People v. Rogers

Decision Date05 October 1922
Docket NumberNo. 14543.,14543.
Citation303 Ill. 578,136 N.E. 470
PartiesPEOPLE v. ROGERS.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Joseph H. Fitch, Judge.

Harvey Rogers was convicted of robbery, and he brings error.

Affirmed.John R. McCabe, of Chicago (Edward N. Sherburne, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Robert E. Crowe, State's Atty., of Chicago, and Edward C. Fitch, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson, Clyde C. Fisher, and Alva Bates, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

DUNCAN, J.

Plaintiff in error and Joseph Eagan were convicted in the criminal court of Cook county on a one-count indictment for robbery by the use of a gun. They were impleaded with Charles Conroy, Walter Buckley, and Charles Olson. Only Rogers, Eagan, and Conroy were tried in this trial, Conroy being acquitted. The charge in the indictment is, in substance, that they committed the crime of robbery with a gun of Louis Plomgren on February 25, 1921, and by force and violence took from his person and carried away money to the value of $8,571, the property of the Western Newspaper Union, a corporation, which money was then in the care of Plomgren. Eagan disappeared during the trial and before the verdict was rendered. Rogers, who was proved to be of the age of 19 years at the trial, was sentenced to serve an indefinite term in the penitentiary, and he sued out this writ of error to reverse the judgment.

The following facts were proved by the people: The Western Newspaper Union has an office in the city of Chicago at 210 South Desplaines street, where it has a printing plant, machinery, and paper stock. It operates its business through managers, cashiers, and other officers appointed. It has a board of directors and a president, elected by the board of directors. The board of directors and the resident operating head conduct the business. The proof also shows that the board of directors has held meetings as such, and that the Western Newspaper Union has a charter, which was at the time of the trial in Maine, and issued capital stock and has a stock book and stock ledger. It also has a secretary and treasurer, and pays its employees by checks drawn by the Western Newspaper Union. Louis Plomgren had been employed by the Western Newspaper Union for 34 years, and, on February 25, 1921, was its cashier and credit man. On the morning of that day, about 20 minutes after 9 o'clock, he left the office of the Western Newspaper Union, accompanied by Joseph Smith, and proceeded to the Mercantile Trust & Savings Bank, at the southwest corner of Jackson boulevard and Clinton street. At the bank he received for said company, which he tied up in a package of brown paper and put rubber bands around it, $8,571, lawful money of the United States. The money made quite a large package, which was all in currency, and contained $20, $10, $5, $2, and $1 bills. After receiving this money, Plomgren and Smith started back to the Western Newspaper Union office, Plomgren carrying the package of money under his left arm. They walked west on Jackson boulevard to Desplaines street, crossed Jackson boulevard, and went north on Desplaines to Quincy street, near which point Rogers, Eagan, and others jumped out of an areaway and in front of Plomgren and Smith and held guns in their faces, demanding that they throw up their hands and that they give up the package of money. Rogers pointed his gun at Plomgren, and, when he demanded the money, Plomgren ducked his head and started to run, but others of the robbers followed him and beat him over the head with guns and knocked him to the sidewalk, upon which he dropped the package. The blows rendered him unconscious for a short time. The robbers escaped in a Mercer touring car, which they had standing at Quincy and Desplaines streets, the license number of which was 30297, which was noted by Smith. After the robbers left, Smith went to the rescue of Plomgren and raised him off the sidewalk. The package of money which he had under his arm was gone, and they never saw it from that day to the day of the trial. Both Smith and Plomgren positively identified plaintiff in error as one of the robbers, and stated that they both had a good look at him while he pointed the gun at Plomgren. They were able to identify him because of his unusual appearance, and particularly with reference to his eyes and very blonde hair. He wore a cap, a kind of brownish suit, and a dark overcoat. Plomgren said his peculiar looks were due to his small, beady eyes and blonde hair. Smith described his eyes as reddish, teary, or watery. Neither of them had ever seen or known Rogers before, but they had a good look at him on the day of the robbery and saw him frequently thereafter, and entertained no about as to his identity.

The defense of Rogers was that of an alibi and former good reputation, the latter being proved by something like half a dozen witnesses. His brother, William D. Rogers, testified in substance, that he was in the motor transportation business, and that defendant was employed by him and his partner on the morning of the robbery and was driving one of their trucks and delivering; that he worked all that day, and that, between the hours of 9 and 10 o'clock on that morning, he started from Kedzie and Taylor streets with a car of glass; that witness helped him load that load and also a second load, the first being loaded about a quarter before 9 o'clock and the second at 12:15. His mother gave corroboration by testifying that she recalled particularly that on that day defendant went to work with his brother. The alibi is not shown to be altogether inconsistent with the defendant's guilt. It does not appear at just what hour and minute the robbery occurred, but it must have taken place about 10 a. m. of that date. The defendant testified the same as his brother on the question of his alibi. He denied all participation in the robbery and all knowledge thereof. On cross-examination he stated that he knew Eagan but had not known him prior to February 25, 1921, the day on which he was arrested. Buch Anderson, a real estate man, testified in rebuttal that he knew Rogers, and knew Eagan as Kearns, and that, previous to the holdup, he saw Rogers and Eagan together on the back porch at 1263 Washington street, and that there was another Rogers about 32 years old there at the same time, but witness does not know if he is a relative of the defendant.

