People v. Santamaria, A057431
| Decision Date | 09 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. A057431,A057431 |
| Citation | 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 921,17 Cal.App.4th 1047 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 17 Cal.App.4th 1047, 22 Cal.App.4th 692, 27 Cal.App.4th 1304 17 Cal.App.4th 1047, 22 Cal.App.4th 692, 27 Cal.App.4th 1304 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jose Napoleon SANTAMARIA, Defendant and Respondent. |
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald A. Bass, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald E. Niver, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Joan Killeen, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.
Lawrence A. Gibbs, Grossman & Gibbs, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Berkeley, for defendant and respondent.
Once a jury has convicted a defendant of murder but found he did not personally use a knife in the commission of the crime for purposes of a sentence enhancement under Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b), may the defendant, following his successful appeal, be retried for murder on the theory he personally stabbed the victim to death? 1 The answer requires us to resolve whether the collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy clause applies to jury determinations of facts alleged for the purpose of a sentence enhancement. The issue has been the subject of conflicting opinions; as we shall explain, we believe United States Supreme Court precedent compels the conclusion that a negative enhancement finding may have collateral estoppel effect upon retrial for the underlying offense. On the facts presented here, the negative enhancement finding precludes the People from retrying defendant on the theory he personally killed the victim with a knife.
On September 5, 1985, the body of Victor Guadron was found in Moss Beach. The body had several stab wounds as well as strangulation injuries and had been run over by a car. Jewelry had apparently been removed from the body. (People v. Santamaria (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 269, 272, 280 Cal.Rptr. 43.)
The circumstances of Guadron's death were related at trial by Anthony Nubla, who had previously pleaded guilty to being an accessory to the murder and had agreed to cooperate with the prosecution. Nubla testified that on the morning of September 5, defendant Jose Napoleon Santamaria called him and offered to pay a $200 debt if Nubla would give him and Guadron a ride. When Nubla picked up the two men, Guadron sat in the front passenger seat; defendant sat behind him. After running an errand, they drove to Dolores Park, where Nubla got out to buy marijuana. Hearing a call for help, Nubla turned around, saw defendant stabbing Guadron and ran back toward the car. Defendant told him to drive toward Pacifica. As they drove, defendant took Guadron's jewelry and his money. At Moss Beach, defendant and Nubla pulled Guadron out of the car. Defendant then took the wheel and twice drove over Guadron's body. The two men returned to defendant's house and cleaned the car. About a week later, with the help of a friend of Nubla's, they pawned the jewelry. (People v. Santamaria, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 273, 280 Cal.Rptr. 43.)
In May 1987, police had Nubla arrange to meet defendant. They told Nubla what to say and equipped him with a transmitter. Nubla had two conversations with defendant, both recorded. Defendant did not explicitly admit his involvement in the murder during these conversations, but they were nonetheless incriminating. (People v. Santamaria, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 274, 280 Cal.Rptr. 43.)
Defendant was convicted by jury of first degree murder and robbery. (§§ 187, 211.) The jury also found true a robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i).) The jury found not true, however, an allegation defendant personally used a knife in committing the murder. (§ 12022, subd. (b).) In a published opinion, this court reversed defendant's conviction on the ground an 11-day continuance Following remand, the People filed a new information that mirrored the preceding one, except it did not allege a violation of section 12022, subdivision (b), for personal use of a deadly weapon. The same day, defendant filed a motion in limine to prohibit retrial on the enhancement that he personally used a knife and to preclude the presentation of evidence and argument by the prosecution in support of the theory he personally used the knife or was the direct perpetrator of the killing. The trial court granted the motion in substantial part. The court's ruling precluded the prosecution from retrying defendant on the enhancement of personal use of a knife or on the theory he personally used the knife during the killing. The court further ordered the jury be instructed at appropriate intervals throughout the trial that defendant did not personally use a knife during the killing. The court denied without prejudice, however, defendant's motion to preclude the introduction of evidence of defendant's use of the knife, including Nubla's testimony that he saw defendant stab the victim and recordings of defendant's conversations with Nubla; the court stated defendant could renew his objections as to relevance of the evidence during the course of the trial. 2
during jury deliberations constituted prejudicial error. (People v. Santamaria, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 269, 280 Cal.Rptr. 43.)
The prosecutor subsequently informed the trial court the People were unable to proceed in light of the ruling. The court ordered the case dismissed due to lack of evidence and in the interest of justice. (§ 1385.) The People appeal the dismissal, seeking review of the ruling precluding the prosecution from trying defendant on the theory he personally stabbed the victim. 3
(Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469; see also People v. White (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 822, 827, 231 Cal.Rptr. 569.) The principle thus precludes relitigation of an ultimate fact issue " (People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 411, 243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279.) In Ashe v. Swenson, supra, the United States Supreme Court held collateral estoppel is an element of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. (397 U.S. at pp. 442, 445, 90 S.Ct. at pp. 1193, 1195.)
As explained by our Supreme Court, the purposes underlying application of the collateral estoppel doctrine are (People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 695, 117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622.) Although courts on occasion describe the doctrine as an equitable concept whose application depends on principles of fairness relevant to a particular case (e.g., People v. Taylor, supra, at p. 695, 117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622, citing Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 605, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439; People v. Pettaway (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1312, 1319, 254 Cal.Rptr. 436, citing People v. Taylor, supra; People v. Nunez (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 214, 222, 228 Cal.Rptr. 64, quoting Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 932, 941, 190 Cal.Rptr. 29), in a criminal case when the same defendant is involved in both trials, the bar of collateral estoppel is constitutionally compelled (People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 692, 117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622, citing Ashe v. Swenson, supra, 397 U.S. at pp. 443-447, 90 S.Ct. at pp. 1194-96).
In this case, the trial court relied on the opinion of our colleagues in Division Five in People v. White, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 822, 231 Cal.Rptr. 569 and on the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Pettaway v. Plummer (9th Cir.1991) 943 F.2d 1041, cert. den. (1992) 506 U.S. 904, 113 S.Ct. 296, 121 L.Ed.2d 220, in ruling the jury finding defendant did not personally use a knife in the commission of the murder estopped the People from relitigating that point on retrial. Both decisions hold a jury's finding on an enhancement allegation may carry collateral estoppel effect upon retrial after appeal. The trial court declined to follow the conflicting majority decision of Division Two of this district in People v. Pettaway, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d 1312, 254 Cal.Rptr. 436.
People v. White, supra, involved a fact situation indistinguishable from that before us. The defendant was charged with a double murder and a sentence enhancement for use of a firearm in the commission of the murders. He was found guilty of the murders, but the jury returned a not true finding on the firearm-use allegation. After the convictions were reversed on appeal, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to bar the prosecution from proceeding on the theory he was the actual killer. (185 Cal.App.3d at p. 826, 231 Cal.Rptr. 569.) The defendant was again convicted on the murder counts. (Id. at p. 824, 231 Cal.Rptr. 569.)
The Court of Appeal reversed on grounds of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel: ...
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People v. Santamaria, S035076
...v. Jose Napoleon SANTAMARIA, Appellant. No. S035076. Supreme Court of California, In Bank. Nov. 17, 1993. Prior report: Cal.App., 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 921. Respondent's petition for review PANELLI, KENNARD, ARABIAN, BAXTER and GEORGE, JJ., concur. ...