People v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 23 April 1974
• Citation: 77 Misc.2d 1081,354 N.Y.S.2d 868
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Michael ROBINSON, Defendant.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 868

354 N.Y.S.2d 868

77 Misc.2d 1081

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Michael ROBINSON, Defendant.

Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County.

April 23, 1974.

Nicholas Ferraro, Dist. Atty. (Martin Goldman, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel), for the People.

Leroy B. Kellam, St. Albans, for defendant.

AARON F. GOLDSTEIN, Judge:

This is a Motion by Defendant for a Preliminary Hearing on a Prosecutor's Misdemeanor Information charging Criminal Trespass and Petty Larceny. Defendant was originally arraigned on a Felony complaint charging Burglary in the Third Degree, and the case was presented directly to the Grand Jury without any preliminary Felony Hearing. The Grand Jury, pursuant to Sec. 190.70, subd. 1 CPL, directed that a Prosecutor's Information be filed, which direction has been followed. After arraignment thereon, Defendant requested a Preliminary Hearing, relying on Section 170.75 CPL. The District Attorney, in opposition, has tendered a one page statement relying almost completely on the decision of my learned colleague, Judge M. Marvin Berger, in People v. McClafferty, 73 Misc.2d 666, 342 N.Y.S.2d 208 (N.Y.C. Criminal Court, 1973). (The District Attorney also cites Sections 100.10, 100.50, 190.75, and 70.10 CPL. The complete irrelevance of these sections to the District Attorney's position is so obvious no comment is necessary other than to observe that if the object of the People's one page argument is to impress this Court by a simple citation of multiple statutory sections, that object has had a reverse impact.)

The McClafferty case represents apparently the only reported decision in this state dealing with this novel, interesting, and important question, and the views of Judge Berger, set forth so cogently, and obviously the product of study, merit a response in depth, particularly since this Court feels constrained to disagree with the conclusion there reached.

It is clear that all parties are in accord on one fundamental point. Sections 190.70, subd. 1 and 170.75 CPL, read literally, and giving full effect to the ordinary meaning of the explicit words there employed, Mandate a Hearing on a Prosecutor's Information, even where such Information is issued pursuant to a Grand Jury direction after the Grand Jury has itself heard the case. Thus, Sec. 190.70, subd. 1 CPL offers to the Grand Jury the option, after hearing a case, to direct that, in place of a Felony Indictment, a Prosecutor's Misdemeanor Information be filed. Sec. 170.75 CPL, in language which on its face is unambiguous, directs that on every Prosecutor's Information (other than Gambling and Multiple Dwelling violations) a Defendant must, upon request, be granted, in New York City, a Preliminary Hearing 'to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that he committed such misdemeanor.' No distinction is made between Prosecutors' Informations which reach the Criminal Court as the result of a Grand Jury direction, and other Prosecutors' Informations. All such Informations are covered equally, and those of us who have been reared on the most elementary principle of statutory interpretation that where legislative language is clear there is no room for judicial legislation under the guise of reaching a presumed legislative intention which runs contrary to the explicit language, would rest our decision on that ground and have done with it.

However, Judge Berger, reaching a conclusion contrary to the express statutory language, has resorted to another principle of statutory construction, a principle which is often misunderstood. To quote from McClafferty:

'. . . section 111 of (McKinney's) Statutes notes that the courts, in a proper case, may depart from literal construction and sustain the legislative intention although it is contrary to the literal letter of the statute. 'In considering the necessity of literal construction of a statute or the propriety of a departure therefrom, it must be kept in mind that the intent of the Legislature is the primary object sought in the interpretation of statutes; and that whenever such intention is apparent, it must be followed in construing the statute. While such intention is first to be sought from a literal reading of the act itself, and the words and language used, giving such language its natural and obvious meaning, it is generally the rule that the literal meaning of the words used must yield when necessary to give effect to the intention of the Legislature." 73 Misc.2d 677, 342 N.Y.S.2d 219.

