People v. Rhoads
Decision Date | 08 June 1990 |
Docket Number | No. E005925,E005925 |
Citation | 270 Cal.Rptr. 266,221 Cal.App.3d 56 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Raymond Willard RHOADS, Defendant and Appellant. |
After the jury found defendant guilty of possession of more than 28.5 grams of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11378, Pen.Code, § 1203.073 subd. (b)(2)) and being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf.Code, § 11550), the trial court found true the allegations that defendant suffered a prior felony conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c) and that defendant committed the violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378 while out on bail, within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.1. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for three years on the violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378, six months, to run concurrent, on the violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550 and an additional three years under Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 subdivision (c), for a total of six years in state prison.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A PRIOR CONVICTION UNDER HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTION 11370.2, SUBDIVISION (c)
We first address defendant's contention that a guilty plea, on which sentence has not yet been imposed, does not constitute a "conviction" under Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c). 1 Defendant cites no direct authority to support this contention but instead relies on a single case from another jurisdiction. 2 We find, based on our review of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c) and cases which have interpreted the term "conviction" in similar contexts, that this contention lacks merit. We hold that for purposes of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c), "conviction" means the ascertainment of guilt, which occurred in this case when defendant voluntarily entered his plea of guilty to the prior offense.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Defendant pled guilty before a magistrate in San Bernardino County on February 11, 1987 to one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11378). Defendant committed the present violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378 on March 15, 1987. Defendant was not sentenced on the February violation in San Bernardino until April 1, 1987. Defendant asserts, based on these facts, that the February guilty plea cannot be a prior conviction under Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c) because (1) defendant could have withdrawn the plea under Penal Code section 1018 prior to pronouncement of judgment and (2) a guilty plea entered pursuant to Penal Code section 859a does not constitute "an ascertainment of guilt" until the plea is accepted in superior court, where a factual basis is taken and sentence is imposed.
The essence of defendant's argument is that a guilty plea, standing alone, has no legal significance until subsequent events occur. In this case the operative event, according to defendant, is acceptance of the guilty plea in superior court, prior to its withdrawal, combined with the pronouncement of judgment. The rationale offered by defendant to support this argument is that "nonsensical results" might occur if an enhancement were imposed based upon a plea which was subsequently withdrawn or rejected. We find that the truly "nonsensical results" would occur under defendant's interpretation of the term "conviction." If defendant's interpretation were accepted, a person could commit and plead guilty to any number of violations within the purview of the statute, but so long as sentencing did not occur, the mandatory three-year enhancement would be avoided. The Legislature certainly did not intend to benefit a repeat offender such as defendant based solely on the fortuity of the timing of sentencing.
The possibility that a plea might be withdrawn or might be rejected does not, in our opinion, affect the validity or effect of the plea unless and until withdrawal or rejection occurs. 3 A guilty plea which might be withdrawn or rejected is directly analogous to a felony conviction which might be reversed on appeal. The legal effect of that conviction remains intact pending appeal and may be charged as a prior felony in a subsequent indictment (see People v. Clapp (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 197, 200, 153 P.2d 758) or used to impeach a witness at trial (see People v. Braun (1939) 14 Cal.2d 1, 6, 92 P.2d 402, where the Supreme Court held that use of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes was proper even though after the trial where impeachment occurred, the prior conviction was reversed on appeal). There is no reason to afford a guilty plea, which might be invalidated as the result of subsequent events, any less efficacy than that afforded to a conviction pending appeal.
We find that the operative event for determining whether defendant has suffered a prior "conviction" for purposes of imposing an enhanced sentence under Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c) is the ascertainment of guilt which, in turn, occurs when defendant pleads guilty. In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the term "conviction" has no fixed definition and has been interpreted by the courts of this state to have various meanings, depending upon the context in which the word is used. The equivocal nature of the term was recognized in Boyll v. State Personnel Board (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1070, 1073-1074, 194 Cal.Rptr. 717, where the court stated,
Our conclusion comports with the purpose of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c) and other criminal statutes which impose more severe penalties for second and subsequent offenses. That purpose is to deter repetition of the criminal conduct. (See People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d 826, 833, 210 Cal.Rptr. 623, 694 P.2d 736, which acknowledges that the purpose of Penal Code section 667 is "the deterrence of recidivism.") In this context, i.e., statutes which impose more severe penalties for second and subsequent criminal offenses, "conviction" means the ascertainment of guilt, whether by plea or verdict. ,"
In People v. Johnson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 316, 258 Cal.Rptr. 347, the court relied upon the foregoing cases, among others, to support its conclusion that the phrase "has been convicted" as used in Penal Code section 667 means the ascertainment of guilt by jury verdict. The Johnson court rejected the contention that the defendant had not suffered a conviction for purposes of Penal Code section 667 where a jury had found defendant guilty but defendant had not been sentenced at the time the second offense was committed. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that (People v....
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