People v. Rodgers
| Decision Date | 22 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 17308 |
| Citation | 144 Cal.Rptr. 602,79 Cal.App.3d 26 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Wesley RODGERS, Defendant and Appellant. |
Paul N. Halvonik, State Public Defender, Clifton R. Jeffers, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, Ezra Hendon, Peter R. Silten, Deputy State Public Defenders, San Francisco, for defendant-appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gloria F. DeHart, William D. Stein, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff-respondent.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether appellant is entitled to credit upon his sentence for 78 days which he spent in Delancey Street Foundation as a condition of probation. We hold that Penal Code section 2900.5 mandates that such credit be given.
Appellant entered a plea of guilty to violation of Penal Code section 12021. On April 14, 1976, the court granted him three years probation and ordered that he maintain residence at Delancey Street Foundation for at least one year, or upon release by the adult probation officer. On August 19, 1976, the probation officer filed a petition alleging that appellant had violated the conditions of probation in that he had failed to remain at Delancey Street and had failed to report to the department when instructed to do so. The court revoked probation and issued a bench warrant. On January 19, 1977, the court pronounced judgment and sentenced appellant to prison. We affirmed the judgment on appeal. On August 16, 1977, appellant petitioned the trial court for credit upon his sentence for time served at Delancey Street. The motion was argued and denied. This appeal followed. (See Pen.Code, § 1237, subd. (2).)
The facts of this case are undisputed. Appellant was admitted to probation on condition that he enter Delancey Street Foundation and that he maintain residence there for at least one year or until release by the adult probation officer. Appellant was transferred to Delancey Street Foundation on May 11, 1976, and he remained there for 78 days, until July 28, 1976.
Penal Code section 2900.5 provides in relevant part: "In all felony . . . convictions . . . when the defendant has been in custody, including but not limited to any time spent in a jail, camp, work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility, hospital, prison, or similar institution, all days of custody of the defendant, including days served as a condition of probation in compliance with a court order, shall be credited upon his sentence . . . ." (Pen.Code, § 2900.5 (emphasis added).)
At the hearing below the district attorney stipulated that Delancey Street Foundation is a "halfway house, rehabilitation facility . . . or similar institution" within the meaning of section 2900.5. He argued, however, and the trial court held, that appellant was not "in custody" within the meaning of the statute when he spent 78 days there.
All of the following facts regarding Delancey Street were stipulated to in the trial court. A person may be placed there as a condition of probation, and no person will be accepted by the Foundation unless he agrees to the condition of probation placing him there. A person accepted by Delancey Street must agree to follow its rules and regulations. He must reside at Delancey Street. Newcomers may not leave the property unescorted for six months. During the first 12 months of residence there is a flat prohibition against meeting with anyone outside the Foundation, including spouses and children.
A person who fails to follow the rules of Delancey Street will be asked to leave. If a person leaves before his commitment is up, or if he should be asked to leave, Delancey Street will immediately notify the proper authorities.
Delancey Street is not enclosed by locked fences; the doors are not locked during the day; there are no bars on the windows; there are no armed or unarmed guards. A person committed to Delancey Street may physically leave, because it is the Foundation's policy that no one will be forced to remain there against his will.
Delancey Street Foundation is a residential treatment program which offers both group and individual counseling together with vocational and remedial education and training for drug abusers, alcoholics, ex-convicts and persons with general character disorders.
Delancey Street offers a live-in, self-help program which provides a supportive environment, and is based on work and education. The program lasts two years, and anyone wishing to enter the program must be willing to commit himself for that period. When men enter the program their heads are shaved; women have their makeup and jewelry removed. This is the beginning of a process whereby the person's self-image is changed. Participants attend a three-hour encounter group session three times each week; the groups are based upon what is known as "attack therapy."
The program offers varied educational and vocational instruction, the latter through use of six foundation-owned businesses. The Foundation also has a credit union from which graduates may borrow money to get started in the community.
The Foundation is willing to provide the Adult Probation Department with progress reports as well as to notify the department in case the probationer leaves or is asked to leave. Generally persons asked to leave may not reenter for 30 days.
A January 1977 evaluation of Delancey Street by the Adult Probation Department of Santa Clara County concluded in part: "This is seen as an excellent program for someone who has not been able or would not be able to respond to a less intense or less structured residential treatment program."
As originally enacted in 1971, section 2900.5 could not have been read as giving credit for time spent on probation in a facility such as Delancey Street Foundation, because it provided such credit only for time served in custody in any jail. (Stats.1971, ch. 1732, § 2, p. 3686.) However, a 1976 amendment broadened the scope of the statute so that now credit must be given for time spent "in custody including but not limited to any time spent in a . . . halfway house, rehabilitation facility . . . or similar institution . . . ." (Stats.1976, ch. 1045, § 2, p. ---.)
A statute which has a "single meaning . . . apparent from its face" requires no interpretation. (See Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 256, 104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 766, 502 P.2d 1049, 1054; Benor v. Board of Medical Examiners (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 542, 546, 87 Cal.Rptr. 415.) The meaning of "halfway house, rehabilitation facility . . . or similar institution" apparently was considered sufficiently apparent on the face of the statute for purposes of this case, since the People stipulated below that Delancey Street Foundation was such a facility within the meaning of the statute. However, the meaning of "in custody" was and is in dispute.
We find that the words "in custody" have a single meaning and are not ambiguous in the context of this statute. The dictionary defines "custody" as follows: "1a: the act or duty of guarding and preserving (as by a duly authorized person or agency); SAFEKEEPING (the Serials Division has (custody) of newspapers . . .) b: protection, care, maintenance, and tuition: GUARDIANSHIP (orphans in the (custody) of their uncle) 2: judicial or penal safekeeping: control of a thing or person with such actual or constructive possession as fulfills the purpose of the law or duty requiring it: imprisonment or durance of persons or charge of things (a man held in police (custody)) (a suspect in protective (custody)) . . . ." (Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1965) p. 559.)
Thus it is clear that the word "custody" connotes a concept quite different from incarceration or...
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...v. State, 609 P.2d 539, 545-546 (Alaska 1980); Commonwealth v. Mallon, 267 Pa.Super. 163, 406 A.2d 569 (1979); People v. Rodgers, 79 Cal.App.3d 26, 144 Cal.Rptr. 602 (1978). Contrary authorities arise under differently worded statutes and in unusual facts. See, for example, People v. Stange......
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