People v. Scalza

• Citation: 548 N.Y.S.2d 349,152 A.D.2d 235
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Patrick SCALZA, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 04 December 1989
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

Page 349

548 N.Y.S.2d 349

152 A.D.2d 235

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Patrick SCALZA, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Dec. 4, 1989.

Steven R. Bernhard, Mineola, for appellant.

Denis Dillon, Dist. Atty., Mineola (Bruce E. Whitney and Kathleen M. Cruise, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MANGANO, J.P., and BROWN, KOOPER and SULLIVAN, JJ.

KOOPER, Justice.

The principal issue on this appeal is whether CPL 255.20(4), which authorizes references to Judicial Hearing Officers in pretrial criminal matters, constitutes an impermissible delegation of the County Court's jurisdiction to unelected, nonjudicial State employees in violation of the New York State Constitution (see, N.Y. Const. art. VI, §§ 10, 11). For the following reasons, we reject the defendant's constitutional challenge and, accordingly, affirm the judgment appealed from.

I.

Insofar as pertinent, the record reveals that the defendant was arrested after the police discovered a quantity of weapons, including 14 rifles and four handguns, in the defendant's residence and automobile. The defendant was subsequently charged, inter alia, with six counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. By order dated May 22, 1987, the County Court, Nassau County, directed that a hearing be conducted with regard to those branches of the defendant's motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement authorities. Pursuant to CPL 255.20(4), the County Court thereafter assigned the pretrial hearing to a judicial hearing officer to hear and report. In rendering his report, the Judicial Hearing Officer found no impropriety was committed by the police in securing the weapons and obtaining the defendant's oral statements.

By order dated November 23, 1987, the County Court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Judicial Hearing Officer. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of six counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and sentenced to six concurrent terms of one year imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant contends, inter alia, that on its face and as applied to him, CPL 255.20(4) is unconstitutional insofar as it allegedly authorizes the transfer of the County Court's powers from constitutionally elected judges to nonjudicial, unelected employees of the Unified Court System (see, N.Y. Const. art. VI, §§ 10, 11). ¹ We find the defendant's contentions to be unpersuasive.

II.

Given impetus by large case backlogs and increasing calendar congestion, the enactment of CPL 255.20(4) had its genesis in the creation of the "Committee to Utilize the Services of Retired Judges". A principal objective underlying the creation of the Committee was to ascertain whether retired judges could be employed in easing the caseload crises facing the judicial system (see, Schanback v. Schanback, 130 A.D.2d 332, 337-338, 519 N.Y.S.2d 819). The Committee, entrusted with the task of determining how best to utilize the experience of the State's retired judges, concluded that the retired judges could, in fact, make "a significant contribution toward alleviating some of the backlog and delay" (see, Report of the Committee to Utilize the Services of Retired Judges, reprinted in Fifth Annual Report of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, at 110 [1983] [hereinafter cited as Fifth Annual Report ]. In its report, the Committee observed that there had occurred a "significant increase in criminal proceedings caused by an increased crime rate and a subsequent increase in arrests and trials", producing "acute pressure on the criminal justice system" (Fifth Annual Report at 113). The Committee anticipated that employing retired judges as Judicial Hearing Officers would, "provide invaluable assistance to the expedition of criminal cases by freeing sitting judges from the time consuming pre-trial processes and permitting them to devote their energy to the actual trials themselves" (Fifth Annual Report, at 113). In 1983, the Legislature adopted the Committee's recommendations and, inter alia, enacted CPL 255.20(4) (L.1983, ch. 840). CPL 255.20(4) empowers the court to assign pretrial matters in criminal cases to Judicial Hearing Officers, who shall entertain the matter "in the same manner as a court", and thereafter file a report "setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law" ² (see also, Judiciary Law § 850). The statute further provides that upon review of the hearing transcript, the hearing officer's report, and other relevant documents and submissions, the court shall render the ultimate determination with regard to the motion (see, Bellacosa, 1983 Supplemental Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL 255.20, 1989 Cum.Ann. Pocket Part, at 177). Contrary to the defendant's contentions, we discern no constitutional infirmity in the foregoing statutory scheme.

III.

We note initially that, "[a]n enactment of our Legislature is presumed to be valid and the heavy burden of demonstrating that a statute is unconstitutional rests with the one seeking to invalidate the statute" (see, People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376, 382, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66, 520 N.E.2d 1355; Matter of McGee v. Korman, 70 N.Y.2d 225, 231, 519 N.Y.S.2d 350, 513 N.E.2d 236; Babigian v. Wachtler, 69 N.Y.2d 1012, 1013-1014, 517 N.Y.S.2d 905, 511 N.E.2d 49; Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust For Cultural Resources of City of N.Y., 46 N.Y.2d 358, 370, 413 N.Y.S.2d 357, 385 N.E.2d 1284; Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25 N.Y.2d 237, 247, 303 N.Y.S.2d 633, 250 N.E.2d 690). The invalidity of the statute must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and, "[t]he drastic step of striking a statute as unconstitutional is to be taken only as a last resort" (see, Matter of McGee v. Korman, supra, 70 N.Y.2d at 231, 519 N.Y.S.2d 350, 513 N.E.2d 236). The defendant has failed to discharge the heavy burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of the challenged statute.

At the outset, we reject the defendant's suggestion that an assigning court's adoption of a Judicial Hearing Officer's recommendations constitutes no more than a ministerial formality by which the court surrenders its constitutional and statutory obligation to render decisions in matters over which it possesses jurisdiction. There is nothing in the record which indicates that the County Court abandoned its statutory duty to fully and independently review the Judicial Hearing Officer's report, together with other relevant documents, prior to rendering its decision. Nor is there anything in the statute itself which would prompt us to subscribe to the defendant's speculative assertions in this respect. Indeed, by vesting in the referring court the authority to render the ultimate decision in any referenced matter, the framers of CPL 255.20(4) necessarily conferred upon the court broad discretion to accept, reject or modify the hearing officer's recommendations (see, e.g., People v. Ortiz, 138 Misc.2d 486, 524 N.Y.S.2d 655; see also, Bellacosa, 1983 Supplemental Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL 255.20, 1989 Cum.Ann. Pocket Part, at 177).

The defendant nevertheless contends that the statute is constitutionally deficient in that certain inherently judicial prerogatives are exercised exclusively by the Judicial Hearing Officer, since it is he or she who presides over the hearing rather than the Judge. He argues, for example, that the key function of assessing credibility can only be exercised by the Judicial Hearing Officer who is present at the hearing. We reject the contention that an issue of constitutional import arises merely because a hearing officer may be required to assess credibility or make findings of fact in matters properly before him or her. Although Judicial Hearing Officers may be empowered to make recommendations with respect to credibility and, necessarily, to perform other duties which can only be exercised by the individual actually presiding at the hearing, they possess no...