People v. Redmond

• Decision Date: 21 April 1971
• Docket Number: Cr. 17639
• Citation: 94 Cal.Rptr. 543,16 Cal.App.3d 931
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Eugene REDMOND, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 543

94 Cal.Rptr. 543

16 Cal.App.3d 931

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Eugene REDMOND, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 17639.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

April 21, 1971.

As Modified April 22, 1971.

Helen E. Simmons, Pasadena under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch and Evelle J. Younger, Attys. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Bakke, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

AISO, Associate Justice.

Defendant Eugene Redmond pleaded 'not guilty' and 'not guilty by reason of insanity' to a charge of an assault with a deadly weapon and by means of a force likely to produce great bodily injury allegedly committed on January 20, 1968. (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (a).) Criminal proceedings were adjourned to permit defendant's hospitalization for 'present insanity' (Pen.Code, § 1368). Criminal proceedings were resumed and trial of the cause to the jury commenced on July 14, 1969.

When the jury found defendant guilty only of a simple assault (Pen.Code, § 240), a lesser and necessarily included misdemeanor offense, defendant through counsel and personally moved for a withdrawal of his 'not guilty by reason of insanity' plea. The trial court denied the motion in view of what it considered 'overwhelming' evidence before it that defendant was insane when he committed the offense. The insanity issue was then tried over defense objections and defendant was committed to a state hospital, the court observing that it did not feel that defendant was fully recovered. (Pen.Code, § 1026.)

Defendant appeals from the order of commitment ¹ entered upon a verdict finding him to have been insane at the time of the offense. His sole contention on this appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his insanity plea. We, therefore, limit our statement of the procedural and background facts to those relevant to the issue presented.

When the case was first called for trial on April 10, 1968, defendant's 'present sanity' (Pen.Code, § 1368) was questioned. Hearing on the issue was had and defendant was committed to the Atascadero State Hospital for care and treatment pending recovery of his sanity. Following certification of his recovery by the hospital authorities, defendant was returned to the court for trial. On April 7, 1969, the cause was called for the setting of a trial date. The trial judge (different from the one who presided at the 1968 section 1368 hearing) expressed his doubt of defendant's then present sanity. Pursuant to defense then present sanity. Pursuant to defense motion for appointment of psychiatrists under Evidence Code, section 730, ² the trial court appointed Doctors Frederick J. Hacker and Harold C. Deering to examine defendant and to report their findings as to: (1) defendant's present sanity, (2) his sanity as of the date of the crime charged, and (3) his 'ability to form specific intent' at the time of the alleged offense. On the basis of the reports of these doctors, the trial court again, on May 9, 1969, expressed its doubt as to 'defendant's present sanity.' It suspended criminal proceedings and referred defendant to 'Department 95 (the mental health department) pursuant to Section 5551 WIC.' Defendant was returned to the criminal court, however, as 'not accepted' by department 95. The reason for the nonacceptance is not specifically stated in the record. ³

The trial court then called the case 'for (present) sanity hearing and trial' on July 14, 1969. Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, the court read and considered the doctors' reports and the Atascadero Hospital reports and found defendant 'presently sane and ready to stand trial.' A third doctor, Dr. Marcus Crahan, was also appointed at this time to examine defendant and file a report under Evidence Code, section 730.

The victim of the assault could not be found at the time of trial and the People were compelled to present his testimony to the jury through the reading of portions of the reporter's transcript of the preliminary hearing.

The trial took place prior to the rendition of either People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370 or People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372 by our Supreme Court, and court and counsel proceeded upon the premise that an assault with a deadly weapon was a specific intent crime.

To establish that defendant's mental illness at the time of the offense diminished his capacity to entertain the requisite specific intent, the defense called Doctors Hacker and Deering as defense witnesses. Dr. Hacker, however, testified that he could not render an opinion as to defendant's diminished capacity because he thought defendant was insane at the time of the crime by M'Naughten standards and that diminished capacity therefore was immaterial. The testimony of Dr. Deering, who testified before Dr. Hacker, was not as pointed but it included a statement that in his opinion defendant was insane by both 'medical and legal standards.'

