People v. Sarkodie

• Decision Date: 08 May 2019
• Docket Number: 2015–01724,Ind. No. 2544/13
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Justin SARKODIE, Appellant.

172 A.D.3d 909
100 N.Y.S.3d 63

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent,
v.
Justin SARKODIE, Appellant.

2015–01724
Ind. No. 2544/13

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—January 7, 2019
May 8, 2019

100 N.Y.S.3d 64

Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Tammy E. Linn of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Victor Barall, Howard B. Goodman, and Diane R. Eisner of counsel), for respondent.

ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J., RUTH C. BALKIN, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

172 A.D.3d 909

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme

172 A.D.3d 910

Court, Kings County (Neil Jon Firetog, J.), rendered February 11, 2015, convicting him of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to an indeterminate

100 N.Y.S.3d 65

term of imprisonment of 25 years to life on the conviction of murder in the second degree, and a concurrent determinate term of imprisonment of 15 years imprisonment, to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision, on the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the sentence imposed on the conviction of murder in the second degree from an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 years to life to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 20 years to life; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the People's contention, the defendant's suppression arguments are preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Jones , 164 A.D.3d 1363, 1364, 85 N.Y.S.3d 75 ). Nevertheless, the record demonstrates that the initial stop of the defendant was based on reasonable suspicion, which ripened into probable cause supporting the defendant's subsequent de facto arrest (see People v. Hicks , 68 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 508 N.Y.S.2d 163, 500 N.E.2d 861 ; People v. De Bour , 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 ; People v. Lawson , 163 A.D.3d 996, 998, 82 N.Y.S.3d 568 ). Additionally, the defendant's statements to the police, which were given after he was informed of, and waived, his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 448, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ), were voluntarily made (see People v. Mateo , 2 N.Y.3d 383, 413, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Sands , 164 A.D.3d 613, 614, 82 N.Y.S.3d 599 ; People v. Gelin , 128 A.D.3d 717, 718, 8 N.Y.S.3d 424 ). Further, there is no support for the defendant's contention that the hearing testimony of the police officers was incredible, patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections, or otherwise unworthy of belief (see People v. Pleasant , 146 A.D.3d 985, 987, 46 N.Y.S.3d 643 ; People v. Hobson , 111 A.D.3d 958, 959, 975 N.Y.S.2d 682 ). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's denial of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.

In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view...