People v. Renchie

• Decision Date: 06 March 1962
• Docket Number: Cr. 4002
• Citation: 201 Cal.App.2d 1,19 Cal.Rptr. 734
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Monroe RENCHIE, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 734

19 Cal.Rptr. 734

201 Cal.App.2d 1

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Monroe RENCHIE, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 4002.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

March 6, 1962.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1962.

Hearing Denied May 2, 1962.

Richard C. Lewis, Oakland, for appellant, under appointment of the District Court of Appeal.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., John S. McInerny, Derald E. Granberg, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

DEVINE, Justice.

Appellant was convicted of four armed robberies, all committed in the City of Oakland on January 20, 1961 and January 22, 1961. Victim of the first robbery was an employee of a liquor store; victims of the second and third robberies were an employee of a hot dog stand and a customer; and victim of the fourth robbery was an employee of another liquor store. Defendant denied commission of the crimes and presented the defense of alibi, testifying himself as to his presence in San Francisco at the times of the robberies, and being supported in his testimony by one witness as to the times of all three instances of robbery (the second and third robberies, at the hot dog stand, are referred to as a single instance of robbery, so far as time is concerned, because the two victims were robbed at almost the same moment), and by two other witnesses as to the time of the third robbery. At least two of the witnesses had seen a picture of appellant in the police department's 'mug file.' Appellant was on parole at the time of the commission of the robberies, and police exhibited his picture to one of his friends, who then informed appellant that the police were looking for him, and appellant reported to his own parole officer, who in turn brought him to the Oakland police. Thereafter, a line-up was arranged, at which the four victims of the robberies identified the defendant. They looked through a one-way mirror and reported their identification to police officers. They testified that each spoke in a soft voice to the officers so that no other victim could hear the identification, which was done by giving the number in the line-up, which in every case was the third from the left. One of the witnesses, however, had testified at the preliminary hearing that he had identified the robber by exhibiting three fingers to the officers, an action which he did not remember at the time of the trial. The evidence connecting defendant with the offenses was exclusively identification by visual inspection. There was no circumstantial evidence, such as possession of a weapon, possession of loot, or possession by defendant of clothing similar to that worn by the robber.

The defense took two courses: First, a testing by cross-examination of the identification made by the victims, and, second, a positive defense of alibi. It is appellant's contention that he was prejudiced by two errors in the course of the trial, the first being the ruling of the court that he was not entitled to the production of notes made by the police relating to their conversations with the identifying witnesses, because the demand for such notes was not made until the time of trial; and the second, that the district attorney, in his argument to the jury, made use of the prior conviction of appellant of robbery, some three years earlier, not for the allowable purpose of impeachment only, but for the purpose of showing that the prior offense was committed, as were two of the present ones, at a liquor store, and that this was unallowable. We agree that there was error in both instances.

During cross-examination of the victim of the first robbery, Peterson, a witness who conceded that identification had been difficult because in his robbery the robber had worn dark glasses and a hat pulled low over his forehead, defense counsel requested notes made by the inspector and police officer at the time of the original interview with the witness or the report in which these notes were incorporated. The district attorney announced that he had a summary of what the inspector wrote down but did not have any original notes and the district attorney conceded that the summary which he had may have come from what the witness had said to the inspector or from other reports. Defense counsel wished to approach the bench for the purpose of making a further request but the court would not permit this and ruled, in effect, that the demand was untimely, because inspection should have been sought prior to the trial. The court agreed to rule on the production of anything which the district attorney had readily available, but that 'if counsel [the district attorney] says that's all he has, why, that is all.' Defense counsel, it appears, understood this ruling to mean that all that would be produced upon his demand was, at the most, what was in the district attorney's file. He asked if the district attorney had a certain 'blue crime report' commonly made by the Oakland Police Department, and the district attorney replied he did not know what was meant by 'blue' (blue report, no doubt), and that he could do no more than give what he had in the courtroom. The court agreed with this. Defense counsel requested that if officers should come in with the description theretofore given by the witness Peterson, the witness might be recalled, and the court replied, '[W]e'll cross that bridge when we come to it.'

During the cross-examination of the other three victims, defense counsel demanded only the notes which the district attorney had in the courtroom, evidently in deference to the court's ruling. Later, defense counsel referred to the 'blue crime report' in cross-examining a police inspector, and the inspector testified that there is such a report, which is usually kept in the office of the police department, that the report contains the description given by the victim of the robbery to the interviewing officer, and that the district attorney's office can get it, and usually does, but in this case had not asked for it. At this point, the court interjected that how the district attorney chooses to try his case is his business and that the defense should proceed with the issues in the case.

The court was in error in ruling that demand came late when made at trial. Production of notes or reports, such as those referred to here, may be demanded either at trial or before trial. (People v. Estrada, 54 Cal.2d 713, 716, 7 Cal.Rptr. 897, 355 P.2d 641; Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 423, 424, 340 P.2d 593; People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d 1.) Indeed, the holding that the accused may have certain discovery before trial (Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 704, 312 P.2d 698) was a consequence of the earlier determination of the right of the accused to production of certain documents in the prosecution's possession at the time of trial (People v. Riser, supra; see Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent? (1961) 49 Cal.L.Rev. 56, 75-79).

A brief consideration of the points made by the Attorney General on this subject is in order. He suggests that the situation is analogous to one wherein the defense moves for a continuance to secure evidence or to procure a witness, which the court may deny, in its discretion, upon the ground that such evidence could have been...