People v. ArcIGA
Decision Date | 26 June 1986 |
Citation | 227 Cal.Rptr. 611,182 Cal.App.3d 991 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alberto Paredes ARCIGA, Defendant and Appellant. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Guadalupe DIAZ, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. F005405, F005843. |
This appeal is a consolidated action brought by two Mexican nationals who illegally entered California and later were convicted of narcotic offenses in separate proceedings. After each man was sent to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC), the Director of Corrections (Director) found them unfit for narcotics abuse treatment and returned them to court for further criminal proceedings. They were rejected because each was an "illegal" and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) "holds" had been placed on them.
Sixteen years ago the court in People v. Hernandez (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 646, 89 Cal.Rptr. 192, determined the pendency of deportation proceedings is an adequate grounds for rejecting a defendant from the program. Arguments of counsel notwithstanding, we find the law remains the same.
Only a brief summary of the background and facts of each defendant's case is necessary. Defendant 1 Diaz appeals from the judgment in two cases out of Merced County, and defendant Arciga appeals from a judgment from Kings County.
Diaz was found guilty of violating Health and Safety Code sections 11350 (possession of heroin) and 11352 (sale of heroin). Arciga pled guilty to twice violating Health and Safety Code section 11352. Each defendant was sentenced to a prison term, but upon review of petitions filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3050, 2 criminal proceedings were suspended due to the finding of drug addiction or the danger of becoming addicted. Both were committed to CRC.
Pursuant to section 3053, each defendant was later found to be unamenable for the reasons previously stated. Criminal proceedings were reinstated and the prison sentences were ordered executed.
We can best summarize the issue by paraphrasing an introduction used by one of the defendants. He was arrested after two sales of heroin; small amounts were involved. At the time, he was on probation "for an unrelated offense, possession of heroin...." Conceding addiction, he claims selling "only to support his habit." His wish is "to be placed in CRC so that he can kick his habit and acquire skills that will help him support his family." He admits to being an illegal alien and having illegally returned to the United States several times after being deported. Prior to conviction for his present crimes, he lived with his wife and two children in Merced. He successfully participated in the addicts' program for six months prior to rejection.
Admitting to these facts of use and multiple illegal entries, he states the issue as follows:
Although considered an involuntary program for purposes of constitutional review, CRC often becomes a preferred post conviction alternative to prison. No longer is there the risk of confinement longer than the prison penal term. With the expected outpatient portion of the treatment program to occur relatively soon, it offers the potential for both a medical cure and early freedom. Therefore, it is not surprising our two appellants strongly argue their termination was arbitrary, particularly because they contend their brief time at CRC established suitability.
Contrary to the position taken by defendants, we believe the issue is better stated as follows: "May an addict be denied rehabilitative care and treatment if the Director determines the outpatient portion of the program is likely to be interrupted prior to the patient-inmate's 'cure' and safe return to society?" So stated, the focus of our inquiry shifts to the program's purposes, and the effect of multiple factors which the Director must consider in such cases. Citizenship of the patient-inmate is then reduced to but one of those factors.
PROGRAM PURPOSES
Section 3000 provides:
The importance of the outpatient participation phase is clear:
(People v. Myers (1972) 6 Cal.3d 811, 817 [100 Cal.Rptr. 612, 494 P.2d 684].)
Section 3053 provides in pertinent part:
"(a) If at any time following receipt at the facility of a person committed pursuant to this article, the Director of Corrections concludes that the person, because of excessive criminality or for other relevant reason, is not a fit subject for confinement or treatment in such narcotic detention, treatment and rehabilitation facility, he shall return the person to the court in which the case originated for such further proceedings on the criminal charges as that court may deem warranted." (Emphasis added.)
We will assume the Director used the INS hold as an "other relevant reason" for returning each patient-inmate to the court.
Courts often find it appropriate to defer to medical judgments based upon relevant facts. The diagnosis of narcotics addiction, the appropriateness of treatment, and the ultimate opinions of cure and safe release are particularly matters involving expertise. Our state Supreme Court has referred to this deference in both aspects of the CRC program. On the entry side, the high court quoted the following from People v. Marquez (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 253, 256-257, 53 Cal.Rptr. 854:
(In re Marks (1969) 71 Cal.2d 31, 40, fn. 6, 77 Cal.Rptr. 1, 453 P.2d 441.)
The Marks court found the same rule of deference applicable to release conditions. (Ibid.)
However, the trial court's authority to conduct the review "is not unfettered." (People v. Morgan (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 33, 39, 98 Cal.Rptr. 165.) Generally, the expert judgment is free from attack unless the facts upon which it depends are shown to be nonexistent or have no legal relevance to the patient-inmate's fitness to remain in the program. "Once it is established that relevant reasons in fact exist the question of whether or not they are so serious as to require rejection from the program is for the Director and not for the court." (People v. Toscano (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 140, 152, 137 Cal.Rptr. 893.)
Because of the "deferential abuse-of-discretion" standard of judicial review, the Director is required to provide the patient-inmate with certain due process rights. (People...
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