People v. Rathbone
| Citation | 40 N.E. 395,145 N.Y. 434 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. RATHBONE. |
| Decision Date | 09 April 1895 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from supreme court, general term, Third department.
Action by the people of the state of New York against William F. Rathbone to forfeit the office of notary public held by him. From a judgment of the general term (33 N. Y. Supp. 132) affirming the judgment of the special term (32 N. Y. Supp. 108) overruling a demurrer to the complaint, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Lewis E. Carr, for appellant.
T. E. Hancock, Atty. Gen., for respondent.
This action was brought to have the office held by the defendant as a notary public in and for the county of Albany, in this state, adjudged to have been forfeited, for the violation by him of that provision of the constitution of the state which prohibits a ‘public officer or person elected or appointed to a public office under the laws of this state’ from receiving ‘any free pass, free transportation, franking privilege, etc., from any person or corporation,’ or from making use of the same. The constitutional provision referred to is contained in section 5 of article 13 of the constitution of this state, which was adopted at the last general election, and which went into effect on January 1, 1895. The defendant demurred to the people's complaint, for not containing facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and the question for our determination is whether a notary public fills a public office, and is a public officer, within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
The argument for the appellant proceeds upon the theory that it could not have been intended to include such an office within a constitutional prohibition which obviously was designed to guard against the mischief of a person engaged in the discharge of the functions of a public office being influenced in his action by a consideration for the corporations giving to him free passes or privileges. That a notary public is public officer I do not think to be open to serious doubt. He is one of the ‘public officers of this state,’ concerning whom chapter 5 of the Revised Statutes treats, and he is therein placed ‘in the class of judicial officers.’ The office of a notary public must be filled by appointment of the governor of the state, with the consent of the senate. The appointee, before he enters upon the duties of his office, is required to take and to file an oath to support the constitution of the United States and of the state, and to faithfully discharge the duties of his office. 1 Rev. St. c. 5, tit. 6, art. 3. His term of office is fixed by law, and in chapter 3 of volume 2 of the Revised Statutes are contained ‘general provisions concerning the powers and djties of certain judicial officers,’ among whom are specified notaries public. All their powers are defined by law, and their acts, within their legitimate sphere, have force and solemnity, because having the express authorization and sanction of statute. The very designation of ‘notary public’ indicates a relation which the incumbent of the office sustains to the body politic. It is impossible to regard him as other than a public officer, and we are brought to the consideration of the proposition of the appellant that his could not be one of the public offices intended to be included within the constitutional provision in question.
I concede the difficulty-indeed, the impossibility-of seeing any reason why a notary public should be prohibited from accepting any privileges or favors from corporations. On its face, the proposition seems absurd, and it is not easy to see the wisdom or necessity of incorporating in our constitution a prohibition so unnecessarily comprehensive in its terms, when it would have been possible to specify the public officers who were probably aimed at. But it is plainly to be read there; and, for the very reason that it was possible to designate the public officers who should be restrained from accepting the favors of corporations, we are, perhaps, the less able to disregard it. In the construction of constitutional provisions, the language used, if plain and precise, should be given its full effect, and we are not concerned with the wisdom of their insertion. As adopted by the people, the intent is to be ascertained, not from speculating upon the subject, but from the words in which the will of the people has been expressed. To hold otherwise would be dangerous to our political institutions. The constitution is the basis upon which rests that complicated social organization called the ‘state.’ It must be...
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...be presumed that its framers understood the force of the language used and, as well, the people who adopted it" ( People v. Rathbone , 145 N.Y. 434, 438, 40 N.E. 395 [1895] ). Our Constitution is "an instrument framed deliberately and with care, and adopted by the people as the organic law ......
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...be presumed that its framers understood the force of the language used and, as well, the people who adopted it" ( People v. Rathbone, 145 N.Y. 434, 438, 40 N.E. 395 [1895] ). The Constitution is "an instrument framed deliberately and with care, and adopted by the people as the organic law o......
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...of functions within a necessarily short time frame are "plain and precise" and must be given "full effect" ( People v. Rathbone , 145 N.Y. 434, 438, 40 N.E. 395 [1895] ). "It must be presumed" that the "force of the language used" was "understood" by those who adopted the constitutional pro......
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