People v. Salem

• Decision Date: 22 January 2016
• Docket Number: Nos. 118693,118694.,s. 118693
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Wail SALEM, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

47 N.E.3d 997

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee

v.Wail SALEM, Appellant.

Nos. 118693

118694.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 22, 2016.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defender, and Jay Wiegman, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James Glasgow, State's Attorney, of Joliet (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Michael L. Cebula, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Chief Justice GARMAN

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In two separate trials, defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of vehicle titles and unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle. In each case, defendant filed a motion for new trial more than 30 days after the jury returned the guilty verdict, but less than 30 days after defendant was sentenced. The State did not object to the timeliness of these motions, and the circuit court of Will County heard arguments on the merits of each. The circuit court denied the motions. On appeal, the State argued that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of defendant's arguments, because the notices of appeal were not filed in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b)

(eff. Feb. 6, 2013). The appellate court, in both cases, concluded that, because the notices of appeal were not filed within 30 days of sentencing nor within 30 days of orders disposing of timely filed motions against the judgment, the appeals were not timely, and thus the appellate court did not have jurisdiction. 2014 IL App (3d) 120390–U, 2014 WL 5311375

; 2014 IL App (3d) 120523–U, 2014 WL 5311404. For the reasons set forth below, we agree. However, given the unique facts of this case, we find defendant's confusion regarding when to file his appeals was understandable. The right to appeal a criminal conviction is fundamental. Therefore, in the exercise of this court's supervisory authority, we order the appeal reinstated.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was charged with five counts of unlawful possession of vehicle titles and one count of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The State opted to proceed to trial on the unlawful possession of vehicle titles counts first. The court dismissed one of these counts by an order of nolle prosequi.

¶ 4 During the unlawful possession of vehicle titles trial (the “open titles case”), defendant objected to the admission of four pieces of evidence of other crimes. Because the trial court found the evidence to be relevant, the evidence was admitted. On December 1, 2011, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on each of the four counts. In the days following the return of the verdict, the trial court, defense counsel, and the State's Attorney discussed scheduling a sentencing hearing in the open titles case and setting a trial date for the stolen motor vehicle case. Defense counsel requested the trial court provide him with certain jury information that he argued would be necessary for a motion for new trial. That request was ultimately denied.

¶ 5 On February 27, 2012, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of four and a half years on each of the four open titles charges. After the sentencing decision was announced, the trial court judge admonished defendant regarding his right to appeal. Defense counsel then informed the court that he intended to file a motion for a new trial. The judge noted that counsel would have 30 days to file any posttrial motion and that he would refrain from assigning a public defender and triggering the appeals process until after the motion for new trial was filed. Defense counsel filed the motion for new trial on March 26, 2012—116 days after the guilty verdict was returned. The State made no objection to the timeliness of the motion. On April 9, 2012, the court heard arguments on the motion for new trial, and then denied it. Thirty days later, on May 9, 2012, defendant filed a notice of appeal.

¶ 6 The jury returned a guilty verdict in the stolen motor vehicle case on April 12, 2012. A sentencing hearing was held on May 14, 2012, and a written judgment was entered on May 17, 2012. Defendant filed a motion for new trial on June 5, 2012—54 days after the guilty verdict was returned. The motion was denied on June 21, 2012. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on June 22—one day after the motion for new trial was denied and 36 days after the written judgment was entered.

¶ 7 In both cases on appeal, the State argued that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction based on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b)

. Rule 606(b) requires that an appeal be filed within 30 days of an entry of final judgment or, if a timely motion is filed attacking a judgment, within 30 days of the order disposing of such motion. Ill. S.Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014). Defendant conceded that the notices of appeal were not filed within 30 days of the entry of final judgment in each case, but argued that, by filing the motions for new trial, he had sufficiently extended the time to file his notices of appeal.

¶ 8 Originally, defendant framed this argument as one falling within the revestment doctrine. This court addressed the scope of the revestment doctrine in People v. Bailey, which was decided while defendant's appeals were pending. 2014 IL 115459, 378 Ill.Dec. 591, 4 N.E.3d 474

. Under the revestment doctrine, the trial court regains jurisdiction beyond the 30 days following the entry of a final judgment if both parties “ ‘actively participate without objection in proceedings which are inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill.2d 237, 241, 74 Ill.Dec. 509, 456 N.E.2d 11 (1983) ). The appellate court found that the revestment doctrine did not apply in either of defendant's cases. In light of Bailey, defendant conceded that the revestment doctrine did not apply, but argued that the notices of appeal should be considered timely because the trial court had jurisdiction when the motions for new trial were filed and the notices of appeal were filed within 30 days of the orders denying the motions for new trial. The appellate court rejected this argument because the motions for new trial themselves were not timely, as required by Rule 606. Justice Wright dissented in each case. In both cases, Justice Wright agreed with the majority that the revestment doctrine did not apply, but agreed with defendant that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the motions for new trial and thus that the motions should have extended the time to file a notice of appeal. In the open titles case, Justice Wright addressed the merits of defendant's appeal and concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of other crimes, in allowing the State to present to the jury federal convictions from more than 10 years ago to impeach defendant's credibility, and in permitting the jury to consider a guilty plea. Therefore, Justice Wright would have vacated defendant's conviction in the open titles case and awarded defendant a new trial.

¶ 9 Defendant sought leave to appeal both cases to this court, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315

(eff. July 1, 2013). We allowed both petitions and consolidated the two appeals.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The only issue before the court is whether the appellate court had jurisdiction. This is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. People v. Marker, 233 Ill.2d 158, 162, 330 Ill.Dec. 164, 908 N.E.2d 16 (2009)

. “The appellate court's jurisdiction turns on litigants' compliance with our rules, specifically including the timelines established therein.” People v. Lyles, 217 Ill.2d 210, 217, 298 Ill.Dec. 752, 840 N.E.2d 1187 (2005). Therefore, resolving this question requires the court to interpret Rule 606, which establishes the procedure and timeline for perfecting an appeal, and section 116–1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which establishes the procedure and timeline for filing a motion for new trial. This court reviews de novo the interpretation of supreme court rules and statutes. Marker, 233 Ill.2d at 162, 330 Ill.Dec. 164, 908 N.E.2d 16. “When interpreting supreme court rules, our court is guided by the same principles applicable to the construction of statutes. [Citation.] With rules, as with statutes, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters' intention. [Citation.] The most reliable indicator of intent is the language used, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citation.]” Id. at 164–65, 330 Ill.Dec. 164, 908 N.E.2d 16.

¶ 12 Subsection (b) of Rule 606

provides, in relevant part, that “the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion.” Ill. S.Ct. R. 606(b)

. In a criminal case, the entry of a sentence constitutes the final judgment in the case. People v. Baldwin, 199 Ill.2d 1, 5, 262 Ill.Dec. 9, 764 N.E.2d 1126 (2002). Both parties agree that the notices of appeal were not filed within 30 days of sentencing in each case. Defendant relies on his motions for new trial, as motions against the judgments, to extend the deadline for filing a notice of appeal beyond the 30 days following the entry of final judgment.

¶ 13 The plain language of Rule 606(b)

requires that a motion challenging a judgment be timely filed in order to toll the 30–day deadline to file a notice of appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 606(b). Defendant contends that, for purposes of the rule, a motion against the judgment is timely so long as the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the motion. In support of this argument, defendant cites People v. Talach, 114 Ill.App.3d 813, 69 Ill.Dec. 920, 448 N.E.2d 638 (1983). I...