People v. Schaufele

• Decision Date: 02 June 2014
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 13SA276
• Citation: 325 P.3d 1060
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Jack Lee SCHAUFELE, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

325 P.3d 1060

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant

v.Jack Lee SCHAUFELE, Defendant-Appellee

Supreme Court Case No. 13SA276

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 2, 2014

Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court, Arapahoe County District Court Case No. 12CR2006, Honorable John L. Wheeler, Judge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant: George H. Brauchler, District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District, L. Andrew Cooper, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Centennial, Colorado.

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee: Foster Graham Milstein & Calisher, LLP, Daniel S. Foster, Lindsay N. Hutchinson, Chip G. Schoneberger, Denver, Colorado.

En Banc

JUSTICE HOOD announced the judgment of the Court.

¶ 1 Jack Lee Schaufele was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in injuries to himself and others. One hour and four minutes later, while Schaufele lay unresponsive at the hospital, a police officer told a nurse to draw Schaufele's blood for alcohol analysis. It is undisputed that the officer and her co-workers never considered applying for a search warrant. The People later sought to use evidence from that blood draw in prosecuting Schaufele for vehicular assault, driving under the influence, driving under the influence per se, and careless driving.

¶ 2 In this interlocutory appeal, we consider whether the trial court applied the proper legal test when it suppressed evidence stemming from the blood draw. The People also ask us to adopt a new approach in evaluating whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless blood draw of a suspected drunk driver, an approach based solely upon the length of time required to secure a search warrant.

¶ 3 We affirm the trial court's suppression order. We hold that the trial court properly adhered to Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), in suppressing evidence of Schaufele's blood draw. We reject the People's invitation to disregard the majority opinion in McNeely, which instructs a trial court to consider the totality of the circumstances, and to adopt instead Chief Justice Roberts's concurring and dissenting opinion that “a warrantless blood draw may ensue” if “an officer could reasonably conclude that there is not sufficient time to seek and receive a warrant.” Id. at 1573 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

¶ 4 Although only four justices expressly rejected Chief Justice Roberts's proposed modified per se rule, the Chief Justice's proposed approach garnered only three votes, and we do not feel at liberty to adopt it here.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 5 The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and made pertinent factual findings in its order granting Schaufele's motion to suppress. The People do not contest these findings, which are summarized below.

¶ 6 Schaufele was involved in a motor vehicle accident at about 7:10 a.m. The first police officer to arrive at the scene, Alden Langert,¹ observed that, although Schaufele was conscious, he was sluggish, his speech was mumbled and unintelligible, and he was largely nonresponsive to the officer's questions. The second officer to arrive, Patrick Andrews, described Schaufele as speaking with a “thick tongue”; he also noted that Schaufele had bloodshot, watery eyes and described his responses as “sluggish,” “delayed,” and “hesitant.”

¶ 7 Officers Langert and Andrews did not smell alcohol on Schaufele's person or in the immediate vicinity, but they nevertheless concluded that Schaufele's behavior was consistent with either intoxication or a head injury. Likewise, a paramedic at the scene smelled Schaufele's breath at close range to assess whether alcohol was involved and did not smell anything indicative of alcohol consumption. Officer Andrews did not believe that probable cause then existed to arrest Schaufele for driving while intoxicated or impaired. Thus, he did not attempt to get a warrant for a nonconsensual blood test, nor did he instruct any other officers to seek Schaufele's consent for a blood draw or to obtain a warrantless blood draw without his consent.

¶ 8 Meanwhile, another officer, Suzanne Beckstrom, arrived at the scene. Officer Andrews briefed her about Schaufele's lethargic manner and slurred speech and told her to follow the ambulance to the hospital to continue investigating.

¶ 9 Paramedics transported Schaufele to the hospital at 7:36 a.m. Officer Beckstrom followed. When she attempted to speak with Schaufele at the hospital, Officer Beckstrom detected the “stale odor of alcohol” on his breath and body. She also noticed that his responses to her questions were unintelligible, his eyes were red and watery, and his speech was slurred.

¶ 10 Based on these observations, Officer Beckstrom decided that she had probable cause to conduct a blood draw. She attempted to speak with Schaufele to provide an advisement under Colorado's express consent law, but was unable to do so because he was either unconscious or sleeping. Officer Beckstrom then told a nurse to draw Schaufele's blood for alcohol analysis. The blood draw took place at 8:14 a.m.—one hour and four minutes after the reported time of the accident. A forensic analysis of the blood sample established that Schaufele's blood alcohol level was .205 grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of blood—well over the statutory threshold.

¶ 11 The police officers did not obtain, or seek to obtain, a warrant. At the suppression hearing, Officers Langert, Andrews, and Beckstrom testified that they were aware that the Greenwood Village Police Department, the Office of the District Attorney, the county attorneys in Arapahoe County, and the Colorado judicial branch all have established procedures in place (which may be initiated by computers in police cars) that would have enabled them to apply for and obtain a search warrant for a blood test on an exigent basis. But none of them had ever applied for an expedited warrant, and none of them did so here.²

¶ 12 The police ultimately determined that Schaufele caused the accident. He was charged with vehicular assault, driving under the influence, driving under the influence per se, and careless driving resulting in death or injury.

¶ 13 Before trial, Schaufele successfully moved to suppress evidence from the warrantless blood draw. In response, the People filed a motion for reconsideration, which—for the first time—suggested that the trial court should invoke the modified per se rule proposed by Chief Justice Roberts and endorsed by only two other members of the Supreme Court.³ The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 14 The People then filed an interlocutory appeal under section 16–12–102(2), C.R.S. (2013), and C.A.R. 4.1, conceding that the trial court reached the right conclusion under existing law, but nonetheless urging with singular focus that we should reverse the trial court under the modified per se rule proposed by Chief Justice Roberts.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 15 Suppression cases typically involve a mixed question of fact and law. People v. Bonilla–Barraza, 209 P.3d 1090, 1094 (Colo.2009). In reviewing a suppression order, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact. We will not overturn those factual findings if competent evidence in the record supports them. People v. Castaneda, 249 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Colo.2011). We review the trial court's application of the law de novo. Id.; accord People v. Brunsting, 2013 CO 55, ¶ 15, 307 P.3d 1073, 1078, cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 789, 187 L.Ed.2d 601 (2013). ⁴

¶ 16 Where, as here, a constitutional right is implicated, we assess whether the trial court “applied an erroneous legal standard or came to a conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent with or unsupported by the factual findings,” considering the court's legal conclusion “under the totality of the circumstances.” People v. Syrie, 101 P.3d 219, 222 (Colo.2004).

III. Analysis

¶ 17 In seeking to reverse the trial court's suppression order, the People pose the following question: “Under the Fourth Amendment, do exigent circumstances justify a warrantless blood draw of a drunk driver if the police reasonably believe the blood can be drawn before a warrant can be secured?” In positing this question, they invite us to adopt the modified per se rule proposed by Chief Justice Roberts. Because we feel constrained by binding precedent of the Supreme Court, we decline to do so.

¶ 18 We begin with a brief discussion of the Fourth Amendment's applicability to blood draws. We next discuss the totality of the circumstances test for exigency that the Supreme Court articulated in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and reiterated in the majority opinion in McNeely. We then examine whether the trial court correctly applied this test in evaluating the constitutionality of Schaufele's blood draw and determine that it did. We conclude by considering the People's invitation to shun the majority opinion in McNeely and to embrace instead the rule that Chief Justice Roberts proposed in his concurring and dissenting opinion. We reject that invitation.

A. The Fourth Amendment

¶ 19 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[A] warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception.” McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1558.

¶ 20 A blood draw is a search because it is “a compelled physical intrusion beneath [a defendant's] skin and into his veins to obtain a sample of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation.” Id. This constitutes “an invasion of bodily integrity [that] implicates an individual's ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’ ” Id. (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985)); see alsoSchmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (emphasizing the “indisputable and great” importance of a warrant before a...