People v. Harris

• Decision Date: 28 July 2011
• Citation: 88 A.D.3d 83,2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 06045,928 N.Y.S.2d 114
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,v.Calvin L. HARRIS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

88 A.D.3d 83

928 N.Y.S.2d 114

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 06045

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Calvin L. HARRIS, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 28, 2011.

Easton, Thompson, Kasperek & Shiffrin, L.L.P., Rochester (William T. Easton of counsel), for appellant.Gerald A. Keene, District Attorney, Owego, for respondent.Before: CARDONA, P.J., MERCURE, SPAIN, MALONE JR. and STEIN, JJ.MERCURE, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Tioga County (Hayden, J.), rendered October 5, 2009, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of murder in the second degree.

Following a lengthy trial, defendant was convicted in 2007 of murder in the second degree for killing his wife, Michele Harris (hereinafter the victim), who was last seen on September 11, 2001. Neither the victim's body nor any murder weapon has ever been found. Within hours after the verdict, an individual, Kevin Tubbs, came forward alleging that he had information relevant to the victim's disappearance. Defendant's ensuing CPL 330.30 motion to set aside the verdict was granted, and a new trial was ordered ( People v. Harris, 55 A.D.3d 958, 865 N.Y.S.2d 386 [2008] ). Following the second trial, defendant was again found guilty of murder in the second degree. County Court denied his subsequent motion to set aside the verdict, and sentenced him to a prison term of 25 years to life. Upon defendant's appeal, we now affirm.

Initially, we reject defendant's argument that his conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence and is against the weight of the evidence. The proper standard for appellate review of a conviction based on wholly circumstantial evidence is the same as in any other criminal case: “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” ( People v. Ficarrota, 91 N.Y.2d 244, 248, 668 N.Y.S.2d 993, 691 N.E.2d 1017 [1997] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Hines, 97 N.Y.2d 56, 62, 736 N.Y.S.2d 643, 762 N.E.2d 329 [2001]; People v. Wong, 81 N.Y.2d 600, 608, 601 N.Y.S.2d 440, 619 N.E.2d 377 [1993] ). While the danger that the trier of fact may leap logical gaps in the People's proof forms the basis for the circumstantial evidence charge to be given to the jury, the Court of Appeals has clarified that the standard set forth in that charge is only for the trier of fact, rather than an appellate court reviewing legal sufficiency ( see People v. Hines, 97 N.Y.2d at 62, 736 N.Y.S.2d 643, 762 N.E.2d 329; People v. Norman, 85 N.Y.2d 609, 620–622, 627 N.Y.S.2d 302, 650 N.E.2d 1303 [1995]; People v. Williams, 84 N.Y.2d 925, 926, 620 N.Y.S.2d 811, 644 N.E.2d 1367 [1994]; see also People v. Rossey, 89 N.Y.2d 970, 971–972, 655 N.Y.S.2d 861, 678 N.E.2d 473 [1997]; People v. Wong, 81 N.Y.2d at 608, 601 N.Y.S.2d 440, 619 N.E.2d 377). Thus, it is settled that “ ‘ the jury should be instructed in substance that it must appear that the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence’ ” ( People v. Ford, 66 N.Y.2d 428, 441, 497 N.Y.S.2d 637, 488 N.E.2d 458 [1985] [emphasis added], quoting People v. Sanchez, 61 N.Y.2d 1022, 1024, 475 N.Y.S.2d 376, 463 N.E.2d 1228 [1984] ). In contrast, although close judicial supervision may be necessary in circumstantial evidence cases, the appellate courts' function in reviewing legal sufficiency remains limited to assessing solely “ ‘whether any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the fact finder on the basis of the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People’ ” ( People v. Hines, 97 N.Y.2d at 62, 736 N.Y.S.2d 643, 762 N.E.2d 329, quoting People v. Williams, 84 N.Y.2d at 926, 620 N.Y.S.2d 811, 644 N.E.2d 1367; see People v. Norman, 85 N.Y.2d at 620–621, 627 N.Y.S.2d 302, 650 N.E.2d 1303).

