People v. Ravaux

• Decision Date: 16 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. D047496.,D047496.
• Citation: 142 Cal.App.4th 914,49 Cal.Rptr.3d 211
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Pascal G. RAVAUX, Defendant and Appellant.

49 Cal.Rptr.3d 211

142 Cal.App.4th 914

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Pascal G. RAVAUX, Defendant and Appellant.

No. D047496.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1.

August 16, 2006.

Bill Lockyer, Atty. Gen., David P. Druliner, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary W. Schons, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raymond M. DiGuiseppe, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Susan E. Cardine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Indio, CA, for Defendant and Appellant.

McINTYRE, J.

Pascal G. Ravaux pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell, with enhancements for two prior convictions for possession and one prison prior for failing to remain unincarcerated for five years after release from prison. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that he is entitled to one additional day of custody credit for time spent in police custody prior to his official booking. We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied Ravaux's motion and correctly determined the custody credits to be given. We affirm the judgment of the lower court.

BACKGROUND

On December 2, 2004 San Diego police conducted surveillance on Ravaux's residence based on a complaint regarding narcotics activities in the garage. Andrew Briers entered the garage, and then left the house about 45 minutes later. While fleeing from the police, Briers threw a bag containing 250.90 grams of methamphetamine out the window of his car. The police recovered the bag and returned to Ravaux's house where they found 4.18 grams of methamphetamine in Ravaux's pocket and 185.5 grams in a bag in the garage. Ravaux was arrested sometime after 9:30 p.m. on December 2 and was booked into the San Diego County jail at approximately 12:28 a.m. on December 3.

Ravaux was initially charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell. The information also alleged five prior convictions on similar charges and two prison priors. In exchange for a guilty plea to the underlying offense and admission of two of the prior convictions and one prison prior, the district attorney dismissed the remaining allegations against Ravaux. Before sentencing, Ravaux requested a continuance and moved to withdraw his plea, stating that he had not been adequately counseled by his attorney prior to the plea and that at the time of the plea he was suffering from medical problems that resulted in the plea not being given of his own free will. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Ravaux to ten years in prison. Ravaux was awarded 321 custody credits based on the date of his booking.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

A defendant may move the trial court to set aside a guilty plea for good cause at any time before the entry of judgment. (Pen.Code, § 1018; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) "Good cause" means mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress or any other factor that overcomes the exercise of free judgment and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. (People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566, 116 Cal.Rptr. 242, 526 P.2d 250.) The grant or denial of such a withdrawal motion is "within the sound discretion of the trial court and must be upheld unless an abuse thereof is clearly demonstrated." (People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793, 796, 114 Cal.Rptr. 596, 523 P.2d 636.) We are required to accept all factual findings of the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254, 69 Cal. Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) Here, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that Ravaux's plea was knowingly and intelligently entered of his own free will, unhindered by any medical condition and with adequate representation.

Ravaux indicated numerous times that he understood the consequences of the guilty plea and the rights he was waiving. He completed the plea form, attesting that he understood and accepted fully the plea agreement and the rights he was required to waive in order to accept the deal. Ravaux also attested on this form that he was sober and that his judgment was not impaired, and that he "had not consumed any drug, alcohol or narcotic within the past 24 hours." While entering his plea in front of the court, Ravaux was again apprised of his rights, informed of the consequences of a guilty plea, and advised by counsel. He acknowledged and answered affirmatively to each of the court's explanations before entering his plea. The only indication Ravaux was confused in any way, when he initially denied having any intent to sell the methamphetamine, was addressed by the court and counsel. This is inconsequential considering that no where else in the record is there any indication that Ravaux was impaired, confused or less than completely lucid.

Ravaux's medical condition was only brought up by counsel at the end of the hearing, and the court noted that he should continue to be monitored. At no time did his medical condition or demeanor indicate to his attorney or the court that he was intoxicated or confused to the point where his judgment was impaired. The sole evidence that his judgment was affected by medication is Ravaux's own assertions in support of his motion to withdraw the plea. These assertions were contrary to the position he took under oath at the time the guilty plea was given. They were also at odds with what the trial judge, who presided over both hearings, recalled about the demeanor and performance of Ravaux at the plea hearing. It is entirely within the trial court's discretion to consider its own observations of the defendant in ruling on such a motion. (People v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1254, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) The court may also take into account the defendant's credibility and his interest in the outcome of the proceedings. (Ibid.; People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 103, 219 Cal.Rptr. 731.) Here the trial court found, based on its own recollection of the previous hearing and the lack of credible evidence to the contrary, that Ravaux was not impaired to the point that his independent judgment was overcome at the time he entered the guilty plea. This determination was supported by substantial evidence.

Ravaux also contends that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because he did not receive adequate legal advice before entering it. However, Ravaux was allowed to consult with counsel prior to, and was represented by counsel at, the hearing when he entered the plea and assented to its terms. Prior to being represented by the public defender's office when the plea was entered, he was represented by a different attorney at his arraignment, several readiness conferences, the preliminary hearing, and the entering of the initial plea of not guilty. He retained different representation yet again before the change of plea hearing. Ravaux was represented by legal counsel during the entire process. The fact that he may have been persuaded, or was reluctant, to accept the plea is not sufficient to warrant the plea being withdrawn. (People v. Urfer (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 887, 892, 156 Cal. Rptr. 682.) "Guilty pleas resulting from a bargain should not be set aside lightly and finality of proceedings should be encouraged." (People v. Hunt, supra, 174 Cal. App.3d at p. 103, 219 Cal.Rptr. 731.) The trial court was acting completely within its discretion when it determined that Ravaux had been adequately represented and denied his motion to withdraw the plea.

Ravaux argues that comments made by the trial court upon being informed of his intention to make a motion to withdraw his guilty plea demonstrate bias against him. These comments are ambiguous at best. They appear to be an expression of frustration rather than bias on the part of the trial court resulting from Ravaux's request for a continuance almost two months after the guilty plea was entered. Because the trial court's ruling was supported by substantial evidence and not an abuse of discretion, the trial court's comments do not persuade us to overturn the judgment below.

II. Custody Credits

Anyone convicted of a felony is entitled to credit against his term of imprisonment for time spent in custody prior to sentencing. (§ 2900.5, subd. (a).) Whether a defendant is in "custody" for the purposes of section 2900.5 while detained by the police prior to being booked into jail is a matter of statutory interpretation, a question of law we review de novo. (Waterman Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1437, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 168.) We conclude that a defendant is not in custody within the meaning of section 2900.5 prior to being processed into a jail or similar custodial situation as described in section 2900.5, subdivision (a). The trial court was correct in calculating Ravaux's custody credits beginning when he was booked into jail rather than from the time of his arrest.

The plain language of section 2900.5 addresses only residential custody arrangements and makes no mention of detention, seizure or arrest by the police as being the type of custody included in the calculation of custody credits. Time spent prior to sentencing in ...