People v. Ramos
| Citation | 424 N.W.2d 509,430 Mich. 544 |
| Decision Date | 07 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 76612 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant. 430 Mich. 544, 424 N.W.2d 509 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., David E. McClernan, Pros. Atty., Thomas C. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Atty. Gen., Pros. Attys. Appellate Service, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.
State Appellate Defender Office by James Krogsrud, Asst. Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Joel Ramos was convicted of welfare fraud 1 and perjury 2 for filing a false application for aid to dependent children (ADC) assistance. 3 Ramos was sentenced to prison terms of two to four years for the welfare fraud and ten to fifteen years for the perjury.
Ramos asserts two grounds for reversing his perjury conviction. First, that the Social Welfare Act 4 does not authorize administration of an oath--an element of perjury--to ADC applicants. Second, that the requisite oath was not administered.
We hold that because administration of an oath is an element of perjury, and an oath was not administered to Ramos when he signed the application, his perjury conviction must be reversed. We therefore do not reach the question whether the Social Welfare Act authorizes the administration of an oath. We affirm the welfare fraud conviction.
Dealisa Husted, a Department of Social Services assistance payments caseworker, testified that she reviewed Ramos' application during an interview with Ramos on October 29, 1980. Ramos had followed DSS instructions and completed the application before the interview. Husted checked over the application with Ramos, witnessed his signature, and signed her name to indicate that she had conducted the review.
The application contained an "affidavit" 5 stating that the intentional omission of information or the providing of false information could result in prosecution for fraud or perjury. Husted acknowledged that she neither read this affidavit to Ramos nor administered an oath to him.
Following Ramos' conviction of welfare fraud and perjury, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion.
We agree with Ramos' contention that his signing of the application does not constitute the making of an oath.
Oaths take the form of a significant and readily observable act or acts that serve to impress upon the oath taker the importance of providing accurate information, and operate as objective evidence that the oath taker understands the importance of providing accurate information and is promising, under threat of severe penalties for lying, to be truthful. 6
The making of an oath is an element of perjury. 7 Under Michigan law, the form of an "oath" sufficient to constitute the basis for a perjury conviction requires more than a signature following a warning of the penalty of perjury. Section 1432 of the Revised Judicature Act sets forth the mode of administering oaths and provides for the oral administration and acknowledgment of the oath, coupled with the oath taker's raising of the right hand:
M.C.L. Sec. 600.1432; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1432. 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
RJA, Sec. 1432 was applied by this Court in People v. Mankin, 225 Mich. 246, 196 N.W. 426 (1923), where Mankin was convicted of perjury for making a false statement in an affidavit for a marriage license. Mankin claimed on appeal that his conviction should be reversed because he was not administered the "usual oath"--the words "so help you God" were omitted. While the Court rejected Mankin's claim, it recognized that the statute was applicable and requires some form of oral admonishment, which the oath taker receives and acknowledges with an upraised right hand:
(Emphasis supplied.) Mankin, supra, p. 252, 196 N.W. 426.
RJA, Sec. 1432 was applied by the Court of Appeals in Dawson v. Secretary of State, 44 Mich.App. 390, 205 N.W.2d 299 (1973). Dawson was arrested for drunken driving and refused to take a breath test. The arresting officer filed a report noting this refusal with the Department of State, which suspended Dawson's driver's license for ninety days. The statute 9 required that the reports be "sworn." Dawson appealed the suspension on the basis that, even though the officer had signed the report, he had not "sworn" to it--he had not raised his right hand and orally sworn.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Dawson's contention, holding that to constitute an "oath," the oath taker must raise the right hand and orally swear. "[T]he statutes involved herein clearly and unequivocally require the police officer's report to be sworn." 10 Because the officer did not fulfill the statutory requirement of raising his right hand and swearing to the report, the report had not been sworn, and the subsequent license suspension was invalid.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan applied RJA, Sec. 1432 to invalidate a chattel mortgage. In re Bennett, 223 F.Supp. 423, 427 (W.D.Mich., 1963). The statute providing for chattel mortgages required that they contain an affidavit. 11 While the chattel mortgage at issue in Bennett contained a notarized affidavit, signed by Bennett, stating that he had been sworn, he had not orally acknowledged, with upraised right hand, an orally administered oath. The affidavit was therefore invalid:
Bennett's signature and the notary's attestation of the signature were insufficient to constitute an "oath."
