People v. Rincon

• Decision Date: 03 March 1992
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Amelio RINCON, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 293

581 N.Y.S.2d 293

177 A.D.2d 125

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Amelio RINCON, Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

First Department.

March 3, 1992.

Lynne DeLisi, of counsel (Kathleen E. Fay, with her on the brief, Robert M. Morgenthau, attorney) for appellant,

Lawrence Fleischer, of counsel (Daniel J. Gotlin, attorney) for defendant-respondent.

Before SULLIVAN, J.P., and ROSENBERGER, WALLACH, ROSS and SMITH, JJ.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

This appeal presents the issue of whether a visitor to a courthouse impliedly consents to the search of a paper bag inside his waist pouch after he triggers the alarm of a metal detector and thereafter places the pouch on a table for the officer's inspection.

On August 17, 1989, court officers Rahor and Parascandolo were assigned to the security checkpoint in the lobby of the Criminal Courts Building at 100 Centre Street in Manhattan. Pursuant to the regulations of the Unified Court System, the lobby was equipped with a metal detector designed to intercept weapons and other contraband brought into the courthouse. The regulations required officers assigned to the security post to instruct those persons to be scanned to "remove all metal objects from their persons and place them in a designated container." According to the regulations, "all briefcases, handbags, knapsacks ... [must] be opened and searched in view of the owner." A conspicuously posted lobby sign stated, "All persons entering this area must pass through a detector device and submit to personal search if warranted." Another sign on a table adjacent thereto directed those about to enter the detector to remove all metallic objects from their pockets before entering.

At approximately 3:30 that afternoon, defendant entered the courthouse and walked through the metal detector. As he passed, the detector's alarm sounded, signalling that defendant was carrying a metal object. In accordance with the security regulations, Officer Parascandolo instructed defendant to empty his pockets and to remove and open his waist pouch and place it on the adjacent table. Defendant complied and passed through the detector without triggering the alarm.

Officer Parascandolo then turned his attention to the waist pouch. Inside, using a hand wand, known as a cubaton, to probe its contents, Parascandolo found a rock, beeper and three by four inch folded down paper bag. Parascandolo removed the paper bag and asked, "what [is] in the bag", but defendant did not reply. Since weapons such as "knives", "a gun" or "razor blades", as well as "hypodermic instruments" could have fit into the bag, Parascandolo could not safely ascertain the nature of its contents by squeezing it. Officer Parascandolo looked inside the bag and found a plastic bag containing a quantity of cocaine. Defendant was arrested.

After he was indicted on one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, defendant moved to suppress physical evidence, which included the cocaine, pouch, a rock and a beeper. A suppression hearing was held at which the foregoing facts were established. The hearing court, crediting the testimony of Officers Rahor and Parascandolo and finding that the Unified Court System regulations upon which Parascandolo relied, were appropriate, necessary and proper, upheld the cubaton search of the pouch but concluded that the search of the paper bag inside was "overbroad" and exceeded the acceptable "routine and minimal invasion into [defendant's] personal privacy." It ruled, therefore, that defendant could not be held to have consented to the search, which was not supported by either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that the paper bag contained contraband. In that connection, the court also noted that other objects in defendant's possession were "[a]rguably" "probable triggers" of the detector's alarm. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to suppress. The People appeal, having certified to the insufficiency of their proof as a result of the suppression. We reverse.

The Fourth Amendment, as is well settled, protects individuals against " 'unreasonable governmental intrusion' 'wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy." ' " (People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557, 561, 446 N.Y.S.2d 906, 431 N.E.2d 267, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 not against all searches. The reasonableness of the "governmental intrusion" is measured by a balancing of society's interest in protecting the public against the individual's right to be free from governmental interference. (People v. Dean, 79 A.D.2d 555, 556, 433 N.Y.S.2d 803.) Courts, applying this balancing test, have recognized that society's interest in protecting the public in airports and in courthouses and other government buildings is so compelling as to justify a limited search of all those seeking entry into those areas. In light of this compelling governmental interest, the interdiction against searches without probable cause or reasonable suspicion is relaxed to the extent of allowing a minimally intrusive search uniformly applied to all those seeking entry. (See, e.g., People v. Price, supra, 54 N.Y.2d at 563, 446 N.Y.S.2d 906 ["It is common knowledge that all airline passengers and their luggage are subject to being searched and that these searches * * * are reasonable even when contraband is discovered in areas where a person would normally have a reasonable expectation of privacy."]; see, also, People v. Luna, 73 N.Y.2d 173, 178, 538 N.Y.S.2d 765, 535 N.E.2d 1305 ["[R]outine detentions, inspections and questioning at the border may be conducted without any particularized justification"]; Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1233 [regulations requiring that one...