People v. Rasul

• Decision Date: 30 October 2014
• Citation: 995 N.Y.S.2d 380,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 07378,121 A.D.3d 1413
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Faqir RASUL, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

121 A.D.3d 1413

995 N.Y.S.2d 380

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 07378

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent

v.Faqir RASUL, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Oct. 30, 2014.

Carolyn B. George, Albany, for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Steven M. Sharp of counsel), for respondent.

Before: PETERS, P.J., STEIN, GARRY, EGAN JR. and CLARK, JJ.

Opinion

EGAN JR., J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Lamont, J.), rendered January 19, 2012 in Albany County, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.

Prior to assuming his patrol duties on the evening of February 10, 2011, State Trooper Gary Denise reviewed a criminal intelligence bulletin, commonly known as a be-on-the-lookout (hereinafter BOLO) alert, advising that a white 2008 Lincoln MKX bearing a certain license plate number might be traveling from New York City to the Albany County area. According to the BOLO, which was based upon an anonymous tip, the vehicle contained two black males—possibly armed with handguns—and a large quantity of cocaine. At approximately 9:30 p.m., while parked in a U-turn on the New York State Thruway south of the City of Albany, Denise saw a vehicle matching the description given in the BOLO pass by in a northbound direction. As Denise continued to observe this vehicle in his rear view mirror, he noted that the vehicle changed lanes without signaling. After radioing for backup, Denise initiated a traffic stop of the suspect vehicle.

Denise and responding State Trooper John Knoetgen approached the vehicle and instructed the occupants to roll down their respective windows; as the driver and defendant (the front-seat passenger) complied, Denise and Knoetgen each noticed the odor of burnt marihuana emanating from the vehicle. Both the driver and defendant were asked to step out of the vehicle, and the driver indicated that he and defendant had smoked marihuana prior to the traffic stop. An initial pat down of defendant's waistband area by Denise did not reveal any weapons, and a subsequent search of the vehicle by Denise and Knoetgen did not produce any weapons or drugs, leading the troopers to suspect that defendant and/or the driver might be carrying marihuana on their persons. Knoetgen then conducted a second pat down/search of defendant—to which defendant consented—and felt a hard object near the top of one of defendant's legs. Knoetgen mouthed the word “gun” to another trooper who had arrived on the scene and asked defendant if the object in question was a weapon. When defendant failed to respond, Knoetgen reached in and retrieved this object, which turned out to be a hard, rectangular-shaped item wrapped in what he described as a bodega-style bag. Defendant thereafter was arrested and, upon questioning at the State Police barracks, admitted that the object seized by Knoetgen was cocaine.

Defendant subsequently was charged in a single-count indictment with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. Following the denial of his motion to suppress, among other things, the cocaine seized during the traffic stop, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree—in satisfaction of both the underlying indictment and other pending charges—and, in accordance with the plea agreement, was sentenced to seven years in prison followed by two years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals, contending that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to suppress.¹

We affirm. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 requires the operator of a motor vehicle to “giv[e] an appropriate signal” when “mov[ing] right or left upon a roadway” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [a] ) and, more to the point, expressly mandates that such signals “shall be used to indicate an intention to ... change lanes” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163[d] ; see People v. Rice, 44 A.D.3d 247, 250–253, 841 N.Y.S.2d 72 [2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 992, 848 N.Y.S.2d 610, 878 N.E.2d 1026 [2007] ). In this regard, law enforcement personnel “may validly stop a vehicle based on probable cause that the driver committed a traffic violation, regardless of the [detaining] officer's underlying motivation or desire to conduct another investigation” (People v. Weishaupt, 118 A.D.3d 1100, 1102, 987 N.Y.S.2d 493 [2014] ; see People v. Cuffie, 109 A.D.3d 1200, 1201, 972 N.Y.S.2d 383 [2013], lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 1087, 981 N.Y.S.2d 673, 4 N.E.3d 975 [2014] ; People v. Ross, 106 A.D.3d 1194, 1195, 964 N.Y.S.2d 740 [2013], lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 1090, 981 N.Y.S.2d 676, 4 N.E.3d 978 [2014] ). “[P]robable cause exists for a traffic stop [when] an officer observes a defendant committing a traffic violation” (People v. Portelli, 116 A.D.3d 1163, 1164, 983 N.Y.S.2d 355 [2014] ). Here, given Denise's testimony that he observed the vehicle in which defendant was riding change lanes without signaling, his subsequent stop of the vehicle was entirely lawful (see People v. Horge, 80 A.D.3d 1074, 1074, 915 N.Y.S.2d 757 [2011] ; People v. Cheatham, 54 A.D.3d 297, 298, 863 N.Y.S.2d 407 [2008], lvs. denied 11 N.Y.3d 854, 872 N.Y.S.2d 76, 900 N.E.2d 559 [2008], 11 N.Y.3d 899, 873 N.Y.S.2d 275, 901 N.E.2d 769 [2008] ; People v. Eure, 46 A.D.3d 386, 386, 848 N.Y.S.2d 84 [2007], lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 810, 857 N.Y.S.2d 44, 886 N.E.2d 809 [2008] ).

As for the propriety of the subsequent pat down and/or search of defendant, “it is well established that [t]he odor of marihuana emanating from a vehicle, when detected by an officer qualified by training and experience to recognize it, is sufficient to constitute probable cause to search a vehicle and its occupants” (People v. Cuffie, 109 A.D.3d at 1201, 972 N.Y.S.2d 383 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Black, 59 A.D.3d 1050, 1051, 872 N.Y.S.2d 791 [2009], lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 851, 881 N.Y.S.2d 663, 909 N.E.2d 586 [2009] ; People v. Badger, 52 A.D.3d 231, 232, 859 N.Y.S.2d 140 [2008], lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 955, 863 N.Y.S.2d 139, 893 N.E.2d 445 [2008] ; People v. Pierre, 8 A.D.3d 904, 905, 780 N.Y.S.2d 389 [2004], lv. denied 3 N.Y.3d 710, 785 N.Y.S.2d 38, 818 N.E.2d 680 [2004] ; People v. Chestnut, 43 A.D.2d 260, 261–262, 351 N.Y.S.2d 26 [1974], affd. 36 N.Y.2d 971, 373 N.Y.S.2d 564, 335 N.E.2d 865 [1975] ; see also People v. Acevedo, 118 A.D.3d 1103, 1106, 987 N.Y.S.2d 660 [2014] ; People v. Horge, 80 A.D.3d at 1074, 915 N.Y.S.2d 757 ). Here,...