The State Bar of Michigan committee on the revision of the criminal code agreed that an "oath," as presently statutorily defined, requires more than a simple signature, even if the signature is made "under the penalties of perjury." As noted in People v. Kasparis, 107 Mich.App. 294, 300, 309 N.W.2d 241 (1981), "the drafters of the proposed criminal code were of the opinion that the terms 'oath' or 'false swearing' as presently used in the general perjury statute do not include statements made on official forms bearing notice that answers are made under the penalties of perjury." 12 In affirming Ramos' perjury conviction, the Court of Appeals relied on People v. Lumbard, 94 Mich.App. 16, 18, 287 N.W.2d 354 (1979), where the Court of Appeals had earlier held that an ADC applicant, by "intentionally fil[ing] an untruthful application for welfare assistance," had committed perjury. That decision did not, however, discuss or advert to RJA, Sec. 1432, Mankin, Dawson, or Bennett.
The statutory form of oath is designed to be sufficiently distinct so that it is recognizable by the oath taker and any observers 13 as a clear acknowledgment of the oath taker's assumption of responsibility for providing truthful information. Signing one's name--to correspondence, checks, credit card receipts--is a frequent and casual act. Signing one's name even to applications to obtain funds--for secured and unsecured loans, credit cards, insurance--is also commonplace. For perjury, a signature following a warning of the penalty of perjury is insufficient. The Legislature requires the administration of a distinctive form of oath.
The dissenting opinion asserts that because RJA, Sec. 1432, prescribing the form for administering oaths, is included in the Revised Judicature Act, it applies only to oaths made in "judicial proceedings." 14 This limitation is not, however, apparent in RJA, Sec. 1432, which in terms applies "in all cases." Further, Mankin (affidavit for a marriage license), Dawson (report of refusal to take a breath test), and Bennett (affidavit for a chattel mortgage), all applied RJA, Sec. 1432 to out-of-court oaths. 15
A number of sections of the Revised Judicature Act govern activity occurring outside "judicial proceedings." The provisions creating and providing for the administration of the State Bar and barring the unauthorized practice of law are included in the RJA. 16 These provisions govern all aspects of the practice of law, not merely those aspects occurring in the context of "judicial proceedings." A nonlawyer is not free to practice law as long as he does so outside of "judicial proceedings."
RJA, Sec. 1412, declaring that the Eastern Orthodox faith is a major faith, 17 RJA, Sec. 1405, governing the rights of third-party beneficiaries in contracts, 18 RJA, ch. 52, regarding assignments for the benefit of creditors, and former 19 RJA, ch. 54, concerning assignments of accounts receivable, are also not limited to "judicial proceedings."
RJA, Sec. 1432 applies in terms to "all cases in which an oath may be administered by law." (Emphasis supplied.) The penalty for violating...
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...an oath under MCL 600.1432, a person may "solemnly and sincerely affirm" to testify truthfully. MCL 600.1434; People v. Ramos, 430 Mich. 544, 549 n. 8, 424 N.W.2d 509 (1988) (describing MCL 600.1434 as one of the statutory exceptions to the general rule of MCL 600.1432). What is less clear ......
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...Ohio, and South Carolina, "have held that a verbal admonishment is not necessary to constitute an ‘oath.’ " People v. Ramos, 430 Mich. 544, 424 N.W.2d 509, 519 n.36 (1988) (collecting cases); Blackburn v. Motor Vehicles Div., 33 Or.App. 397, 576 P.2d 1267, 1269-70 (1978) (also collecting ca......
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