The first contention made by the plaintiff in error is that the evidence does not show a completed crime of robbery, but, at most, an assault with intent to commit robbery. This contention is made upon the ground that enither Smith nor Plomgren was able to state that he saw or knew who took away the package. This clearly appears to have so happened, because at the time of the taking, they were separated and while Plomgren was partially unconscious and Smith was detained with a gun in his face and could not go to Plomgren's rescue until the robbers left. But this proof is supplied by circumstances. When Smith did go to Plomgren, the latter was down and out, the robbers gone, and the package of money, too. The robbers were after money—the particular package in question—and that is what they demanded. They were not interrupted in the holdup by anybody, and it follows as a moral certainty that they did not voluntarily go off and leave the package on the sidewalk after they made Plomgren drop it. Jurors, as well as courts, are permitted to use their common sense in deawing conclusions that naturally are to be drawn from facts proved.

There was no failure to prove ownership as alleged. The proof in the record shows that the Western Newspaper Union is a corporation by user. People v. Buckman, 279 Ill. 348, 116 N. E. 835. Even if the proof had not established the existence of the corporation, the allegation that the Western Newspaper Union is a corporation and was the owner of the property might be regarded as mere surplusage. The indictment alleges, also, that the money was in the possession of Plomgren as the agent of the company and that it was taken from him by force and violence. This amounts, in robbery, to a sufficient charge that the property was the property of Plomgren, possession of property being a sufficient ownership under this offense as against the robber. Where, in robbery, ownership is properly alleged in one person and proved, the indictment and the verdict of guilty will not be held bad, because the indictment contains of further allegation of ownership in another person that is not proved, or where the further allegation is that the property belongs to some named company that is not proved to be a corporation or a person in law. People v. Knox, 302 Ill. 471, 134 N. E. 923. In this case ownership was sufficiently proved in both Plomgren and the corporation to sustain the charge of robbery, and there is no variance or failure to prove ownership as alleged. The gist of the offense is the force or intimidation used in taking from the person of Plomgren, against his will, property belonging to him or in his care for another.

In his opening statement the state's attorney made the following statement to the jury:

‘These men got into an automobile, right after completing the robbery, which was standing near the curb with the engine running, and started south, and, at Twenty-Fourth and Michigan, this machine collided with an automobile belonging to the fire chief of the city of Chicago.Then the men abandoned their car and ran to 1811 Prairie avenue and deposited in a victrola there some revolvers and $100 in currency. * * * The police went to this place at about 6 o'clock in the evening, and, while there, there was a telephone call, and the police listening heard somebody say: ‘This is Joe Eagan's friend; there is something the matter with your victrola; look and see what is the matter with it.’ The police...

To continue reading

Request your trial
62 cases
  • People v. Terrell
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 25, 1989
    ...is brought into question by a motion to suppress. (People v. Armstrong (1972), 51 Ill.2d 471, 475-76, 282 N.E.2d 712; People v. Rogers (1922), 303 Ill. 578, 136 N.E. 470.) Section 114-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 114-11) provides, however, th......
  • People v. Patterson
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1992
    ...61 Ill.2d 383, 389, 336 N.E.2d 753.) This court has consistently enforced this rule in an unbroken line of cases. (See People v. Rogers (1922), 303 Ill. 578, 136 N.E. 470; People v. Sweeney (1922), 304 Ill. 502, 136 N.E. 687; see Armstrong, 51 Ill.2d at 476, 282 N.E.2d 712 (and cases cited)......
  • People v. R.D., s. 72268
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • April 15, 1993
    ...to limit the scope of the material witness rule (People v. Armstrong (1972), 51 Ill.2d 471, 475-76, 282 N.E.2d 712; People v. Rogers (1922), 303 Ill. 578, 136 N.E. 470; Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 114-11(d)). That rule requires the State to produce or explain the absence of all material......
  • People v. Sims
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • March 29, 1961
    ...it was voluntary. (People v. Sammons, 17 Ill.2d 316, 161 N.E.2d 322; People v. Wagoner, 8 Ill.2d 188, 133 N.E.2d 24; People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578, 136 N.E. 470.) However, as was pointed out in People v. Jennings, 11 Ill.2d 610, 144 N.E.2d 612, it is not a mechanical rule but a practical o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT