People v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 09 June 1997
• Citation: 658 N.Y.S.2d 433,240 A.D.2d 517
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Christopher REYNOLDS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 433

658 N.Y.S.2d 433

240 A.D.2d 517

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Christopher REYNOLDS, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

June 9, 1997.

Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, (Monroe A. Semble, of counsel), for appellant.

James M. Catterson, Jr., District Attorney, Riverhead, (Mark D. Cohen, of counsel; Daniel Dutton and Peter S. Smith on the brief), for respondent.

Before MANGANO, P.J., and O'BRIEN, RITTER and McGINITY, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Weissman, J.), rendered August 30, 1993, convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), burglary in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, arson in the third degree, and attempted burglary in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of the branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by him to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contentions, there was probable cause for his arrest. The evidence clearly establishes that the defendant was arrested for attempted burglary, and that the arrest was not a sham. "[N]or could it be made so because the police were naturally more anxious to question defendant about the [murder], a crime newer and graver than the [attempted burglary] charge" (People v. Cypriano, 73 A.D.2d 902, 903, 424 N.Y.S.2d 214; see, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89; People v. McCoy, 239 A.D.2d 437, 657 N.Y.S.2d 437 ). A defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated even if the purpose of a lawful arrest is to question him about another offense (People v. Cypriano, supra; see also, People v. Acuna, 145 A.D.2d 427, 535 N.Y.S.2d 407; People v. McCoy, supra).

The defendant also failed to establish that the statements made by him to detectives should have been suppressed because he was intoxicated at the time. For a statement to be suppressed because the defendant was intoxicated when it was made, the degree of inebriation must have risen to the level of mania (People v. Schompert, 19 N.Y.2d 300, 279 N.Y.S.2d 515, 226 N.E.2d 305, cert. denied 389 U.S. 874, 88 S.Ct. 164, 19 L.Ed.2d 157; see also, People v. O'Keefe, 191 A.D.2d 464, 594 N.Y.S.2d 265; People v. Roth, 139 A.D.2d 605, 527 N.Y.S.2d 97). There was no clear evidence at the hearing that the defendant had reached that stage (see, People v. O'Keefe, supra; People v. McClaney, 135 A.D.2d 901, 521 N.Y.S.2d 894).

The manner in which the defendant was treated by the police does not suggest that the statements were the product of coercion. The interrogation of the defendant was not continuous but, rather, had sufficient breaks. The defendant was offered food, but he declined to eat. He asked for, and was given, water. The defendant was also offered cigarettes, which he accepted. He was permitted to use the bathroom and was given an opportunity to place a telephone call to his sister, during which he was overheard stating that he killed the lady up the block and had confessed to the police. Consequently, based on the totality of the circumstances,...