People v. Russo
| Decision Date | 16 December 1974 |
| Citation | 46 A.D.2d 904,362 N.Y.S.2d 191 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Rocco RUSSO, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Robert E. Twiste, Staten Island, for appellant.
John M. Braisted, Jr., Dist. Atty., Staten Island (Norman C. Morse, Staten Island, of counsel), for respondent.
Before HOPKINS, Acting P.J., and MARTUSCELLO, LATHAM, COHALAN and SHAPIRO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, rendered March 9, 1972, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
The memorandum of this court dated November 4, 1974, which would appear to be a decision, is hereby withdrawn and vacated and the following decision is hereby rendered.
Judgment affirmed.
Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree for the brutal killing of his estranged girl friend, Christine Russo (no relation). Briefly, the facts adduced at the trial are as follows: Defendant had made careful arrangements to meet the decedent at night in a parking lot in Von Briesen Park, Staten Island. He prevailed upon a girl friend of the victim to bring her to this park on some pretense and there he told the victim's friend he hoped to reconcile with Christine. He cautioned her (the victim's friend) that Christine was not to know that he would be there, as he wanted their meeting to appear to be one of happenstance. He himself was driven to the park by yet a third female, a close friend of his. The meeting took place as arranged and in the park he was given an opportunity by the friend who had brought Christine to speak with Christine alone. Soon after he was left alone with Christine he stabbed her numerous times, killing her. He raised the defense of insanity.
Our dissenting brethren cite a number of instances they assert constituted improper conduct by the Trial Justice which they say deprived defendant of a fair trial. As to the first of these instances (the trial court's observations that defendant appeared competent to stand trial), we note only that the trial court's comments were not in the presence of the jury, but made during a hearing to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial. The issue of competency to stand trial was not seriously contested. The sole witness at the hearing was Dr. Schwartz and the court's aforementioned observations were made just after Dr. Schwartz testified that defendant was competent to stand trial and before a rather brief and ineffectual cross-examination took place. None of the questions on cross-examination were directed to an impugnation of the doctor's opinion of defendant's competency. Importantly, neither of the defense's medical experts who testified at the trial was called to dispute defendant's present competency at the hearing. In this context we find no basis for a reversal.
As to the claim that the Trial Justice 'improperly summarized the findings of the expert to the jury and thus usurped the latter's function to weigh and evaluate the testimony,' we note that in reviewing the record there were times that the testimony of the medical experts was rather prolix and highly technical and the court summarized the testimony in simpler terms for the benefit of the jury. The Trial Justice, however, took pains at those times to instruct the jury that he was only reviewing the medical testimony for their benefit and understanding and that if they (the jury) disagreed with the view it was their recollection of the medical testimony that was to control. We are not persuaded that the foregoing constitutes a usurpation of the jury's function to weigh and evaluate testimony.
As to the last claim, it must be conceded that there were instances where the trial court 'interrupt(ed) the examination and cross-examination of witnesses' and posed questions of its own. It is well settled, however, that a 'trial judge is something more than a mere automaton' (People v. Ohanian, 245 N.Y. 227, 232, 157 N.E. 94, 96). Indeed, a 'Trial Judge in criminal matters may take an...
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