Defense counsel in moving for withdrawal of the 'not guilty by reason fo insanity' plea frankly stated that it was his client's wish to accept criminal punishment consisting of a county jail sentence, which at most was six months, ⁴ rather than an indefinite noncriminal commitment to a mental hospital. The trial court expressed its view that such a disposition would result in defendant's getting a criminal record, albeit for a misdemeanor, in face of 'overwhelming' or 'very, very strong' evidence in the record that defendant was not criminally responsible for the crime because of his insanity. It stated to defense counsel that under the circumstances, defense counsel (in its opinion) was not acting in the best interests of his client. It also expressed concern about compliance with Penal Code, section 1367 providing: 'A person cannot be tried, adjudged to punishment, or punished for a public offense, while he is insane.' It denied defendant's motion to withdraw his insanity plea and ordered the issue to be tried over defense objections.

When a jury, different from the one which tried the issue raised by the 'not guilty' plea was impaneled, defense counsel rested without producing any evidence. The People likewise rested. The defense then requested the judge to advise the jury to return a verdict finding defendant to have been sane. The trial court, caught in this unenviable situation, denied the request. The record reflects that the trial court felt that its duty went beyond acting as a mere umpire in a contest of wits between counsel and that it would be held derelict in performance of its duties if it did not insist upon a full development of the facts so that justice to both defendant and to the People could be achieved. In pursuance of this goal, the trial court called upon Doctors Deering and Crahan and Dr. John Paul Walters, who apparently had examined defendant at one time, as the court's witnesses. Dr. Hacker was out of town and unavailable. The court conducted the direct examination of these medical witnesses. The deputy district attorney and defense counsel cross-examined them.

For the avowed purpose of proving that defendant was suffering from a delusion in stating to the doctors and in the course of his testimony at the 'not guilty' phase of the trial that the reason for his arrest was due to his relations with the mother of a Los Angeles police officer rather than because of the crime charged, the prosecution put on the lady and police officer concerned to rebut the truth of such statements.

Mrs. Linda Jackson testified that she had known defendant from the latter part of 1964. Defendant had worked for her as a salesman in her furniture store at one time, but she had to fire him. He proposed marriage stating that he wanted to marry and to have children, but she had rejected him as a suitor. In February 1967, she appeared in court and testified against him upon a charge for which she had caused defendant to be arrested. She thereafter never saw defendant until after his arrest on the present charge.

Officer Jackson testified that he had arrested defendant in February 1967 for an offense of which his mother was the victim. The only reason he happened to be the arresting officer was that he was on routine patrol assigned to the area. He had also arrested defendant in July 1967, but this was in connection with a matter in no way involving his mother. He never threatened to 'get' defendant nor did he arrange for any fellow police officers to harass him. He knew of no 'relationship' between his mother and defendant.

Upon the trial court's assurance that defendant's taking the witness stand would not be a waiver of defense objections to the denial of his motion to withdraw his insanity plea and to the trial of the insanity issue, defense counsel acquiesced in defendant's insistence that he testify and tell his side. The testimony in many parts is not coherent so that it is difficult to summarize all parts of it. In essence, he admitted having been at the bar where the assault was alleged to have occurred, having raised his glass 'with no intention of striking the individual,' having been asked by the bartender to leave the premises, and having been arrested on the street about 45 minutes later. He said that he had worked for Mrs. Linda Jackson and that they had talked about getting married and about adopting children since they could not have children of their own. The night before his arrest, he had asked a police officer on the street if it would be all right to go to the police station to talk to Officer Jackson concerning $3,000 he claimed the officer's mother owed him. He was arrested by the policeman with whom he had had the foregoing conversation on the night prior to his arrest. He assumed that Officer Jackson had called the other officer to arrest him. The...