People v. Rogers

• Docket Number: 346348
• Decision Date: 05 August 2021
• Citation: 338 Mich.App. 312,979 N.W.2d 747
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Deonton Autez ROGERS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

338 Mich.App. 312

979 N.W.2d 747

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Deonton Autez ROGERS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 346348

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted December 3, 2020, at Lansing.

Decided August 5, 2021, 9:00 a.m.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jon P. Wojtala, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, for the people.

David R. Cripps, Detroit, for defendant.

Jay D. Kaplan, Livonia, and Daniel S. Korobkin for the American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan and John A. Knight for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Amicus Curiae.

Before: Gadola, P.J., and Servitto and Redford, JJ.

ON REMAND

Gadola, P.J.

This case returns to this Court on remand from our Supreme Court for reconsideration, in light of Bostock v. Clayton Co., Georgia , 590 U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 207 L.Ed.2d 218 (2020), of the prosecution's challenge to the trial court's order dismissing the charge against defendant of ethnic intimidation, MCL 750.147b. We reverse the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to quash the ethnic-intimidation charge, reinstate the ethnic-intimidation charge, and remand for further proceedings.

I. FACTS

The basic facts of this case were set forth in this Court's prior opinion as follows:

This case arises out of an altercation between defendant and the complainant on the night of July 23, 2018. The complainant is a transgender person, which she explained to the court means that she was assigned as a male at birth but now identifies as a woman, living her life and presenting herself as such in society. On the night of the incident, the complainant went to a gas station in Detroit to make a purchase. When she arrived at the gas station, she saw defendant inside the gas station with a woman. The complainant got in line, and defendant began talking to her, using derogatory terms. According to the complainant, defendant made various offensive statements to her, including, "[Y]ou're a nigga." The complainant responded that "nigga is somebody that identify [sic] themselves as a man, carry themselves as a man. I don't do that. I'm a transgender." Defendant then asked the complainant about her sex organs and asked if he could see "it." The complainant tried to ignore defendant, but he continued to make derogatory remarks, which the complainant described as "gay" in nature and included calling her a man and asking to see her penis. Defendant then pulled out a gun and threatened to kill her. The complainant was frightened that defendant would follow through on his threat to kill her. The woman with defendant told defendant to leave the complainant alone and to leave the gas station. While defendant was speaking to the complainant, a child who had arrived in the car with defendant entered the gas station. Defendant subsequently walked in close proximity to the complainant, gun in hand, moving toward the exit. The complainant testified that she feared that defendant would turn around and shoot her before leaving the gas station. The complainant further testified that transgender people are often attacked and harmed and that she feared for her life. Reacting to the threat from defendant, she grabbed at defendant's hand as he came near her in an attempt to get the gun away from him. A struggle between the two ensued, during which the complainant never had control of the gun. During this struggle, defendant kept his finger on the trigger. At some point during the struggle, the gun fired into the complainant's left shoulder. The complainant was then able to grab the gun from defendant. The woman with defendant took the gun from the complainant and moved toward the exit. Defendant then ran to the gas station exit, whereupon the woman with defendant gave him back the gun. Defendant then got into his car, and the child followed him out, climbing into defendant's car with him. The complainant was taken to the hospital, where she spent several days being treated for a shattered shoulder, including undergoing surgery.

At defendant's preliminary examination, surveillance footage was shown detailing the incident. Defendant objected to the court binding him over on the two charges of intentionally discharging a firearm, asserting that he did not intentionally fire a weapon at the complainant. With regard to the remaining charges (including the ethnic-intimidation charge), defendant conceded that there were "questions of fact for a jury[.]" Relevant to the appeal at hand, the district court ruled that "transgender" fell within the statutory definition of "gender" for purposes of the ethnic-intimidation charge.

In the trial court, defendant moved to quash the district court's decision to bind him over on the two charges of intentionally discharging a firearm in a building and the charge of ethnic intimidation. With respect to the ethnic-intimidation charge, defendant argued that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that defendant committed a malicious physical act accompanied by a specific intent to harass the complainant because of her gender. In his amended motion to quash, defendant further contended that the ethnic-intimidation statute does not apply to situations involving transgender people. The trial court granted defendant's motion to quash, finding that with respect to ethnic intimidation, the preliminary-examination testimony established that the complainant, not defendant, caused the physical contact between the two by grabbing defendant's wrist. The trial court further concluded that because the term "gender" is defined in the Michigan Penal Code as including only masculine, feminine, and neuter genders, the ethnic-intimidation statute did not apply to protect transgender people. [ People v. Rogers , 331 Mich.App. 12, 16-19, 951 N.W.2d 50 (2020) (citations omitted), vacated and remanded 506 Mich. 949, 950 N.W.2d 48 (2020).]

This Court granted the prosecution leave to appeal¹ the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to quash and challenging the trial court's dismissal of the ethnic-intimidation charge. This Court affirmed the trial court's order, concluding that although the trial court had employed erroneous reasoning, the trial court nonetheless reached the correct result. Rogers , 331 Mich.App. at 16, 951 N.W.2d 50. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Bostock , 590 U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1731, and the Michigan Supreme Court subsequently vacated the judgment of this Court and remanded this case to us for reconsideration in light of Bostock . Rogers , 506 Mich. 949, 950 N.W.2d 48.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court's decision regarding a motion to quash an information for an abuse of discretion.

People v. March , 499 Mich. 389, 397, 886 N.W.2d 396 (2016) ; People v. Dowdy , 489 Mich. 373, 379, 802 N.W.2d 239 (2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.

People v. Babcock , 469 Mich. 247, 269, 666 N.W.2d 231 (2003). To the extent that a trial court bases its decision regarding a motion to quash an information on an interpretation of the law, we review that interpretation de novo. March , 499 Mich. at 397, 886 N.W.2d 396. Whether a defendant's conduct falls within the scope of a criminal statute is a question of statutory interpretation, which we also review de novo. People v. Flick , 487 Mich. 1, 8-9, 790 N.W.2d 295 (2010). When a trial court makes an error of law, it necessarily abuses its discretion. People v. Duncan , 494 Mich. 713, 723, 835 N.W.2d 399 (2013).

B. MCL 750.147B

The prosecution contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the charge of ethnic intimidation asserted against defendant under MCL 750.147b. That statute provides, in pertinent part:

(1) A person is guilty of ethnic intimidation if that person maliciously, and with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's race, color, religion, gender, or national origin, does any of the following:

(a) Causes physical contact with another person.

(b) Damages, destroys, or defaces any real or personal property of another person.

(c) Threatens, by word or act, to do an act described in subdivision (a) or (b), if there is reasonable cause to believe that an act described in subdivision (a) or (b) will occur. [ MCL 750.147b.]

Before the trial court, defendant moved to quash the ethnic-intimidation charge, arguing, in part, that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that defendant had the specific intent to harass the complainant because of her gender. Defendant further argued that the ethnic-intimidation statute does not apply to situations involving transgender people. The trial court agreed in part, concluding that because the term "gender" is defined in the Michigan Penal Code, MCL 750.1 et seq. , as including only masculine, feminine, and neuter genders, the ethnic-intimidation statute did not apply to protect transgender people.

The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. See Dowdy , 489 Mich. at 379, 802 N.W.2d 239. If a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the language as written, and judicial construction is neither required nor permitted. People v. Gardner , 482 Mich. 41, 50, 753 N.W.2d 78 (2008). The word "gender" is not specifically defined within MCL 750.147b. The trial court in this case therefore considered the word "gender" as defined in the Penal Code, at MCL 750.10, and concluded that as defined in that section the word "gender" does not include "transgender."

We conclude that the trial court was misguided in relying on that provision to conclude that transgender is not a part or subset of "gender" for purposes of the ethnic-intimidation statute. MCL 750.10 states, in relevant part, that "[t]he masculine gender includes the feminine and neuter genders." MCL 750.10 provides...