People v. Rawlins

Decision Date09 May 1991
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael RAWLINS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Pamela Peters, of counsel (Philip L. Weinstein, atty.) for defendant-appellant,

Myles L. Orosco, of counsel (Norman Barclay, with him on the brief, Robert M. Morgenthau, atty.) for respondent.

Before MILONAS, J.P., and ROSS, KASSAL, SMITH and RUBIN, JJ.

SMITH, Justice.

The issues in this appeal are the sufficiency of the court's charge on the credibility of witnesses and on circumstantial evidence. Because we believe the charge was deficient in both respects, we reverse.

The People's case established the following. On April 3, 1987 at approximately 3:30 A.M. uniformed security guards Joseph Lombardo and Patricia Rivera were dispatched by Holmes Protection Service to Rafael's Restaurant, located on West 54th Street in Manhattan, in response to a silent burglar alarm. Lombardo and Rivera arrived at the restaurant in separate vehicles approximately eight minutes later. Both officers observed the defendant ascending the staircase from the restaurant to the street level. The lighting conditions were good. Rivera testified that the defendant was carrying a beige box which he dropped under a tree 8 to 10 feet from the restaurant. As Lombardo radioed his office, he heard something metallic hit the ground. After dropping the box, the defendant proceeded to walk west on 54th Street toward 6th Avenue. Police Officers John Eterno and Daniel Hamill responded to the scene. Eterno observed the defendant walking quickly by him toward 6th Avenue. Upon inspection of the restaurant, the security guards determined that two window panes had been broken. Lombardo stated to the police, "I have a break-in. Grab him," pointing to the defendant. Defendant was apprehended by the police at the corner. He was not handcuffed at this point. Two silver dining knives were recovered from the defendant's fists. Lombardo recovered a locked cash box from a flower bed in front of the restaurant, showed it to the police and then both security guards positively identified the defendant who was then arrested.

The restaurant owner arrived on the scene, indicated that he had neither seen the defendant before nor authorized him to enter the restaurant after hours, identified the cash box and the knives as being from the restaurant (silver tray next to the door was missing some knives) and noticed it appeared that the knives had been used in an attempt to force open the cash box. The owner indicated that there was some other minor damage inside the restaurant and that no cash had been taken.

The defendant did not present any evidence.

The jury returned a verdict of guilt of burglary in the third degree, the sole count in the indictment.

The court's credibility charge provided in pertinent part:

Sometimes a witness in this case or in a case has a real interest in how the case comes out, a very strong psychological interest, a very strong emotional interest. Sometimes they don't. Even when somebody does have an interest, the law says there is no presumption that that person lied and the law also says a person who has no interest in how a case comes out tells the truth. In other words, some person may have a real interest in how the case comes out and be very truthful and the reverse may be true. That's all for you to decide.

If a person had a motive to lie, did he actually lie. Sometimes a person has a motive to lie but he doesn't lie.

* * * * * *

Now we had policemen testify. Let me assure you as we spoke about earlier during the trial that you are to treat each person as any ordinary person. The fact that somebody has a uniform or has a certain profession or is of a certain sex or whatever factor one may think of, doesn't necessarily mean that you have to automatically accept the testimony of that person, nor the flip side is you automatically reject that person's testimony.

You use the fact that somebody is a policeman, you can weigh that in determining his credibility--or security guards in this case. But you are not to automatically accept or reject that person's testimony.

Analyze and evaluate the testimony with your common sense and with some of the factors that I outlined before in assessing whether you believe that person. (emphasis added).

The defendant challenges the credibility charge on at least two grounds: (1) the misstatement of law that "the law also says a person who has no interest in how a case comes out tells the truth"; and (2) the instruction that the jury could consider that a person was a police officer or security guard in weighing his credibility.

The trial court's instruction that, as a matter of law, a disinterested witness tells the truth is erroneous and warrants reversal. See People v. Whitmore, 123 A.D.2d 336, 506 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1986). The People contend that this was simply a misstatement that was effectively cured by the remainder of the charge. We disagree. This misstatement of law was brought to the attention of the trial court which denied it had made the statement and left it uncorrected. The court's charge that the jury could consider the fact that the witnesses were police officers or security guards improperly conveyed to the jury that their testimony should be given greater weight than that of the ordinary witness. People v. Gadsden, 80 A.D.2d 508, 435 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1981); People v. Aiello, 58 A.D.2d 875, 396 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1977).

The court gave the following circumstantial evidence charge, in pertinent part:

In the law basically, there are two types of evidence they speak about. One is direct evidence and one is circumstantial evidence; and you may draw a conclusion that in this case you found both or you didn't find both, but there may or may not; perhaps, there is both.

The two evidence--two broad areas of evidence consist on the one hand direct and on the other hand circumstantial evidence. (sic). Direct evidence is essentially evidence you could see, observe, hear with your senses. Circumstantial evidence is not something that one observes; but from facts one can draw a conclusion. (sic).

For instance, if I have a knife in my hand, and I pierce the knife through somebody's heart; and a man over there sees me take the knife, pierce it in his heart. (sic) He sees the man fall down. He sees blood gushing from him and he sees the man expired, and sees me with that knife and then he sees me run away.

He comes to court and he testifies as to that. He is giving testimony as to direct. (sic). He saw it with his naked eye. Either you believe him or don't believe him in whole or in part; and do you believe him, actually, he saw me do it or whatever it is you have to believe him or you don't in whole or in part. (sic). That's direct evidence.

Circumstantial evidence consists of something else. The same fact situation but a difference. (sic). That man in the back didn't see me pierce the knife into his heart. (sic). When he came, he saw a dead body. He saw a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Franza v. Stinson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • July 1, 1999
    ...Fifth, the "circumstantial facts proved must exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis but guilt." People v. Rawlins, 166 A.D.2d 64, 68-69, 569 N.Y.S.2d 635, 638 (1st Dep't 1991) (quoting 1 Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions of the State of New York, Crim. Jury Instructions (N.Y.) ......
  • People v. Allan
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • April 22, 1993
    ...as that of any other witness. Again, an error of this nature has occasioned prior reversal of this trial judge (see, People v. Rawlins, 166 A.D.2d 64, 66, 569 N.Y.S.2d 635). All concur except KUPFERMAN, J., who dissents in a memorandum as KUPFERMAN, Justice (dissenting). I would affirm the ......
  • People v. Pegeise
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • July 8, 1993
    ...testimony." Both branches of this instruction have been cited as reversible error in the past (People v. Allan, supra; People v. Rawlins, 166 A.D.2d 64, 569 N.Y.S.2d 635). Also to be noted was the court's instruction to the jury that some of the evidence they heard at the trial was unimport......
  • People v. Nunez
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • April 21, 1992
    ...Wright, 174 A.D.2d 522, 571 N.Y.S.2d 470 [the "no inference" charge regarding a defendant's decision not to testify]; People v. Rawlins, 166 A.D.2d 64, 569 N.Y.S.2d 635 [credibility charge and circumstantial evidence charge].) Here, on the subject of defendant's decision not to testify, the......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT