People v. Rice

• Decision Date: 08 October 2020
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 19CA0014
• Citation: 478 P.3d 1276
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brian Allen RICE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

478 P.3d 1276

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Brian Allen RICE, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 19CA0014

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division I.

Announced October 8, 2020

Rehearing Denied December 10, 2020

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Lisa Weisz, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON

¶ 1 Defendant Brian Allen Rice (Rice) challenges the district court's order of restitution on grounds that (1) it was entered more than ninety-one days after his conviction without a showing of good cause and (2) he did not proximately cause the harm to the victim's vehicle. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case with instructions to modify the amount of restitution awarded.

I. Background

¶ 2 On August 7, 2018, Rice pled guilty to one count of first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft, display of unlawful license plates, under section 18-4-409(2)(h), (3)(a), C.R.S. 2019. He was also charged with two counts of the same, based on other aggravating factors: retaining possession for more than twenty-four hours and causing five hundred dollars or more in property damage. See § 18-4-409(2)(a), (e). But those additional charges were dismissed as part of Rice's plea agreement. The district court entered a restitution order in the amount of $3056.82 on November 14, 2018, ninety-nine days after Rice's sentence.

II. Deadline to Determine Restitution Under Section 18-1.3-603(1)(b)

¶ 3 No one disputes that the district court held the restitution hearing ninety-three days from entry of Rice's sentence and issued a restitution order ninety-nine days after entry of his sentence. We conclude that a district court must enter restitution within ninety-one days from sentencing, but that implied good cause to extend that deadline was shown in this case.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 4 The interpretation of the restitution statute is a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Ortiz , 2016 COA 58, ¶ 15, 381 P.3d 410. The issue of whether good cause exists to extend the ninety-one-day deadline to determine restitution under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), C.R.S. 2019, is one we review for an abuse of discretion. People v. Harman , 97 P.3d 290, 294 (Colo. App. 2004). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misconstrues or misapplies the law. People v. Weeks , 2020 COA 44, ¶ 11, ––– P.3d ––––.

B. Analysis

¶ 5 Restitution is part of the district court's sentencing function in criminal cases. People v. Vasseur , 2016 COA 107, ¶ 16, 409 P.3d 524. Under the Colorado restitution statute, if a district court decides at sentencing to defer its decision regarding the appropriate amount of restitution, "the specific amount of restitution shall be determined within the ninety-one days immediately following the order of conviction, unless good cause is shown for extending the time period by which the restitution amount shall be determined." § 18-1.3-603(1)(b).

¶ 6 At Rice's sentencing, the district court left open the specific amount of restitution for ninety-one days. Rice argues that under People v. Turecek , 2012 COA 59, ¶¶ 13-15, 280 P.3d 73, section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) requires a court to enter a restitution order within this time frame. We agree.¹

1. Ninety-One Day Deadline

¶ 7 Divisions of this court have recently disagreed over whether the court or the prosecutor "determine[s]" restitution under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) and (2).

¶ 8 Weeks , ¶¶ 12-13, held that section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) ’s language of "determin[ing]" restitution refers to the district court's obligation to order a specific amount within ninety-one days, unless good cause is shown. Because the record in that case contained no explanation of good cause as to an eleven-month delay from conviction to entry of the restitution order, Weeks vacated the restitution order.

¶ 9 People v. Perez , 2020 COA 83, ¶¶ 18-26, 36, ––– P.3d ––––, on the other hand, held that section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) only obligates the district court to consider restitution as part of the defendant's judgment of conviction, but does not necessarily impose a deadline of ninety-one days on the court. This interpretation, Perez reasons, avoids a circumstance when the district court must decide restitution within ninety-one days under subsection (1)(b), and the prosecutor may take the same full ninety-one days to determine the restitution amount it will seek under subsection (2).

¶ 10 Although we understand the rationale underlying Perez , we determine the statutory interpretation in Weeks to be more persuasive.² Even though the district court did not enter Rice's restitution order within the required ninety-one days from entry of conviction, as we explain next, we conclude that good cause was shown to extend the deadline under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b).

