People v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 06 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. B063021,B063021
• Citation: 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 395,9 Cal.App.4th 1855
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Patrick RYAN, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 395

12 Cal.Rptr.2d 395

9 Cal.App.4th 1855

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Patrick RYAN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B063021.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6, California.

Oct. 6, 1992.

Sharon M. Jones, Ventura, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Carol Wendelin Pollack, Acting Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Marc E. Turchin, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Juliet H. Swoboda, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

YEGAN, Associate Justice.

The basic principle of fairness dictates that we reverse the order excluding appellant from the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC). The order was predicated on appellant having been attacked at CRC by three fellow inmates as he slept. We hold that the decision to preclude treatment cannot be based upon the inmate's status as a crime victim. To quote a popular phrase, "victims have rights too." Conspiring violent CRC inmates may not dictate who should be treated there.

In 1990 appellant was convicted of possessing heroin (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and placed on probation. Thereafter, he was arrested for narcotics-related violations, found in violation of probation, and sentenced to state prison for three years. The prison sentence was suspended and appellant was determined to be a narcotic addict or in imminent danger of becoming one. He was committed to CRC.

While receiving treatment for narcotic addiction at CRC, appellant was attacked by three fellow inmates as he slept. This fact was not in dispute. At the exclusion hearing in superior court, the District Attorney stipulated "... to the fact that Mr. Ryan was in fact initially the victim of an assault; that he wasn't the aggressor."

After the attack, appellant was concerned for his future safety. So was the warden at CRC. Notwithstanding appellant's desire to continue treatment at CRC, the warden returned appellant to the superior court noting: "It is our evaluation that he is not amenable [for treatment] because his fear for his safety precludes his ability to program in the open dormitory setting of the Civil Addict Program at the California Rehabilitation Center."

In upholding the exclusion, the superior court said: "The warden of the California Rehabilitation Center has excluded the defendant as unsuitable. This Court is very limited in ... ability to review that decision. [p] I can't second guess what the staff at CRC has done. The law is designed to give them that sort of discretion. Whether I as a Judge would have come to the same conclusion that those people came to based on the same amount of or the same evidence is not what I can do. [p] I can look at what's before me now, look at the record before me. If there's anything in there to support the decision then the decision stands. I cannot find that abuse of discretion. [p] The motion is denied. The defendant is excluded and this Court will not interfere with that decision. [p] ... [p] Now, I think it's unfortunate. I think Mr. Ryan needs treatment. I agree with him. But the people that are there to provide that treatment have decided that he can't--they can't treat him in the program as it exists, and there's nothing I can do about that. I sympathize with him. But I today am going to order that this three year sentence be ordered if [into] full force and effect."

The trial court's reference to the discretion afforded to CRC officials is based upon case law. "[W]hether or not any given defendant can be treated with success is a fact which, in the last analysis, must be determined not by judges but by people trained in that field and actually engaged in the treatment process. Hence, out of practical necessity, the statute leaves to the professional experts the final decision on whether or not treatment should be begun or be continued...." (People v. Marquez (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 253, 256-257, 53 Cal.Rptr. 854; see also In re Marks (1969) 71 Cal.2d 31, 40, fn. 6, 77 Cal.Rptr. 1, 453 P.2d 441; People v. Arciga (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 991, 996, 227 Cal.Rptr. 611.) The salutary language of Marquez, supra, however, simply does not speak to the issue presented by this case. No one has even suggested that appellant could not have been rehabilitated by the CRC process. The only impediment thereto was the warden's belief, based upon the single attack, that appellant might be attacked again.

"[A] patient-inmate has an important interest in receiving treatment at the CRC for his narcotics addiction." (People v. Ramirez ) (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 272, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622.) This right cannot be defeated because the inmate is the victim of an attack and cannot be protected by the warden and his staff. A contrary determination would mean that a violent inmate or inmates could, by attacking an inmate, have him excluded from the program. This would be nonsense. It is the attackers who should be excluded, not the victim.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 3053, subdivision (a), in pertinent part, provides: "If at any...