People v. Salgado
| Decision Date | 28 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. B134841.,B134841. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ricardo SALGADO, Defendant and Respondent. |
Gil Garcetti, District Attorney, Brent Riggs and Shirley S.N. Sun, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lisa M. Bassis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
In this case, we address issues left undecided in People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165 (Hatch). We hold that a trial court's post-conviction dismissal of a jury's verdict based on insufficiency of evidence is an appealable order. We further hold that judgment may be entered on that underlying jury verdict without violating the state or federal prohibition against double jeopardy.
After a jury convicted Ricardo Salgado of carjacking (Pen.Code, § 215)1 and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), the trial court granted its own motion for new trial of the carjacking count and dismissed that count after finding the evidence legally insufficient to support the verdict. In their appeal, the People raise procedural issues concerning the new trial order and dismissal, and also contend that the trial court erred in finding insufficient evidence to support Salgado's conviction for carjacking. We conclude that although the trial court had the power to dismiss the charge of carjacking, its doing so in this case on a finding that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict is error. Therefore, we reverse.
Matthew Casillas was driving a black Nissan Maxima in Whittier, California. While Casillas was stopped at a traffic light, someone opened his side door. Casillas got out of the car to investigate and saw a man, later identified as codefendant Giovanni Padilla, standing by the car holding a gun. As Casillas ran away, he saw Padilla get into the car. He also saw three men get into the back seat of the car. The car then drove off. One of the men who had gotten into the back seat wore a hat and had a shaved head on the sides but long hair in the back. Casillas identified Salgado in a photographic lineup as resembling this man because of the "shaved head and the sides." During trial, however, Casillas was unable or unwilling to identify Salgado.
Forty minutes later, the black Nissan Maxima stopped near Margarito Gutierrez, who was standing on a sidewalk in Compton. Shots were fired from the car, and Gutierrez was wounded. About 15 minutes later, the car was spotted by the police and a chase ensued. When the car crashed, codefendant Padilla jumped out from the driver's seat and was subdued by the police. Salgado was apprehended while still in the front passenger seat.
Evidence showed that the shooting was gang related. An expert testified that Padilla was a member of the Tortilla Flats street gang and Salgado was an associate of the gang. The expert also testified that there was hostility between Tortilla Flats and a rival gang, and that Gutierrez had the same ethnicity and dress style as members of the rival gang.
After the jury verdict, the trial court expressed concern over the sufficiency of the evidence against Salgado on the carjacking count and stated that it was considering relief under the new trial statute, section 1181, subdivision 6. Following argument, the court granted its own motion for a new trial on that count and, immediately thereafter, dismissed it. A June 25, 1999, minute order stated that "there was not enough evidence to support a conviction by jury; therefore, the court grants a new trial and dismisses [the carjacking count] pursuant to P.C. 1181.6." The People appeal the new trial and dismissal orders. (§ 1238, subds.(a)(3) & (a)(8).)
The People contend that the new trial order exceeded the authority of the trial court since it was made on the court's motion, not on motion by Salgado. (§ 1181.) The People also contend that granting a new trial and dismissing the carjacking count at the same time were inconsistent rulings.
We agree that, ordinarily, a trial court has no authority to grant a new trial on its own motion. (People v. Rothrock (1936) 8 Cal.2d 21, 24, 63 P.2d 807; People v. Sanders (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 350, 363, 271 Cal.Rptr. 534.) But a trial court has authority to dismiss an action or part of an action under section 1385. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 268-269, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165; People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 942, 120 Cal.Rptr. 65, 533 P.2d 193.) The trial court's error in ordering a new trial does not invalidate its contemporaneous dismissal of the carjacking count. The dismissal was a separate and distinct action authorized by section 1385. "The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed." (§ 1385.) Moreover, a section 1385 dismissal may be made after the case has been submitted to the jury. (Hatch, supra, at pp. 268-269, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165.)
The June 25, 1999, minute order cites the new trial statute (§ 1181, subd. 6), and the record shows that the trial court believed it was acting under that statute. Nevertheless, the record and minute order establish that all the conditions of a 1385 dismissal were satisfied. The minute order satisfies the requirement that "[t]he reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes." (§ 1385; People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 944, 120 Cal.Rptr. 65, 533 P.2d 193.) And the record shows that the court, in essence, made the order in furtherance of justice when it said it could not sentence a defendant on the basis of insufficient evidence. Also, the People do not contend that the trial court failed to clearly state its reason for dismissing the carjacking count.
If the dismissal is correct upon any legal theory applicable to the case, it will be upheld on appeal regardless of the court's stated explanation for the ruling. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) Also, a defect in the form of the motion should not be construed to undermine the trial court's duty to protect the fundamental rights of the accused. (See Glasser v. U.S. (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 71, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.)
Despite its deficient form, the dismissal of the carjacking count was consistent with this constitutional duty.
The record also shows that the dismissal was based on the trial court's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction as a matter of law. This is important to the questions of appealability because double jeopardy principles permit a retrial when a dismissal is based on the trial court's reweighing of the evidence as a "thirteenth juror," but precluded when a dismissal is based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence. (Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 42, 45-46, fn. 22, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652; Burks v. U.S. (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1; Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 271-272, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165.)
A section 1385 dismissal will be construed as being based on legally insufficient evidence only if "the record clearly indicates that the trial court applied the substantial evidence standard." (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 273, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165, fn. omitted.) Here, it is clear that the court applied the substantial evidence test since it "viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could [convict]." (Hatch, supra, at p. 273, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165; see also U.S. v. Martin Linen Supply Co. (1977) 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (Martin Linen).)
The June 25, 1999, minute order states that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction, and the trial court repeatedly used the phrase "insufficient evidence" during the hearings. (See People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599, 189 Cal.Rptr. 862, 659 P.2d 1152 []; see also Mannes v. Gillespie (9th Cir.1992) 967 F.2d 1310, 1315-1316 [].) Specifically, Saigado was prosecuted as an aider and abettor, and the trial court stated that the carjacking.
The People contend that, even if the dismissal was procedurally correct, the trial court erred in finding no substantial evidence to support the verdict. Before we can reach the merits of this contention, we must first determine whether the dismissal order is appealable.
In Hatch, the trial court declared a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict and later dismissed the case pursuant to section 1385. After the People refiled charges, the defendant contended that the second prosecution was barred by double jeopardy principles. The Supreme Court held that a section 1385 dismissal could be made for legally insufficient evidence after a case is submitted to the jury, and that such a dismissal is the functional equivalent of an acquittal. (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 269, 271-272, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165.) However, it concluded that the dismissal at issue resulted from the reweighing of evidence, not a determination of legal insufficiency. Therefore, the court expressly declined to decide whether a dismissal for...
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