People v. Reardon
| Decision Date | 14 January 2015 |
| Citation | 124 A.D.3d 681,1 N.Y.S.3d 289 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Anthony REARDON, appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
124 A.D.3d 681
1 N.Y.S.3d 289
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,
v.
Anthony REARDON, appellant.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Jan. 14, 2015.
Adam W. Toraya, New York, N.Y., for appellant.
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., District Attorney, Staten Island, N.Y. (Morrie I. Kleinbart and Paul M. Tarr of counsel), for respondent.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Rooney, J.), rendered June 10, 2009,
convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
In December 2007, the defendant's 22–day–old daughter (hereafter the infant) died after having been alone in a room with the defendant and the defendant's other child, who was 18 months old at the time. The infant's autopsy revealed five cranial fractures, significant subdural bleeding, and hemorrhages on the retina and optic nerves, all indicative of injuries consistent with shaken baby syndrome and blunt force trauma to the child's head. On the day of the incident, the defendant told law enforcement officials and emergency personnel conflicting stories—one in which
the infant was hit in the head with a flashlight by the older child and the other in which the infant fell from the top bunk of a bunk bed on which she had been sleeping with the defendant.
Approximately three weeks after the infant's death, in January 2008, while the defendant was leaving the New York City Office of Chief Medical Examiner, the car in which he was traveling was stopped by two police cars, carrying a total of four detectives. One of the cars had its lights activated and had stopped in front of the defendant's vehicle, preventing the vehicle from continuing. Two detectives then approached the defendant's car from each side and asked the defendant and his girlfriend to accompany them to the police station to answer questions. Both agreed, and the defendant was transported to the police station in the back of a police car. Upon arriving at the police station, the defendant was placed in a locked interview room and the police refused his request to speak with his girlfriend. Before any Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ) were administered, the police asked the defendant to recount what occurred on December 21, 2007. The defendant admitted that the story he had told about the older child hitting the infant with the flashlight was not true, and said that he fell asleep while cradling the infant in his arms while he was on the top bunk of a bunk bed. He then woke up to the infant's screams, and saw her face down on the floor. When asked whether he used drugs, the defendant indicated that he occasionally smoked marijuana.
After a short break, the detectives told the defendant that his story was not consistent with the autopsy results and told him that he had lied about the incident and about his drug use. In
response, the defendant told the police that the infant may have hit her head on the dresser or the bed when she fell from the bunk bed and that when he picked her up, her head hit the bed frame and he may have hit her head against the wall when he was picking her up and consoling her. The defendant also admitted that he had smoked crack cocaine on the day of the incident. The police then administered Miranda warnings, after which the defendant agreed to give a written statement.
The defendant was subsequently indicted and charged with one count of murder in the second degree. The defendant moved to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials on the ground that they were the product of custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. After a hearing, the suppression court determined that the defendant was not in custody when he made his oral statements at the police station, and denied his motion. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree.
Contrary to the suppression court's determination, the statements made by the defendant at the police station should have been suppressed as the product of custodial interrogation conducted without the benefit of Miranda warnings. "Mi...
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