People v. Ramirez

• Decision Date: 18 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. B102146,B102146
• Citation: 59 Cal.App.4th 1548,70 Cal.Rptr.2d 341
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,181 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Roberto RAMIREZ, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 341

70 Cal.Rptr.2d 341

59 Cal.App.4th 1548, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,181

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Roberto RAMIREZ, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B102146.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

Nov. 18, 1997.

Review Denied March 11, 1998.

[59 Cal.App.4th 1551] John Yzurdiaga, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and James William Bilderback II, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

JOHNSON, Acting Presiding Justice.

Roberto Ramirez appeals from the judgment entered upon his plea of guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine (Pen.Code, § 182). He contends the evidence of cocaine the police found in the trunk of his car should have been suppressed on grounds (1) the police illegally detained his vehicle without probable cause, and (2) he did not give a voluntary consent to the search of his car. We find both of appellant's arguments unpersuasive and therefore affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Evidence relating to the search and seizure of appellant's vehicle was taken at the hearing on a motion to suppress on March 13, 1996. The evidence established Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Dave Marzullo was conducting a wiretap operation pursuant to a federal court order on November 3, 1995. During this operation, Agent Marzullo intercepted a call which indicated 300 kilograms of cocaine were to be delivered to 2641 Jackson Street, a residence in Carson, Los Angeles County. Orange County Sheriff's Investigator Thomas Dove received information from agent Marzullo that 300 kilograms of cocaine were to be delivered to the 2641 Jackson address. Investigator Dove then related this information to Narcotics Officer Scott Dean McKnight, who was parked on the west side of the 2600 block of Jackson Street for 24-hour surveillance of the location.

Shortly after 10:20 on the morning of November 5, Officer McKnight observed appellant arrive at the 2641 Jackson residence in a blue Ford Tempo. Appellant drove his car into the driveway and behind the house until he disappeared from Officer McKnight's view.

Appellant stayed inside the house for 40 to 50 minutes, after which he drove away in the same car. Believing appellant possibly picked up a supply of cocaine from the Jackson residence, Officer McKnight began to follow appellant's car at a distance of 50 to 75 yards. Although Officer McKnight did not look at his speedometer or clock the speed of appellant's vehicle, he estimated the appellant's vehicle was traveling at a speed of 40 to 45 m.p.h. in a residential area with a posted speed limit of 25 m.p.h.

Officer McKnight advised over his police radio to other surveillance team members--Investigator Dove, Investigator Rodolpho Garcia, and Sergeant John Ortega--he believed the appellant's vehicle was speeding. He also related to Investigator Dove he thought appellant was "hauling ass." Investigator Dove had previously arranged with his sergeant to have a marked patrol unit in the area in the event any cars needed to be stopped. Upon learning appellant was getting away at a high speed from the Jackson residence, Investigator Dove relayed this information to Sergeant Ortega. When Sergeant Ortega saw appellant's vehicle turn northbound on Dominguez, he directed Los Angeles Sheriff's Sergeant Brown to make a stop of the appellant's vehicle in order to conduct a narcotics investigation.

After making the stop of the appellant's vehicle, Sergeant Ortega stepped up to the The trial court ruled the bare possibility appellant's vehicle contained narcotics did not constitute sufficient probable cause to stop appellant's vehicle. The court upheld the search, however, after finding the traffic violation constituted sufficient probable cause for stopping appellant's vehicle and once stopped, appellant consented to the search of his trunk.

                vehicle and asked appellant in Spanish if he would be "so kind and be cooperative and allow us to search the vehicle."   Appellant responded by saying "yes" in Spanish and handed his car keys to Sergeant Ortega.  Sergeant Ortega also instructed appellant to step out of his vehicle, and appellant stepped out to the sidewalk.  As appellant was standing on the sidewalk, Investigator Garcia talked with appellant while preparing a search consent form appellant could sign.  When Sergeant Ortega opened the trunk of the appellant's vehicle, he found 50 kilograms of cocaine wrapped in plastic bags.  When appellant saw the cocaine in his trunk, he immediately asked for an attorney and refused to sign the consent form Investigator Garcia had prepared
                

DISCUSSION

I. OFFICER BROWN'S STOP OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS JUSTIFIED IN THAT HE RELIED ON THE COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER OFFICERS TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE.

