People v. Ramos

• Decision Date: 11 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 00SA159.,00SA159.
• Citation: 13 P.3d 295
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roberto RAMOS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

13 P.3d 295

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roberto RAMOS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00SA159.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

September 11, 2000.

Mark T. Adams, District Attorney, Thirteenth Judicial District, Derek Regensburger, Deputy District Attorney, Sterling, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Shannon Lyons, Deputy State Public Defender, Greeley, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice MARTINEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The People bring an interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.1 to contest the trial court's order suppressing evidence seized pursuant to an investigatory stop of the defendant's truck. We hold that the investigating officer retained the authority to detain the defendant and check the validity of the defendant's identifying information even though the officer expressed his decision not to issue the defendant a traffic citation. We therefore reverse the trial court's order suppressing the evidence seized during a search of the defendant's vehicle. However, we return this case to the trial court to complete the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress, to make findings of fact, and to make additional orders not inconsistent with this opinion.

I.

We begin our analysis with a brief review of the proceedings in the trial court and proceed to relate the facts of the case.

The sole witness at the hearing held on the defendant's motion to suppress evidence was Colorado State Patrol Trooper Leonard Fleckenstein. The officer's testimony at key points was imprecise, and examination of the witness by both counsel sometimes failed to elucidate the sequence of events in this case. In an apparent attempt to understand the sequence of events, the court interrupted the cross-examination of Fleckenstein to ask a few questions of the witness. After eliciting some responses pivotal to the court's resolution of the motion before it, the court effectively terminated the hearing to discuss the legal issue that had emerged from the testimony. This legal discussion with the attorneys evolved into the court's ruling on the motion. Thus, the parties did not finish their presentation and the court did not distinctly and separately make any formal findings of fact.

Our understanding of the facts in this case is based on inferences from the court's legal analysis and the actual testimony that supports the court's discussion. We recognize that a complete presentation of the relevant evidence after the return of this case to the trial court could result in some differences in the findings. This is particularly so because Fleckenstein testified that the entire encounter was recorded on videotape and we do not know whether that videotape will be introduced in the proceedings after this case is returned to the trial court.

On November 6, 1999, Fleckenstein stopped the defendant's truck on eastbound I-76. Immediately prior to the stop, Fleckenstein had observed the vehicle traveling approximately sixty miles per hour in a seventy-five mile per hour zone and weaving once over the shoulder line of the highway.¹ Fleckenstein explained to the defendant, Roberto Ramos, the reason for the stop. Ramos informed the officer that he was traveling from Las Vegas and was tired, having gotten very little sleep. Fleckenstein then requested Ramos's license, registration, and proof of insurance and asked the defendant to wait near the back of the truck. The officer and Ramos talked for a few minutes about several topics, including the defendant's travel plans. In the course of this initial contact, Fleckenstein determined that Ramos was not under the influence of alcohol. Fleckenstein then informed Ramos that he would not cite him for weaving. The officer then returned to his cruiser and ran a computer check on Ramos, which indicated that his license and registration were valid. While waiting for the computer check to conclude, Fleckenstein filled out a consent to search form.

Following the computer check, the officer returned to Ramos, handed back the license, registration, and proof of insurance, and informed the defendant that he was free to leave. Fleckenstein then asked for Ramos's permission to search the truck. According to the officer, Ramos gave both verbal and written consent to search. Investigation by the officer and, subsequently, a further search by a dog trained in drug detection led to the discovery of marijuana in Ramos's truck.

The trial court held that the officer's initial stop of the defendant was supported by reasonable suspicion, and thus was permissible. Relying on our decision in People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81 (Colo.1995), the court further held that Fleckenstein's authority to detain Ramos ended once Fleckenstein decided not to issue a traffic citation and expressed his decision to the defendant. The trial court concluded the suppression hearing before determining whether the defendant consented to a search of his truck and whether the ensuing search exceeded its proper scope. Because the trial court held that Fleckenstein illegally detained Ramos, the court suppressed the evidence and statements seized pursuant to the detention.

The prosecution brought this interlocutory appeal of the trial court's suppression order under C.A.R. 4.1.

II.

The trial court held that the defendant was illegally detained because, once Fleckenstein decided not to issue a traffic citation and expressed his decision to Ramos, the officer no longer had a legitimate basis for requesting identifying information and detaining the defendant while checking the validity of the defendant's information. We believe that the trial court's reasoning conflicts with our analysis in several prior cases.

Police officers are entitled under the Fourth Amendment to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed or is about to commit a crime, if the purpose of the detention is reasonable, and if the detention itself is reasonable when considered in light of the purpose for the investigatory stop. See People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Colo.1997)

; see also Redinger, 906 P.2d at 83; Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 509, 485 P.2d 495, 497 (1971). Objective standards of reasonableness guide our inquiry as to the propriety of an officer's decision to conduct an investigatory stop. See People v. Mendoza-Balderama, 981 P.2d 150, 157 (Colo.1999); Rodriguez, 945 P.2d at 1359-60. While the officer's subjective assessment of the facts may assist a court in arriving at an understanding of the situation confronting the officer at the time of the search, or may affect the officer's credibility, his or her subjective motives do not negate the propriety of an objectively reasonable search. See Rodriguez, 945 P.2d at 1360. We consistently have applied the objective reasonableness standard in determining the propriety of a search or seizure. See, e.g., People v. Daverin, 967 P.2d 629, 632 (Colo.1998); People v. Dumas, 955 P.2d 60, 63 (Colo.1998); People v. Altman, 938 P.2d 142, 146 (Colo.1997); People v. Hauseman, 900 P.2d 74, 78 (Colo.1995); People v. Weston, 869 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Colo. 1994); People v. Ratcliff, 778 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Colo.1989).

In Redinger, 906 P.2d at 84, we first considered the question "of the extent to which an official who has properly initiated an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle based on reasonable suspicion that the driver thereof has violated the motor vehicle law may detain and interrogate the driver after the official learns that the initial suspicion is ill-founded." A state patrol officer stopped Redinger because he did not see a license plate or temporary sticker on the rear of Redinger's vehicle. See id. at 82. After stopping the defendant's vehicle, and as he approached the vehicle, the officer observed a valid temporary registration plate displayed in the rear window. See id. The officer then questioned Redinger and requested his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. See id. As the defendant was gathering these documents, a small bag containing illegal drugs fell out of his pocket. See id. The officer seized the bag and arrested Redinger for possession of a controlled substance. See id.

The trial court granted Redinger's motion to suppress the drug evidence on the grounds that, after the officer determined that the defendant had not committed a traffic violation, he had no authority to detain the defendant and question him. See id. at 83. We upheld the trial court's decision because the purpose of the investigation had been completed. We stated that:

The basis for the principle that, consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a police officer may detain and interrogate a driver of a motor vehicle on less than probable cause is the conclusion that narrowly limited governmental intrusion into the conduct of motor vehicle drivers is warranted when a government official has reasonable grounds to investigate the that conduct. When, as here, the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished and no other reasonable suspicion exists to support further investigation, there is no justification for continued detention and interrogation of citizens.

Id. at 85-86 (emphasis added). Because the officer, prior to questioning Redinger, determined that a registration plate was properly displayed on the defendant's car, the basis for the reasonable suspicion that caused the investigatory stop dissipated and the purpose for the stop was satisfied. See id. at 86. Thus, the officer unjustifiably required the defendant to produce information. See id. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to the illegal detention was inadmissible. See id.

We have since returned to the issue presented in Redinger. In Altman, 938 P.2d at 143, two state patrol officers stopped the defendant's car after observing...