People v. De Santis

• Decision Date: 07 December 1978
• Citation: 46 N.Y.2d 82,385 N.E.2d 577,412 N.Y.S.2d 838
• Parties: , 385 N.E.2d 577 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James L. DE SANTIS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 838

412 N.Y.S.2d 838

46 N.Y.2d 82, 385 N.E.2d 577

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James L. DE SANTIS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 7, 1978.

William B. Mahoney, Hudson Falls, for appellant

Edward C. Cosgrove, Dist. Atty. (Judith Blake Manzella, Buffalo, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Judge.

Defendant appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree (Penal Law, § 220.18, subd. 3) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (Penal Law, § 220.09, subd. 10). Among several grounds urged for reversal, it is argued that the determination of the Supreme Court in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) renders the actions of the police unreasonable and mandates that the fruits of their warrantless search be suppressed. We hold that the conviction should be affirmed, as the scope, intensity and duration of the search and seizure incident to defendant's lawful arrest did not exceed constitutional limits.

On December 10, 1974, defendant and his traveling companion approached a United Airlines ticket agent in San Diego, California, to purchase tickets for a flight to Buffalo by way of Chicago. They paid for their tickets by peeling one hundred dollar bills from what, according to the agent, appeared to be a wad of bills of large denomination. Throughout the entire transaction, defendant and his fellow traveler exhibited a degree of anxiety atypical of persons engaged in such a routine occurrence. His suspicions aroused by this curious conduct, and in keeping with his "responsibility to the company", the agent opened the two unlocked suitcases which the pair had checked for the flight. While subjecting the contents of the baggage to a cursory examination, the agent discovered two large plastic bags containing what appeared to be marihuana.

Upon making this discovery, the agent relayed this information to Federal drug enforcement authorities in San Diego, furnishing them with the suspects' names and features, a description of their luggage, their flight number and destination and the baggage claim ticket number for the suitcase containing the contraband. This information, in turn, was communicated to Federal authorities in Buffalo who notified the Erie County Sheriff's Department of the then impending arrest.

Upon arrival of the flight in Buffalo, Federal Agent Johnson observed two individuals matching the description supplied by San Diego authorities disembark from the plane. He followed them to the baggage claim area where he observed defendant pick up the suitcase bearing the claim number furnished by the authorities in San Diego. Addressing the defendant, Johnson said, "Excuse me, I believe you have my suitcase." When defendant produced the claim check matching the number of the ticket on the bag, Johnson apologized and defendant walked away with the suitcase. Defendant was then arrested by an Erie County Deputy Sheriff.

Both defendant and his suitcase were at once taken from the baggage claim area to a police substation located within the airport. Once there, defendant was immediately searched and the suitcase opened, revealing two large plastic bags of marihuana and a brown paper bag containing smaller bags of amphetamine pills.

Defendant raises a number of objections to the events leading up to his arrest, all of which are without merit for the reasons stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Michael F. Dillon at the Appellate Division (59 A.2d 257, 258-259, 399 N.Y.S.2d 514, 516). All that remains for our determination is the claim that the warrantless search of the suitcase exceeded constitutional limits under the rule of United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538, Supra.

It merits little discussion but to note that, except in a few specified categorical instances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits all searches and seizures without the prior approval of a disinterested Magistrate (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564). One of these exceptions, of course, allows for a warrantless search of a person and the objects within his access incident to his lawful arrest (Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231). A warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest is most often justified as necessary to protect the safety of the arresting officer, to deprive the arrestee of any potential means of escape or of the ability to destroy the evidence of a crime (Chimel v. California, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 756, 48 S.Ct. 74; People v. Evans, 43 N.Y.2d 160, 165, 400 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812, 371 N.E.2d 528, 530; People v. Erwin, 42 N.Y.2d 1064, 1065, 399 N.Y.S.2d 637, 369 N.E.2d 1170, 1171; People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177, 180, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582, 584, 313 N.E.2d 49, 51). But the practical impetus for allowing these searches lies in the fact that the arrest itself constitutes such a major intrusion into the privacy of the individual that the encroachment caused by a contemporaneous search of the arrestee and his possessions at hand is in reality De minimus (People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 462, 467-468, 358 N.Y.S.2d 383, 388-389, 315 N.E.2d 452, 455-456; see also, People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d 351, 354, 361 N.Y.S.2d 897, 900, 320 N.E.2d 636, 638). Thus, when viewed in the context of reasonableness, the cornerstone in any Fourth Amendment inquiry (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576), the lawful custodial arrest being reasonable (see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598), the search of the person and the area within his immediate control, in this instance defendant's suitcase, does not involve any greater reduction in the arrestee's expectation of privacy than that caused by the arrest itself.

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 Supra does not compel a different result. In that case, railroad officials in San Diego observed two individuals loading a heavy footlocker on a train bound for Boston. Their suspicious were aroused when they noticed it was leaking talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor of marihuana. These suspicions were reported to Federal agents who relayed the information to their counterparts in...