People v. Reaves
| Decision Date | 16 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 352354,352348 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TURON JEROME REAVES, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FELIX ANTOINE JONES-HILL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC Nos. 19-000618-01-FC, 19-003777-01-FC.
Before: Thomas C. Cameron, P.J., and Kathleen Jansen and Elizabeth L. Gleicher, JJ.
Defendants Turon Jerome Reaves and Felix Antoine Jones-Hill were tried jointly, before a single jury. The jury convicted both defendants, as charged, of first-degree premeditated murder MCL 750.316(1)(a), three counts of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), second offense, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced Reaves to life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, parolable life terms for each assault with intent to commit murder conviction, and two to five years in prison for the felon-in-possession conviction, to be served concurrently, but consecutive to concurrent five-year terms of imprisonment for the felony-firearm convictions. The court sentenced Jones-Hill to life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, 20 to 30 years in prison for each assault with intent to commit murder conviction, and two to five years in prison for the felon-in-possession conviction, to be served concurrently, but consecutive to concurrent five-year terms of imprisonment for the felony-firearm convictions. Reaves now appeals as of right in Docket No. 352348 and Jones-Hill appeals as of right in Docket No. 352354. We affirm in both appeals.
Defendants' convictions arise from a drive-by shooting on Eight Mile Road in Detroit at approximately 2:00 a.m. on October 14, 2018. The four victims were in a Dodge Charger when a Ford Fusion pulled up along the driver's side of their vehicle and an occupant of the Fusion began shooting at the victims' vehicle. Toma Al-Saoor ("Toma"), the driver of the Charger, his brother Taef Al-Saoor ("Taef"), who was a backseat passenger, and Taef s girlfriend, Mireya Jurado, who was also in the backseat, were all shot. Taef died from his injury, a gunshot wound to the head. A fourth occupant, Rami Hadaya, who was the front-seat passenger, was not injured. The prosecution's theory at trial was that both defendants were occupants of the Fusion and they targeted the victims' vehicle in a case of mistaken identity. The prosecutor argued that Reaves was driving the Fusion and Jones-Hill was the shooter.
The prosecution presented evidence that the shooting was preceded by an earlier incident at the Ace of Spades strip club on Eight Mile Road in Detroit. Shortly before the two defendants left the club, Jones-Hill and a man known as "O" were involved in an altercation in the parking lot, during which Jones-Hill removed an assault rifle from the Fusion. A security guard intervened, kept Jones-Hill from raising his rifle, and directed "O" to leave. The guard also asked Jones-Hill to leave, but allowed him to go back inside the club to get Reaves. The security guard placed Jones-Hill's assault rifle on a backseat in the Fusion when Jones-Hill went inside the club. When the two defendants came back out, Jones-Hill asked the guard where "O" went, but the guard did not know. Reaves then got into the driver's seat of the Fusion and Jones-Hill got into the backseat, where the guard had placed the assault rifle. The two then left the club together in the Fusion. The prosecutor's theory at trial was that Jones-Hill intended to "settle a score" with "O" when they left the club.
The shooting occurred within minutes after defendants left the club's parking lot. The vehicle that "O" drove as depicted in surveillance recordings, was a gray Dodge Challenger; it was a unique, newer model with a wet paint finish and tinted windows. The victims were driving a similar looking Dodge Charger that night. The prosecutor argued that defendants mistook the victims' vehicle for the vehicle driven by "O."
Defendant Reaves conceded that he was at the club just before the shooting, but denied possessing any weapons or engaging in any argument at the club that night, or doing anything to actively assist in the charged crimes. Jones-Hill argued that from the security guard's observations, it was "O," not Jones-Hill, who was perceived as a threat and that there was no evidence identifying him as the person who shot at the victims' vehicle.
Defendants argue that the trial court improperly expressed its view of the evidence during preliminary comments when instructing the jury on aiding or abetting, which thereby deprived them of a fair trial. We disagree.
Initially, although only defendant Reaves objected to the trial court's comments, because the court's comments and ruling affected both defendants, the issue may also be considered preserved with respect to defendant Jones-Hill. See People v Griffin, 235 Mich.App. 27, 41 n 4; 597 N.W.2d 176 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds by People v Thompson, 477 Mich. 146, 148 (2007). As explained in People v Mitchell, 301 Mich.App. 282, 286; 835 N.W.2d 615 (2013):
"We review a claim of instructional error involving a question of law de novo, but we review the trial court's determination that a jury instruction applies to the facts of the case for an abuse of discretion." People v Dupree, 486 Mich. 693, 702; 788 N.W.2d 399 (2010). However, not all instructional error warrants reversal. Reversal is warranted only if" 'after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear' that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative." People v Lukity, 460 Mich. 484, 495-496; 596 N.W.2d 607 (1999), quoting MCL 769.26. "[T]he effect of the error is evaluated by assessing it in the context of the untainted evidence to determine whether it is more probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted without the error." Lukity, 460 Mich. at 495. The verdict is undermined when the evidence clearly supports the requested lesser included instruction that was not given to the jury. People v Cornell, 466 Mich. 335, 365; 646 N.W.2d 127 (2002).
Reaves has also raised constitutional arguments, which are reviewed de novo. People v Armstrong, 490 Mich. 281, 289; 806 N.W.2d 676 (2011).
When instructing the jury on aiding or abetting, the trial court stated:
Defendants argue that the emphasized comments improperly conveyed to the jury the court's view regarding disputed questions of fact, namely, that the shots were fired from the Fusion and that one occupant of the Fusion was the shooter and the other the driver.
Preliminarily, we agree with defendants that, when responding to the defense objection, the trial court inaccurately stated that it had qualified its remarks by stating that it was commenting on the prosecution's theory of the case. However, that in fact was the prosecutor's theory and the court did not misrepresent the evidence by stating that "the evidence as you've heard it had one occupant of the Fusion doing the shooting and the other apparently doing the driving." This remark was consistent with evidence presented at trial. We believe that defendants overstate the effect of the trial court's remarks as an expression of the court's view of the evidence. Viewed in context, the remarks were made as introductory comments intended only to explain why the court was instructing the jury on aiding or abetting-because, as the trial court indicated, evidence was presented that "one occupant of the Fusion [was] doing the shooting and the other apparently doing the driving." The court did not indicate that it believed that testimony or express any opinion whether the testimony implicated either of the defendants. In this context, the court's remarks cannot be viewed as endorsing the prosecutor's theory or usurping the jury's role as the fact-finder. See People v Young, 364 Mich. 554, 558-559; 111 N.W.2d 870 (1961).
Furthermore, to the extent that there was any perceived risk that the jury might interpret the court's remarks as an expression of the court's view of the evidence, the trial court adequately protected defendants' rights to a fair trial by instructing the jury to disregard any opinions that the jury believed the court may have expressed. Specifically, the court instructed:
My comments, rulings, questions and instructions are also not evidence. It is my duty to see that the trial is conducted according to the law and to tell you the law that applies to the case. However, when I make a comment or give an instruction, I am not trying to influence your vote or express a personal opinion about the case. If you believe that I have an opinion about how you should decide the case, pay no attention to that opinion. You are the only judges of the facts and you must...
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