People v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 20 November 2008
• Docket Number: No. 105206.,105206.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. William ROBINSON, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

902 N.E.2d 622

232 Ill.2d 98

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. William ROBINSON, Appellant.

No. 105206.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

November 20, 2008.

Rehearing Denied January 26, 2009.

Michael J. Pelletier and Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defenders, Linda Olthoff, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg and Noah C. Montague, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Chief Justice FITZGERALD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Defendant, William Robinson, was charged with six counts of first degree murder, but was ultimately convicted of involuntary manslaughter and felony unlawful use of a weapon in the circuit court of Cook County. Involuntary manslaughter is generally a Class 3 felony with a sentencing range of two to five years. 720 ILCS 5/9-3(d) (West 2000). However, where the victim is a "family or household member," the penalty is increased to a Class 2 felony, with a sentencing range of 3 to 14 years. See 720 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West 2000). At sentencing, the trial court found that the victim in this case was a "family or household member" (see 725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West 2000)) and defendant was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment for involuntary manslaughter with a concurrent sentence of five years for felony unlawful use of a weapon. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. 374 Ill.App.3d 949, 313 Ill.Dec. 313, 872 N.E.2d 73. We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315(a). We now consider whether defendant was properly sentenced to a Class 2 felony for involuntary manslaughter where the "family or household member" classification was not included in the indictment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged by indictment with six counts of first degree murder and one count of felony unlawful use of a weapon as a result of the April 13, 2001, shooting death of Joi Jefferson. The State proceeded on one count of first degree murder and a jury trial was commenced. At trial, the uncontested evidence demonstrated that on April 13, 2001, defendant received a call from Joi, his on-again, off-again "girlfriend" of three years. Joi asked defendant if he would escort her from her job at a fast-food restaurant because she had just cashed her paycheck and was afraid to take the bus by herself. Defendant met Joi and they took the bus back to defendant's apartment.

Defendant and Joi engaged in sexual intercourse upon arriving at defendant's apartment. They were interrupted by two telephone calls. The second caller was Angel Jordan, another woman with whom defendant was involved. Joi was upset that defendant was talking to Angel, and was angry because defendant was ignoring her and telling her to go home.

Defendant had a loaded, 16-gauge sawed-off shotgun lying on his kitchen counter. Joi took the shotgun off the counter, pointed it at defendant, and went into the bathroom. After finishing his telephone call, defendant began knocking on the bathroom door to antagonize Joi. At some point, he decided to go into the bathroom to obtain his gun.

Contradictory evidence was presented regarding what occurred inside the bathroom. Assistant State's Attorney Megan Goldish testified that defendant gave two oral statements and one videotaped statement about the shooting. In his first oral statement, defendant said that Joi took the loaded shotgun into the bathroom, a struggle ensued, and Joi was shot. When defendant was told that this version of events was contradicted by the physical evidence, he gave another oral statement. In his second oral statement, defendant said that he kicked the bathroom door open, grabbed the gun away from Joi, called her a "bitch," pointed the gun, and stepped back and pulled the trigger. This statement was not memorialized. In a third statement, which was videotaped, defendant indicated that he "bust[ed]" into the bathroom to get his gun, and, after a small struggle, pulled the gun away from Joi. He then pointed the gun in Joi's direction for one to two seconds, and squeezed the trigger. Defendant described the actual act of shooting Joi in several ways. Initially, he said that "reflex" made him squeeze the trigger. He also said, "the gun went off." He later declared, "I shot her." Finally, defendant said: "I didn't use any caution. I took the gun from her and I just shot her." Defendant's videotaped statement was played for the jury and admitted into evidence.

At trial, defendant testified that he entered the bathroom, told Joi to give him the gun, and ultimately snatched it away from her. As he took a step backward, he saw a big flash and heard a loud boom. Defendant explained that the gun went off almost instantaneously after he grabbed it away from Joi. Defendant testified that he "never intended for anything like that to happen."

