People v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 01 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | B220185 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERIC MARK ROBINSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PA063541)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Shari Silver, Judge. Affirmed.
Lisa M. Bassis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and Robert S. Henry, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Eric Mark Robinson (defendant) appeals from his conviction of one count of criminal threats and two counts of felony resisting arrest. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding him mentally competent to stand trial and in allowing him to represent himself during pretrial proceedings. He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of resisting arrest, that his removal for disruptive behavior during sentencing violated his constitutional and statutory rights to be present during a critical stage of the proceedings, and that the trial court made sentencing errors requiring reversal. We conclude that none of defendant's contentions has merit, and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged in count 1 with making felony criminal threats to his brother Craig Robinson (Craig), in violation of Penal Code section 422,1 and misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer (count 2), in violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1). The information was later amended to add two counts of felony resisting an executive officer by means of threats and violence (Officer Nelson Fong in count 3 and Officer Mark Richardson in count 4), in violation of section 69. The amended information also alleged as to counts 1, 3, and 4, for purposes of the "Three Strikes" law,2 that defendant had suffered a 1993 conviction of manslaughter. The information also alleged the 1993 manslaughter conviction as to count 1, for purposes of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The same allegation as to counts 3 and 4 was later stricken upon motion of the People, as it had been erroneously charged. Prior to the verdicts, the trial court dismissed count 2 upon motion of the prosecutor.
On April 16, 2009, when jury trial was first scheduled to begin, defendant requested self-representation or new counsel and the trial court held a closed Marsdenhearing.3 After hearing from defendant and his counsel, the trial court denied defendant's request for a new attorney, gave defendant the appropriate forms to apply for self-representation, and set that motion for hearing the following day.
The next day, defendant continuously interrupted the court by arguing his innocence and criticizing his brother and the state of the evidence against him. This behavior coupled with the events of the day before, led the trial court to declare a doubt regarding defendant's mental competence to stand trial. The court appointed two mental health experts pursuant to Evidence Code section 730, adjourned the proceedings until May 19, 2009, and continued defendant's motion to proceed in propria persona to the same date.
At the May 19 hearing, defense counsel submitted the issue of competence on the reports of the two experts, psychologist Haig Kojian and psychiatrist Kory Knapke, without presenting other evidence or argument. The two experts came to different conclusions. Dr. Knapke found defendant competent to stand trial, while Dr. Kojian was of the opinion that defendant was not competent to proceed. The trial court found Dr. Knapke's report more persuasive and concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. The proceedings resumed.
After continued discussions regarding self-representation, defendant persisted in his desire to represent himself. He filed an initialed and signed written advisement and waiver of his right to counsel ("Faretta Waiver").4 After giving defendant additional time to confer with his attorney and explaining the disadvantages of self-representation, the trial court granted the motion and continued the trial to a later date.
Over the following three months, defendant filed several pretrial motions, one to set aside the information, one for discovery, two motions to suppress evidence, and motions to reduce the charges to misdemeanors, to strike prior convictions, to changevenue, for transcripts, and for a Boykin/Tahl5 hearing. Defendant also made several oral motions, including a request for advisory counsel. The discovery motion was granted. All other motions were denied.
On August 17, 1009, just before the voir dire began, defendant moved for a continuance. The following day, before the trial court ruled, defendant asked the court to terminate his pro. per. status and appoint stand-by counsel, Mr. Avery, to represent him. The trial court granted the request, but a few days later, defendant changed his mind, interrupted the prosecutor's opening statement, and once again requested self-representation. The trial court denied the motion and Mr. Avery represented defendant throughout the remainder of the trial.
The jury found defendant guilty of counts 1, 3, and 4, as charged. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the allegation that he had a prior manslaughter conviction in 1993. The trial court heard the evidence and found the allegation true.
At the October 29, 2009 sentencing hearing, defense counsel requested additional psychological testing to prepare for sentencing, but did not press for a ruling after defendant stated that he would not cooperate in such an evaluation. As his counsel was addressing the court regarding sentencing, defendant interrupted with comments or objections. After several such interruptions and a warning from the trial court, defendant was removed from the courtroom until after pronouncement of sentence.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 13 years 8 months, and ordered a DNA test, as well as the payment of mandatory fines and fees. As to count 1, the court selected the high term of three years and doubled it to six years under the Three Strikes law. The court found that defendant committed counts 3 and 4 against separate victims, Officer Richardson and Officer Fong, and thus sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of eight months (one-third the two-year middle term), doubled to 16 months under the Three Strikes law. The court added five years for the prior conviction under section 667, subdivision (a). Defendant was awarded a total of 421custody credits, which included 281 actual days in custody and 140 local conduct credits. Defendant was then brought back into the courtroom to hear his total sentence and his appeal rights.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
On January 22, 2009, defendant and his older brother Craig had one of their frequent arguments after consuming alcohol. Defendant said that he was going to get a gun or a bullet and shoot Craig and the "old lady," referring to Helen Robinson, their 89-year-old mother, in whose home they both lived. Defendant then threw milk or water in Craig's face, and Craig walked out of the house to call the police. Craig believed that defendant was capable of shooting him because defendant had threatened to shoot Craig in the past; had hit Craig and others; and had fatally shot another brother in 1992.
After learning from Craig about the threat, the presence of a shotgun, a BB gun, and Mrs. Robinson in the house, the responding officers observed defendant in the driveway. When the officers asked to speak to him, defendant belligerently said "no," went into the house, and locked the door. Additional officers and a SWAT unit arrived soon after they were summoned. Defendant refused several demands to come out with his hands raised and instead yelled profanities and said he did not trust the police department.
While inside defendant called the United States Marshall's office at the federal courthouse and spoke to Special Deputy Marshal George Gammon, the court security officer. Defendant told Deputy Gammon that he would not surrender to the police and that the front door was barricaded. Defendant said, Defendant refused to allow his mother to leave the house, but did allow Deputy Gammon to speak to her by telephone. Deputy Gammon asked about weapons, and she told him there was a rifle under the bed. Eventually, defendant moved the chair so that his mother could leave, but he remained in the house.
Defendant remained barricaded in the house for approximately 90 minutes as SWAT and other officers waited outside. Sometime after Mrs. Robinson was allowed toleave the house defendant emerged from the back door. SWAT supervisor Sergeant James Bilodeau, and SWAT officers Nelson Fong, Mark Richardson, and Rick Anzaldo all testified about the ensuing events. Officer Fong had told defendant, and Defendant did not comply. Defendant seemed agitated and angry, and aggressively lurched toward the officers with clenched fists, despite their continued commands to stop and get down on the ground.
As defendant advanced toward them, Officer Anzaldo warned defendant that if he took another step forward he would get "zapped," and may be hurt. Defendant continued forward, and Officer Anzaldo...
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