such offers to plea and pleas as admissions of guilt are no longer controlling' (60 A.C. p. 60, 32 Cal.Rptr. p. 8, 383 P.2d p. 416), it is obvious from a reading of the case that the reference is to pleas made pursuant to sections 1192.1, 1192.2 and 1192.3. In Hamilton we note the following language: 'By this section [1192.4], the Legislature has decided, just as it did many years ago in civil cases by prohibiting the introduction into evidence of offers to compromise (Code Civ.Proc. § 2078), that it is in the public interest that pleas of guilty to a lesser degree of crime shall not be admissible.' 3 (P. 60 of 60 A.C., p. 8 of 32 Cal.Rptr., p. 416 of 383 P.2d; emphasis added.) It is noteworthy, moreover, that in both Hamilton and Wilson, the Supreme Court recognized that it is the rule in California that, in the absence of statute, an offer to plead guilty (citing People v. Boyd, supra, and People v. Cooper, supra), and a plea of guilty later withdrawn, are admissible. (Citing People v. Ivy, supra; (and People v. Snell, supra, in Wilson only).)
It is also of particular significance that Ivy and Clay, which were decided after the enactment of the foregoing sections, 4 both involved cases of a withdrawn plea of guilty to a specific crime charged without reference to a lesser degree or lesser punishment. In Ivy, the defendant pleaded guilty to Court I of an information which charged him with two counts of selling heroin (violation of Health & Saf. Code, § 11500). The disposition of Count II was continued. Later the defendant withdrew his plea of guilty to Count I and pleaded not guilty thereto. The trial was had, and the defendant was found guilty as charged in both counts. During the trial the court below permitted evidence of the defendant's withdrawn plea of guilty to Count...
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People v. Brooks
...551, 39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705, and it was concluded that the objection of privilege was properly overruled. (People v. Quinn (1963) 36 Cal.Rptr. 233, 240-241, vacated and superseded by People v. Quinn, supra.) The Supreme Court in finding that the statements were involuntary had no oc......