It was uncontested that defendant called 911 after the shooting and reported a suicide. Police were dispatched to defendant's apartment. When they arrived, defendant was standing naked in the doorway. He had blood on his hands and feet. Defendant was asked what happened, and he said his "girlfriend" shot herself. Police found Joi lying dead, in a pool of blood, on the floor of defendant's bathroom, between the toilet and the bathtub. A 16-gauge sawed-off shotgun was found near her body.

After the jury heard all the evidence, but prior to closing arguments, defendant executed a jury waiver and the matter proceeded as a bench trial. During closing argument, defendant asked the court to find him guilty of involuntary manslaughter. The trial court found that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for murder, and thus convicted defendant of involuntary manslaughter and felony unlawful use of a weapon.

At sentencing, the State argued that, as defendant's girlfriend, Joi was a "family or household member" at the time of the shooting. The State urged the court to make a finding that the defendant's sentence could be enhanced due to the victim's status and sentence defendant to the maximum Class 2 felony term of 14 years' imprisonment. The defense objected to sentencing defendant as a Class 2 offender, but ultimately conceded that the evidence demonstrated that the victim was a "family or household member" as defined by statute. The trial court sentenced defendant to 12 years in prison.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, alleging that his rights to equal protection and due process were violated because he did not receive written notification before trial advising him that the State sought to increase the range of penalties for the offense beyond the statutory maximum and did not prove the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant further argued that involuntary manslaughter, upgraded to a Class 2 felony as a result of the victim's status as a family or household member, is not a lesser-included offense of first degree murder. The trial court rejected defendant's arguments. Defendant then filed a motion for a new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment, arguing that the charging instrument was insufficient because it failed to allege that the victim was a family or household member. Defendant's motions were denied. Defendant appealed, raising the same arguments raised in the trial court. His conviction and sentence were affirmed. 374 Ill. App.3d 949, 313 Ill.Dec. 313, 872 N.E.2d 73. We now consider defendant's claims of error.

ANALYSIS

Defendant asserts that his right to due process was violated when he was convicted and sentenced for the offense of "involuntary manslaughter of a family or household member" because that offense was not alleged in the charging instrument and is not a lesser-included offense of murder, the crime with which defendant was actually charged. Defendant's argument hinges on the premise that "involuntary manslaughter of a family or household member" is a unique offense, separate and apart from the offense of involuntary manslaughter. In fact, at oral argument, defendant conceded that his due process argument could only succeed if this court concludes that "involuntary manslaughter of a family or household member" is a distinct crime, separate from involuntary manslaughter. Defendant admits that involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder, and that a conviction for involuntary manslaughter would have been proper in this case.

The State argues that defendant's conviction and subsequent sentencing enhancement based on the victim's status as a family or household member was entirely proper. The State's position is that involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder and there is only one offense of involuntary manslaughter, which is either a Class 3 or Class 2 felony, depending on the victim's status.

At the outset, we acknowledge that a criminal defendant has a fundamental right to due process of law, which includes notice of the charges brought against him. People v. Kolton, 219 Ill.2d 353, 359, 302 Ill.Dec. 386, 848 N.E.2d 950 (2006). A defendant may not be convicted of an uncharged offense. People v. Baldwin, 199 Ill.2d 1, 6, 262 Ill.Dec. 9, 764 N.E.2d 1126 (2002). However, a defendant may be convicted of an offense that was not included in the charging instrument if that offense is a lesser-included offense of the crime actually charged, and the evidence presented at trial rationally supports that outcome. Kolton, 219 Ill.2d at 360, 302 Ill.Dec. 386, 848 N.E.2d 950. A lesser-included offense is an offense established by proof of lesser facts or a lesser mental state, or both, than the charged offense. 720 ILCS 5/2-9(a) (West 2000); People v. Davis, 213 Ill.2d 459, 477, 290 Ill.Dec. 580, 821 N.E.2d 1154 (2004). The...