2. Good Cause

¶ 11 Section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) permits a court to extend the time period for determining restitution if "good cause is shown." Our reading of this provision is where we depart from Weeks and determine that a showing may be implied. We instead adopt the reasoning of People v. Knoeppchen , 2019 COA 34, ¶ 25, 459 P.3d 679, to the extent that division observed that "nothing in the statute explicitly requires the court to make an oral or written finding of good cause; rather, the statute merely requires good cause to be shown ." (Emphasis added.) We acknowledge that the Weeks majority rejected Knoeppchen ’s analysis of section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) on grounds that such analysis was dicta, as "the division ultimately determined that the defendant's motion to vacate the restitution order was time barred." Weeks , ¶ 16.

¶ 12 Regardless, subsection (1)(b) requires a showing of good cause, not an explicit finding, and we share Knoeppchen ’s reluctance to read additional requirements into the statute when such words are not there. See People v. Roddy , 2020 COA 72, ¶¶ 25, 26, ––– P.3d –––– (assuming without deciding that the ninety-one day period applies to court to determine restitution, district court's use of "extenuating circumstances" constituted good cause to enter the order after that time period because the victim continued to incur and pay attorney's fees); see also People v. Rojas , 2019 CO 86M, ¶ 11, 450 P.3d 719 ("We may not add or subtract words from [a] statute, but instead read the words and phrases in context, construing them according to the rules of grammar and common usage.").

¶ 13 Such a showing under the statute is also, in our view, not time-restricted. See Knoeppchen , ¶ 26 (finding "no authority ... that requires the showing (or finding) of good cause to occur at any particular time"). We therefore reject Rice's argument that the district court needed to affirmatively grant an extension within the original statutory time period to enter a valid restitution order after ninety-one days had passed.

¶ 14 With that said, we underscore the requirement that implied good cause must be shown or demonstrated in the record for us to uphold a district court's tardy restitution order. See Harman , 97 P.3d at 294 ; see also Weeks , ¶ 27 (reversing the district court's eleven-month late restitution order where "[t]he trial court's ruling did not explain, and the record does not show , what good cause, if any, existed for that inordinate delay") (emphasis added). We will not simply assume good cause exists by virtue of the district court entering an order following the ninety-one day period. See, e.g. , Weeks , ¶ 17 ("To the extent that the division in Knoeppchen said that an order extending a prosecutor's time to seek restitution always constitutes good cause under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), we respectfully decline to follow the decision.") (emphasis added).

¶ 15 Here, the record reflects that good cause was shown to extend the time period for determining restitution under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b). The timeline of filings, actions, and hearings that followed Rice's conviction reflects a trial court that was proactively attending to the unresolved restitution issue, but ultimately missed the ninety-one-day deadline by mere days due to docket scheduling.

• The parties did not agree on the amount of restitution, so the district court left it open for ninety-one days.

• Three days after the conviction entered, the prosecution filed its motion for restitution, seeking $3605.34 payable to the victim for automobile repairs. Six days after the conviction entered, the district court granted the motion before Rice filed his objection.

• Rice filed his objection to the prosecution's proposed restitution fifty-two days after his conviction, leaving the district court with less than half of the presumptive ninety-one-day period.

• Four business days after Rice's objection, the district court placed the matter on its upcoming setting docket.

• At the setting hearing, the court attempted to expedite the restitution issue by inquiring whether counsel "could talk and maybe reach an agreement."

• When this attempt was unsuccessful, the court was left with fifteen days to schedule a restitution hearing, preside over the hearing, and enter a restitution order.

• The court held the restitution hearing two days past the presumptive deadline and, after taking the matter under advisement, entered its final order eight days late.

Such a procedural history constitutes a showing of implied good cause.

¶ 16 The district court kept up with the filings in this case and repeatedly took action; it did not let the issue of restitution languish unresolved for months. Cf. id. at ¶¶ 6-8, 10, 28 (reversing restitution order where more than seven months elapsed without the district court acting on the defendant's filed objection). Given the circumstances in this case, we will not vacate an order of restitution where,...