When officers lack either a search or arrest warrant, they may stop a person's vehicle only when they have sufficient probable cause to believe the person being detained has committed a crime. "[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.)

Appellant here does not argue Officer McKnight, upon seeing appellant drive his car from the Jackson Street residence, lacked sufficient probable cause to believe appellant committed a traffic violation. Officer McKnight testified Jackson Street was a residential street with a posted speed limit of 25 m.p.h. Furthermore, he testified that based on his nine years of experience as a police officer who issued traffic citations, he estimated appellant's vehicle was traveling at approximately 40 to 45 m.p.h. As these were the "specific and articulable facts" the officer personally witnessed and from which he could derive "rational inferences" appellant was breaking a traffic law, Officer McKnight clearly had sufficient probable cause to stop appellant's vehicle.

Appellant, however, argues that although Officer McKnight possessed sufficient probable cause to detain appellant's vehicle based on a traffic violation, Officer Brown, who actually made a stop of the appellant's vehicle, did not have knowledge of Officer McKnight's probable cause. Appellant further argues there is no evidence the knowledge of appellant's traffic violation reached either Investigator Dove or Sergeant Ortega because the term "hauling ass" Officer McKnight used to describe appellant's vehicle speed does not in itself indicate appellant was breaking a speed limit.

It is well settled in California officers can make arrests based on information and probable cause furnished by other officers. (Remers v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 659, 666, 87 Cal.Rptr. 202, 470 P.2d 11; People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017, 1021, 88 Cal.Rptr. 171, 471 P.2d 971; People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365, 374, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202; People v. Alcorn (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 652, 655, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 47; People v. Poehner (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 481, 486-487, 94 Cal.Rptr. 94; People v. Adkins (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 196, 198, 78 Cal.Rptr. 397.) These cases, however, require that when the first officer passes off information through "official channels" that leads to arrest, the officer must also show basis for his probable cause. In other words, the so-called Harvey- Madden rule requires the basis for the first officer's probable cause must be "something other than the imagination of an officer who does not become a witness." (Adkins, supra, at p. 198, 78 Cal.Rptr. 397.)

In Remers v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d 659, 87 Cal.Rptr. 202, 470 P.2d 11, the arresting officer arrested and searched the defendant's purse when he heard from other officers the defendant had been selling dangerous drugs before. The officer, however, did not know whether the basis of the information given him by other officers came from an informer or some other officer who actually observed the defendant make a sale of drugs. The court ruled the arresting officer lacked probable cause to search the defendant's purse because the prosecution failed to show the basis for the former officer's information. To explain its ruling, the court stated "the absence of such a requirement would allow a police officer to manufacture reasonable grounds to arrest while circumventing the necessity of pointing to 'specific and articulable facts' justifying his suspicions." (At p. 667, 87 Cal.Rptr. 202, 470 P.2d 11, quoting from Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.)

On the other hand, in People v. Poehner, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 481, 94 Cal.Rptr. 94, the border patrolmen seized a package of drugs thrown from the defendant's vehicle after the patrolmen learned from a fellow officer a blue Volkswagen which was owned by San Diego resident and which had a specified license number was crossing the border from Tijuana, but the suspect vehicle escaped from his view. The fellow officer suspected the defendants may have picked up narcotics from Tijuana because there was no reason why they would take a 70-mile detour route to enter San Diego through the Tecate border station.

The court ruled the border patrolmen had sufficient probable cause to stop and seize the package of drugs from the defendants because proof of probable cause the patrolmen received from the fellow officer was " 'factual rather than conclusionary', related 'specific and articulable facts', was the product of personal observations by the informing officer, and was reliable." (People v. Poehner, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 481, 488, 94 Cal.Rptr. 94, quoting from People v. Hamilton (1969) 71 Cal.2d 176, 179-180, 77 Cal.Rptr. 785, 454...