The court's quotation from McKinney's (McKinney's Consol.Laws of New York, Book 1, Statutes, § 111) is, of course accurate, but it suffers an important omission. It would be well at this point to add an additional quotation, appearing in the very same section of McKinney's Statutes, albeit on a later page:

'However, the rule that the literal language of a statute is not always controlling in the interpretation thereof is a principle to be applied With extreme caution, and only where the plain intent and purpose of the statute would otherwise be defeated. The doctrine permitting departure from literal construction does not authorize the courts to disregard arbitrarily the plain import of the language used in a statute.' McKinney's, Supra, pp. 230--231. (Emphasis added)

Thus, McClafferty relies on only one half of the rule stated in McKinney's, neglecting the crucial qualification quoted Supra. The half-rule as quoted in McClafferty represents a commentator's capsule comment as to the state of our case law. Standing alone it is misleading and inaccurate, and is saved only by the commentator's later insertion of the critical qualification.

An examination of our case law, with particular reference to the very cases cited in support of the half-rule quoted in McClafferty, reveals that one of the cardinal principles of statutory construction remains constant: where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the judiciary has no choice but to follow the legislative language--any remedy remains the exclusive province of the legislature. The difficulty arises as the result of an apparent exception to the basic rule, and exception which, upon careful evaluation, proves to be not an exception at all, but simply a logical application of the rule regarding unambiguous statutory language. The rule in its totality may be stated as follows: where the statutory language is clear there is no room for judicial legislation, but where the language, taken at its face value, produces a result which is Absurd, or manifestly unjust, or productive of great public injury, or is in direct contravention or derogation of the statutory purpose, then this in itself creates an ambiguity which then, and only then, allows judicial interpretation in order, if possible, to remove the absurdity. The cases cited in the very portion of McKinney's quoted in McClafferty clearly support this view: Application of Barry Equity Corp., 276 App.Div. 685, 96 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1950)--literalness held absurd; Metropolitan Life v. Durkin, 195 Misc. 1040, 91 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Sup.Ct., Sp.Term, N.Y.Co., 1949)--literal interpretation defeats statutory purpose and leads to absurdity; Packer v. Board of Standards, 62 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sup.Ct., Bx.Co., 1946)--Ambiguity resolved in favor of interpretation which would not produce injustice or lead to absurdity; Matter of Hogan v. Culkin, 18 N.Y.2d 330, 274 N.Y.S.2d 881, 221 N.E.2d 546 (1966)--literalness would thwart manifest legislative policy; In re Meyer, 209 N.Y. 386, 103 N.E. 713 (1914)--literalness would produce inequality or injustice; People v. Lacombe, 99 N.Y. 43, 1 N.E. 599 (1885)--literalness produces absurdity; Onondaga Commercial Dry Well Corp. v. 150 Clinton St., 28 A.D.2d 71, 281 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1967)--literalness destroys entire purpose and intention of statute; Ewen v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 208 N.Y. 245, 101 N.E. 894 (1913)--literal construction absurd.

Thus, the crux of the issue here presented is whether a literal reading of Sec. 170.75 CPL, requiring a Preliminary Hearing on all Prosecutors' Informations, including an Information filed by direction of the Grand Jury, produces an absurdity, or defeats the legislative policy and purpose, or produces an unwarranted hardship or injustice, to such an extent as to render ambiguous that which on its face seems clear. In this connection, it is appropriate to examine the nature and function of a Preliminary Hearing, together with its place in the administration of criminal justice in New York City. McClafferty rightly observes that the fundamental objective of the New York statutory Misdemeanor Preliminary Hearing is to establish whether there is reasonable cause to hold the Defendant for trial. CPL 170.75, subd. 1. But conceding this elementary point, does this dispose of our problem? Actually, in cold pragmatic terms, the Preliminary Hearing serves a far broader function, a function which reaches Federal constitutional levels, a function which simply cannot be ignored. There is a tendency in some quarters to view Defense counsel demanding a Preliminary Hearing as somehow engaging in devious, sly conduct, seeking some unholy advantage, if only to thwart the ends of justice. The truth is otherwise. See Cipes, Criminal Defense Techniques, Vol. 1, Chapter 8, where the author points out the perfectly legitimate Discovery aspects of the Preliminary Hearing, and suggests that Defense counsel who waive these Hearings often sacrifice the interests of their clients. And can anyone gainsay that to the extent that any Defense counsel appropriately serves the interests of any one client accused of crime, he serves the interest of all of us? But, it will be argued, the Preliminary Hearing is not a Discovery device, and to use it for Discovery is to pervert its basic function. This is true as far as it goes, but consider the pertinent observations of the United States Court of Appeals in a recent decision, Coleman v. Burnett, 155...