People v. Rice
| Decision Date | 23 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | 249. |
| Citation | 2007 NY Slip Op 06503,841 N.Y.S.2d 72,44 A.D.3d 247 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. WAYNE RICE, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
NARDELLI, J.P.
In this People's appeal, we are asked to determine whether the suppression court properly granted defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence on the ground that the stop of defendant's vehicle was unauthorized pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163, which, the court held, does not require the operator of a motor vehicle to signal every lane change.
Testimony educed at a suppression hearing held on September 7, 2005 reveals that at approximately 9:30 P.M. on February 10, 2005, New York City Police Officers Brennan and Hoffman were on routine patrol, in uniform, in an unmarked police car. Officer Hoffman was driving north on Amsterdam Avenue, in the vicinity of West 153rd Street, when he observed a silver Mazda, also proceeding north on Amsterdam Avenue, move from the left lane to the right lane without signaling. Officer Hoffman ran the vehicle's license plate number, learned it was a rental car, which had not been reported stolen, and then witnessed the Mazda move from the right lane of Amsterdam Avenue back into the left lane, again without signaling. Officer Hoffman, at that point, activated his emergency lights and pulled the vehicle over.
The officers exited their car; Officer Hoffman approached the driver's side of the Mazda while Officer Brennan approached the passenger side. Hoffman requested the driver produce his license and the vehicle's registration and, in response, the driver, defendant Wayne Rice, presented a valid New York State driver's license in his name. Defendant then fumbled around in the glove compartment before handing the officer a rental agreement in the name of Sylena Cole. Hoffman remarked to defendant that the agreement was in a woman's name, prompting defendant to search the glove compartment a second time, resulting in the production of another rental agreement in defendant's name. Officer Hoffman testified that defendant was acting nervous and offered no explanation for the duplicate agreements.
Officer Hoffman, upon examining the agreements, noted that most of the information on them, except the drivers' names, was identical, including dates, account number and invoice number. Hoffman further observed that the rental agreement in Sylena Cole's name was handwritten in places, whereas the agreement in defendant's name was typed or computer-generated, and that the car had been due back to the rental company two days prior to the stop. Hoffman, an experienced officer with approximately 400 arrests, and a trained member of the Narcotics Enforcement Unit, testified that although the computer check revealed the vehicle was not stolen, such information was not conclusive since he had been involved in many cases where a vehicle was stolen from a rental company lot and the theft was not discovered and reported for one or two weeks.
Hoffman, accordingly, believed something was wrong with the agreements and questioned defendant as to why there were two identical agreements in different names, but defendant again did not offer an explanation. Hoffman then asked defendant what he was doing in the area, to which he responded that he had come there to get a haircut, although upon further questioning, he did not know the name or location of the place where he intended to get a haircut, or how long he had been in the area. Officer Hoffman subsequently inquired if defendant had any weapons on him and, after defendant responded in the negative, the officer asked him to step out of the vehicle. As defendant complied, the officer noticed a knife clipped and hanging from defendant's left pants pocket. Hoffman grabbed the knife, a folding knife with a four-inch blade, possession of which is a violation of Administrative Code of the City of NY § 10-133.1
Officer Hoffman then proceeded to frisk defendant to ensure that he did not have another weapon, and discovered an abnormal, unnatural bulge in defendant's groin area. Hoffman asked defendant if he had anything on him, to which defendant replied in the negative. Hoffman checked the groin area again, and defendant stated that it was his "balls," and then started yelling that Hoffman was hurting him and that the officer was touching his private parts. Hoffman testified that he knew from his training, as well as his experience, that rental cars are often used to transport narcotics and that the contraband is often transported in the groin area as if it were part of the human anatomy. Hoffman, due to suspicions concerning the two rental agreements and defendant's possession of the knife, arrested defendant and brought him to the precinct. Once at the precinct, the officer recovered $1,849 from defendant's person and, after again feeling the unnatural bulge in defendant's groin area, took defendant to a private room, and directed him to remove his pants and underwear. After defendant complied, Officer Brennan recovered a clear plastic package the size of a tennis ball containing cocaine, which had been wrapped inside defendant's underwear.
Defendant presented no evidence at the suppression hearing and, after argument by counsel, the hearing court issued a decision, dated February 2, 2006, granting defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence on the ground that the traffic stop was unlawful. The hearing court credited the testimony of Officer Hoffman, including his observation of defendant's vehicle changing lanes on two occasions without using a signal. The hearing court concluded, however, that while the Vehicle and Traffic Law requires the use of directional signals on all occasions when a turn (a change of direction) is made, it does not require signaling when a lane change can be made in complete safety without such a signal. Accordingly, the hearing court found that the automobile stop in this case violated defendant's Fourth Amendment and New York State constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby compelling suppression of the fruits of that unlawful stop. We disagree and reverse.
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163, entitled "Turning movements and required signals," provides, in pertinent part:
Our analysis begins with the well-settled proposition that in matters of statutory interpretation, the courts are obligated to construe an enactment so as to effectuate the intent of the Legislature (Long v State of New York, 7 NY3d 269, 273 [2006]; Flores v Lower E. Side Serv. Ctr., Inc., 4 NY3d 363, 367 [2005]; McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92). Moreover, "[a]s the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" (Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]; Matter of Jansen Ct. Homeowners Assn. v City of New York, 17 AD3d 588, 589 [2005]).
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (a) consists of two sentences: the first defines the "turning movements" governed by the statute as: turning a vehicle at an intersection; turning to enter a private road or driveway; otherwise turning a vehicle from a direct course upon a roadway; and moving right or left upon a roadway. The second sentence imposes a duty to use the required signals, stating: "[n]o person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided" (emphasis added). It is clear from the foregoing that the word "so," in this context, is a plain reference to the four movements described in the first sentence of that subdivision.
Moreover, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (d) unequivocally requires that a turn signal "shall be used to indicate an intention to ... change lanes" (emphasis added). While the Legislature's employment of mandatory language, such as "shall" or "must," is not, by itself, conclusive, "such a word of command is ordinarily construed as peremptory in the absence of circumstances suggesting a contrary legislative intent" (People v Schonfeld, 74 NY2d 324, 328 [1989]; Matter of Janus Petroleum v New York State Tax Appeals Trib., 180 AD2d 53, 54 [1992]). Here, not only is there an absence of any contrary intent, but the absence of any such qualification or limitation is consistent with the wording of section 1163 (a), which imposes a duty to signal a lane change under all circumstances. Indeed, if a duty to signal a lane change existed only under certain circumstances, as found by the hearing court, then a harmonizing reference to such a limitation would have been included in section 1163 (d).
To further expound on the foregoing, it has been observed that a valuable guidepost is discerning the intent of the Legislature...
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