People v. Russell

Decision Date10 March 2005
Docket Number14929.
Citation791 N.Y.S.2d 198,16 A.D.3d 776,2005 NY Slip Op 01761
PartiesTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. HEATH B. RUSSELL, Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Warren County (Austin, J.), rendered May 28, 2003, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in the second degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree.

Crew III, J.

Defendant was indicted and charged, in a three-count indictment, with murder in the second degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to terms of imprisonment of 25 years to life for each count of murder and one year for his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, all sentences to run concurrently. Defendant now appeals.

Initially, defendant contends that the search warrants issued for his residence and garage were unsupported by probable cause. We disagree. The factual assertions supporting the applications reasonably demonstrated that the victim was the subject of foul play and that forensic evidence may well be found in the places sought to be searched. Insofar as defendant claims that the issuing court erred in finding "reasonable cause," as opposed to "probable cause," in justifying issuance of the warrants, we need note only that the terms have been held to be interchangeable (see e.g. People v Curry, 294 AD2d 608, 610 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 674 [2002]). Indeed, "reasonable cause" is the quantum of evidence required by the statute authorizing the issuance of such warrants (see CPL 690.40 [2]).

Next defendant contends that County Court erred in denying one of his challenges for cause. We agree. During jury selection, defense counsel asked the prospective jurors if their ability to be impartial would be affected if defendant exercised his right not to testify. In response, four jurors indicated that defendant's failure to testify would affect their ability to be impartial, while two jurors indicated that such failure might influence them. Immediately thereafter, County Court, sua sponte, excused four jurors (presumably those who asserted that defendant's failure to testify would influence their determination). The prosecutor then exercised a peremptory challenge as to one of the two remaining jurors who had indicated that such failure might influence them. Defense counsel challenged the remaining juror for cause. The prosecutor objected to the challenge, asserting that the juror's response was merely equivocal, and County Court denied the challenge.* Defense counsel then challenged the juror peremptorily and jury selection continued.

CPL 270.20 (1) (b) provides that a party may challenge a prospective juror for cause if the juror "has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial." It has been made clear that a prospective juror's statement that a defendant's decision not to testify "might" influence his or her ability to be impartial is sufficient to cast serious doubt on his or her ability to render a fair verdict (see People v Bludson, 97 NY2d 644, 646 [2001]). Accordingly, where a challenge for cause on this ground is denied and a defendant subsequently exhausts his or her peremptory challenges prior to the jury being sworn, an ensuing verdict must be set aside and a new trial ordered (see id.).

Notwithstanding, the People assert that with only two jurors remaining to "fill" the jury, defense counsel's exercise of his only remaining peremptory challenge as to one such juror was "nothing more than a tactical move for appellate purposes," thus apparently claiming that any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. While review of the record indeed indicates that the...

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7 cases
  • People v. Harris
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • July 28, 2011
    ...at 616, 709 N.Y.S.2d 134, 730 N.E.2d 932; People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d at 367, 482 N.Y.S.2d 448, 472 N.E.2d 298; People v. Russell, 16 A.D.3d 776, 778, 791 N.Y.S.2d 198 [2005], lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 809, 803 N.Y.S.2d 38, 836 N.E.2d 1161 [2005] ). As the Court of Appeals advises, “[i]t is almos......
  • People v. Mei
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • April 5, 2023
    ... ... committed it." New York has employed the term ... "reasonable cause to believe" as a statutory ... equivalent of probable cause. See New York Search ... and Seizure, Hon. Barry Kamins (ret.), §102(1)(a), ... citing People v Russell , 16 A.D.3d 776 (3rd Dept ... 2005); cf. People v Jenkins, 209 A.D.2d 164 (1st ... Dept 1994). In addition, "A[n] arrest need not be ... supported by information and knowledge which, at the time, ... excludes all possibility of innocence and points to the ... defendant's guilt beyond a ... ...
  • People v. Boddie
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • March 12, 2015
    ...an impartial verdict (see People v. Bludson, 97 N.Y.2d 644, 645–646, 736 N.Y.S.2d 289, 761 N.E.2d 1016 [2001] ; People v. Russell, 16 A.D.3d 776, 778, 791 N.Y.S.2d 198 [2005], lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 809, 803 N.Y.S.2d 38, 836 N.E.2d 1161 [2005] ). Having eliminated its doubts about the juror's ......
  • People v. Hargis
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • June 30, 2017
    ...v. Jackson, 125 A.D.3d 485, 485–486, 4 N.Y.S.3d 14 ; People v. Givans, 45 A.D.3d 1460, 1461, 845 N.Y.S.2d 665 ; People v. Russell, 16 A.D.3d 776, 777–778, 791 N.Y.S.2d 198, lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 809, 803 N.Y.S.2d 38, 836 N.E.2d 1161 ). We further conclude that the prospective juror's silence ......
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