People v. Brunsting
| Citation | 307 P.3d 1073 |
| Decision Date | 01 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 09SC323 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Lance Patrick BRUNSTING, Respondent |
| Court | Supreme Court of Colorado |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Court of Appeals Case No. 05CA2776
Attorneys for Petitioner: John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Katherine A. Hansen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent:Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Joseph Paul Hough, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
¶ 1 In this appeal, we consider the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement as it applies to the emergency created when officer safety is placed in jeopardy. We hold that officer safety concerns fall within the exigent circumstances exception when “(1) the officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others, and (2) the manner and scope of the search is reasonable.” 1 We apply this test to the record in this case, and we conclude that the deputy sheriff's initial entry into the defendant's curtilage was justified by the exigent circumstances exception.2 We do not consider, nor did the court of appeals consider, conduct by law enforcement in response to observations made after officer safety concerns caused the first deputy to enter the curtilage. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. We remand to that court to consider the remainder of the issues raised on appeal concerning the conduct by law enforcement that occurred after the first deputy crossed into the defendant's curtilage and to consider all other outstanding issues.
¶ 2 The Arapahoe County Sheriff's Department received a call from R. Talent, who claimed to have spotted his stolen van in the driveway of a house that was later determined to be the residence of the Respondent, Lance Brunsting. Talent told police that he suspected that a man named Lance stole his van. Additionally, Talent reported to police that Lance was known to carry a gun and was associated with dangerous people who were involved in drugs and who were known to carry guns. Talent explained that he had found his van at Brunsting's residence after searching the neighborhood. Before the deputies arrived, Talent reportedly approached the home to speak with Brunsting and overheard people inside discussing guns. According to Talent, he then retreated and called the Sheriff's Department.
¶ 3 Concerned with the report of guns at the residence, the Sheriff's Department dispatched five deputies and a sergeant to the location identified by Talent. The officers arrived at the residence at approximately 11:00 p.m. and met Talent in front of the house. The house was illuminated only by a single light above the garage on the side of the house.
¶ 4 As deputies interviewed Talent, a woman and two juveniles exited the house. The woman identified herself as the owner of the house. The deputies informed the owner about the stolen van allegation, and she denied knowledge of the van and its purported theft. The owner also confirmed to the deputies that a man named Lance rented out her basement, and she informed the officers that four people were inside the house. When the deputies asked for permission to enter the house, she denied the request. The owner raised her voice throughout the interview, which led Deputy Carroll to conclude that she sought to alert the remaining occupants in the house to the deputies' presence.
¶ 5 At the same time, Talent became impatient with the investigation and told the deputies he would knock on the residence's door unless they did. Deputy Carroll then approached the van parked in the driveway. He observed that the stereo and speakers had been stripped from the van, consistent with Talent's theft claim.
¶ 6 The deputies attempted to reach the house's occupants by phone, and when that failed, they decided to knock on the front door. Just before they knocked, the deputies noticed security cameras positioned around the home's front perimeter. The cameras raised officer safety concerns with Sergeant Dennis, the supervisor on duty. Specifically, he expressed concern that individuals within the house would know the deputies' positions and movements and would use that information to ambush them.
¶ 7 Because of his concern that their position left the deputies vulnerable to a confrontation with one or more armed suspects, Sergeant Dennis ordered deputies to monitor the backyard from the east and west sides of the home in case someone were to emerge from the back side of the residence and confront them. At the west side of the house, Deputy Carroll was assigned to a position on the house's driveway next to the open gate of a waist-high chain-link fence that separated the right-hand side of the driveway from the backyard. As he approached the side of the house, however, Deputy Carroll realized that a security camera had been hung over the garage door and was pointed at the driveway, directly at Deputy Carroll's assigned position. As a result, Deputy Carroll grew concerned that the house's occupants would observe him standing in the driveway and that he would be vulnerable to shots fired by the reportedly armed occupants from the cover of the house's darkened windows. In order to mitigate the potential threat from within the house and to protect Sergeant Dennis from ambush, Deputy Carroll avoided the cameras, entered the backyard through the open gate, and hid in the shadows of a nearby bush. 3
¶ 8 After Deputy Carroll entered the property, a rapid series of events led to the detention of four individuals as well as the discovery of guns and evidence consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine.4 Consequently, the deputies arrested several individuals, including Brunsting.
¶ 9 The prosecution charged Brunsting with several felonies related to the manufacture of methamphetamine.5 Relevant to this appeal, he moved to suppress the evidence found in the house, arguing that the deputies' entry into the backyard violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
¶ 10 The trial court found that Deputy Carroll entered the residence's curtilage out of concern for officer safety and concluded that the evidence should not be suppressed. The trial judge explained that to ask officers to cease their investigation and “disregard their training as police officers and their obligation to protect us ... defies logic.” The trial court found that because Talent insisted on confronting the house's occupants, the deputies could not have withdrawn to seek a search warrant without leaving behind a dangerous and volatile situation. The trial court also found that Deputy Carroll's entry into Brunsting's backyard was reasonable and was motivated by reasonable concern for his safety: “the police officers had a right to go into the backyard of this house to protect themselves, ... and their entry into the backyard was reasonable.” Accordingly, the court denied Brunsting's suppression motion.
¶ 11 In a subsequent trial, a jury convicted Brunsting of the charged offenses. He appealed.
¶ 12 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion and determined that, while the deputies possessed probable cause to believe a theft occurred, no exigent circumstance permitted Deputy Carroll to enter the backyard. People v. Brunsting, 224 P.3d 259, 265 (Colo.App.2009). Therefore, the court of appeals held that such entry violated Brunsting's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The court of appeals declined to address Brunsting's remaining issues on appeal, including several constitutional violations that Brunsting alleged occurred after Deputy Carroll entered the backyard.6Id. at 266.
Judge Connelly dissented. Id. (Connelly, J., dissenting). He opined that the prosecution demonstrated the reasonableness of the entry in light of the deputies' concern for officer safety, and he concluded that “[t]he officers reasonably decided the exigencies of this fast-developing situation required immediate action.” Id. at 268.
¶ 14 We granted certiorari to consider “[w]hether the court of appeals erred in concluding that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless entry and search in this case.”
¶ 15 When we review a motion to suppress, we defer to a trial court's findings of fact and will not disturb those findings as long as they are supported by evidence in the record. People v. Funez–Paiagua, 2012 CO 37, ¶ 37, 276 P.3d 576, 578. We review de novo the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion of whether the officers violated the defendant's constitutional rights. People v. Revoal, 2012 CO 8, ¶ 9, 269 P.3d 1238, 1240.
¶ 16 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution prohibit “unreasonable searches and seizures.” For purposes of appeal, the People have conceded that Deputy Carroll's actions constituted a search. Therefore, we consider only whether Deputy Carroll's actions are lawful under our case law, the case law of the United States Supreme Court, and Fourth Amendment principles generally. To that end, we begin by summarizing the principles of law that govern a warrantless search. Next, we consider whether the actions of law enforcement in this case were supported by probable cause. Then, we examine the exigency created when officer safety is placed in jeopardy, and we hold that officer safety concerns fall within the exigent circumstances exception when (1) the officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others, and (2) the manner and scope of the search is reasonable. Finally, we apply our test to the facts of this case.
¶ 17 The Fourth Amendment state...
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