Further, “the People are entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence” ( People v. Cintron, 95 N.Y.2d 329, 332, 717 N.Y.S.2d 72, 740 N.E.2d 217 [2000]; see People v. Hines, 97 N.Y.2d at 62, 736 N.Y.S.2d 643, 762 N.E.2d 329).¹ As a practical matter, then, we must “assume that the jury credited the prosecution witnesses and gave the prosecution's evidence the full weight that might reasonably be accorded it” ( People v. Benzinger, 36 N.Y.2d 29, 32, 364 N.Y.S.2d 855, 324 N.E.2d 334 [1974]; see People v. Bierenbaum, 301 A.D.2d 119, 131, 748 N.Y.S.2d 563 [2002], lv. denied 99 N.Y.2d 626, 760 N.Y.S.2d 107, 790 N.E.2d 281 [2003], cert. denied 540 U.S. 821, 124 S.Ct. 134, 157 L.Ed.2d 40 [2003] ). In reviewing legal sufficiency, we also must be mindful that “[t]he possibility that someone other than [defendant] may have committed the crime does not preclude a guilty verdict”; even in circumstantial evidence cases, “the jury [remains] free to assess the evidence and to reject that which it finds to be nonpersuasive” ( People v. Ford, 66 N.Y.2d at 437, 497 N.Y.S.2d 637, 488 N.E.2d 458). That is, “it is for the jury to determine what evidence is to be believed and what evidence is to be discredited, as long as that decision does not involve any logical inconsistencies” ( People v. Kennedy, 47 N.Y.2d 196, 204, 417 N.Y.S.2d 452, 391 N.E.2d 288 [1979] ). Acquittal is not mandated in a circumstantial evidence case simply because “every bit of evidence submitted to the jury [is not] inculpatory rather than exculpatory” ( id.), or because certain evidence, “when ... evaluated in isolation, [is] susceptible to arguable inferences which at first blush seem consistent with [a] defendant's claim of innocence” ( People v. Bierenbaum, 301 A.D.2d at 132, 748 N.Y.S.2d 563). Rather, we must review all the evidence presented as a whole, “ cast in its aggregated and interwoven symmetry, and after applying all natural and reasonable inferences” that favor the People ( id. at 132–133, 748 N.Y.S.2d 563), determine whether the jury could logically conclude that the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Viewed under that standard, the proof herein is legally sufficient to establish that defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim at their home on the night of September 11, 2001. Specifically, although there is no direct evidence, the People demonstrated defendant's guilt through circumstantial proof of motive, intent, opportunity and consciousness of guilt, as well as evidence of the victim's sudden disappearance and her spattered blood in the garage and kitchen in the family home.²

Turning first to motive, defendant is correct that such evidence “does not establish any element of the crime, and cannot take the place of proof of [defendant's] actual commission of the crime” ( People v. Marin, 65 N.Y.2d 741, 745, 492 N.Y.S.2d 16, 481 N.E.2d 556 [1985] ). Nevertheless, that truism does not provide a basis for discounting the evidence of motive here. Indeed, “evidence of ... motive cannot be ignored in examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution” ( id. [emphasis added]; see People v. Kimes, 37 A.D.3d 1, 13–14, 831 N.Y.S.2d 1 [2006], lv. denied 8 N.Y.3d 881, 832 N.Y.S.2d 494, 864 N.E.2d 624 [2007]; People v. Bierenbaum, 301 A.D.2d at 135, 748 N.Y.S.2d 563; People v. Seifert, 152 A.D.2d 433, 443, 548 N.Y.S.2d 971 [1989], lv. denied 75 N.Y.2d 924, 555 N.Y.S.2d 43, 554 N.E.2d 80 [1990] ). Particularly in circumstantial evidence cases, “ ‘motive often becomes not only material, but controlling’ ” ( People v. Toland, 284 A.D.2d 798, 804, 728 N.Y.S.2d 538 [2001], lv. denied 96 N.Y.2d 942, 733 N.Y.S.2d 383, 759 N.E.2d 382 [2001], quoting People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N.Y. 253, 258, 50 N.E. 846 [1898]; see People v. Thibeault, 73 A.D.3d 1237, 1239–1240, 900 N.Y.S.2d 501 [2010], lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 810, 908 N.Y.S.2d 170, 934 N.E.2d 904 [2010], cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1691, 179 L.Ed.2d 628 [2011] ).

The record demonstrates that at the time of the victim's death, her marriage to defendant was nearing its end, and the two were in the midst of unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate a divorce settlement. The marriage was marked by infidelity; both defendant and the victim were having intimate relationships with other people prior to the commencement of divorce proceedings. When the victim initially told defendant on December 8, 2000 that she wanted a divorce, he reacted explosively. The victim's sister-in-law, who telephoned that evening, reported hearing defendant screaming at the victim, as she pleaded with him not to come near her and attempted to flee. Despite defendant using his truck to block the victim's car in the family garage, she was eventually able to retreat to the home of her brother and sister-in-law. Shortly thereafter, the victim removed all of defendant's guns from the family's house and brought them to her brother's home.

Although defendant and the victim had four young children and she did not work outside the home during the marriage, defendant stopped providing her with money once she announced her intention to divorce him. The victim took a job as a waitress at a local restaurant, and continued to live separately from defendant within the family home. Defendant contacted the victim's friends and family, seeking assistance in convincing her to discontinue the divorce proceedings, and declared that “there wasn't going to be a divorce and she wasn't going to get half of his business.” ³ Although he also informed the victim's family of his concerns regarding her drug use, he told them that he blamed the victim for his own unfaithfulness with other women, citing the victim's failure to keep the family home clean. Ultimately, Supreme Court directed defendant to pay...