People v. Schuemann, 26353

Decision Date19 April 1976
Docket NumberNo. 26353,26353
Citation190 Colo. 474,548 P.2d 911
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald LeRoy SCHUEMANN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

John D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., David A. Sorenson, Janet Lee Miller, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Dorian E. Welch, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.

ERICKSON, Justice.

The defendant, Ronald LeRoy Schuemann, was charged with and convicted of first-degree murder, 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40--3--102, 1 and conspiracy to commit murder, 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40--2--201. 2 He was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of forty years to life. Numerous errors are alleged as a basis for a new trial. Our review of the record satisfies us that reversible error occurred which requires us to direct that a new trial be granted.

The defendant contends that he was unfairly restricted in the presentation of evidence and was denied the right to offer the testimony of a key witness. We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial.

In the early morning hours of May 8, 1973, the Arapahoe County sheriff's department commenced an investigation of the shooting death of John Plum. Plum was shot while he was in his pickup truck, and he was found dead behind the steering wheel. An investigation led to the arrest of the defendant, Ronald LeRoy Schuemann.

The prosecution established that John Plum was executed pursuant to contract. The evidence before the jury was that Robert Byers was carrying on an affair with Charlotte Plum, John Plum's wife, and wanted the husband killed. The trial established that Byers contracted with the defendant to have John Plum killed and paid $500 down on the contract price. Byers pled guilty to being an accessory and testified against the defendant.

The defendant took the stand in his own defense and told a story that placed responsibility for the murder on Byers. He testified that Byers told him he had a 'package' that he wanted picked up and taken somewhere and that the job was dangerous and would pay quite well. According to Scheumann, on the night of the murder, he met Byers outside Plum's apartment house and, at the same time, discovered John Plum's body behind the steering wheel of his truck. Byers, according to Scheumann, pointed a rifle at him and told him that this was his package and that he was to dispose of it in a place where it would not be found for a while.

Byers was last seen by his roommate around 10:30 p.m. on the night in question, and his roommate testified that Byers conceivably could have left the apartment without his knowledge. Lastly, when Byers was in custody, he admitted killing Plum. The jury was called upon to determine whether Plum met his death at the hands of the defendant or Byers. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conclusion by the jury that the defendant shot Plum. On the other hand, the defendant's testimony that Byers shot Plum was entitled to be evaluated by a jury that was aware of Byers' mental condition. At the trial, Byers' credibility became significantly important when he denied shooting Plum.

Certainly, the defendant's credibility was downgraded because of his numerous and inconsistent versions of the events which culminated in the murder of Plum. Scheumann had psychiatric and drug problems which further diminished his credibility. Byers, however, suffered from psychiatric problems which may have affected his credibility. Defense counsel should have been permitted to present evidence to the jury relating to Byers' mental condition. The evidence indicated that Byers, not the defendant, created and was the moving force behind the plot to murder John Plum.

I. Limitations on Cross-Examination

Defense counsel was limited by the court in his cross-examination of Byers as to Byers' mental condition. The record clearly establishes that Byers not only had a history of psychiatric problems, but also, according to one psychiatrist, was a delusional paranoid schizophrenic. One psychiatric report in the record declared that Byers was insane. Initially, an In camera hearing was held to determine whether Byers was competent to testify. The court ruled that Byers was competent to testify and further stated that 'any questions that might be raised go to the weight to be given to (his) testimony . . ..'

When the jury was recalled, Byers was cross-examined by defense counsel on his original, but withdrawn, plea of insanity. He was asked whether he had originally pled not guilty by reason of insanity and whether he had been examined by a doctor in Pueblo. The prosecution objected to this line of questioning, and the objection was sustained. Thereafter, another In camera hearing was held outside of the presence of the jury, and defense counsel, at this hearing, stated that he intended to ask Byers whether a doctor in Pueblo had found him to be legally insane. Alternatively, he declared that he intended to ask Byers whether he knew that a doctor in Pueblo had found him to be legally insane. Both questions were held to be improper by the trial judge. In our view, the trial judge made the correct evidentiary ruling.

Mental incapacity of a witness is clearly admissible for the purpose of impeachment, since it bears directly upon the question of credibility. Johnson v. People, 171 Colo. 505, 468 P.2d 745 (1970); ...

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20 cases
  • Kogan v. People
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • May 9, 1988
    ...People v. Loscutoff, 661 P.2d 274 (Colo.1983) (limitation of cross-examination within trial court's discretion); People v. Schuemann, 190 Colo. 474, 548 P.2d 911 (1976) (same). Cullen was a critical witness in the prosecution's case since he was the school official responsible for assisting......
  • State v. Harman
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • September 16, 1980
    ...(1974); Bakken v. State, 489 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1971); People v. Neely, 228 Cal.App.2d 16, 39 Cal.Rptr. 251 (1964); People v. Schuemann, 190 Colo. 474, 548 P.2d 911 (1976); State v. Heald, 393 A.2d 537 (Me.1978); People v. Mandel, 61 A.D.2d 563, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978); State v. Stamm, 16 Wash......
  • State v. Fain
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 4, 1989
    ...to testify at trial, he is still subject to an attack on his credibility based upon his mental state or capacity. People v. Schuemann , 548 P.2d 911, 913 (1976). The value of this rule was pointed out by a commentator who stated that, 'Actually, the psychopathic liar may be so convincing th......
  • People v. Rubanowitz
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • September 4, 1984
    ...would elicit testimony in itself inadmissible or which probes matters immaterial to issues of bias or prejudice. People v. Scheumann, 190 Colo. 474, 548 P.2d 911 (1976); People v. Simmons, 182 Colo. 350, 513 P.2d 193 (1973). Within this framework, the motives of those who testify against a ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Cross-examination in Criminal Cases
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 7-10, October 1978
    • Invalid date
    ...49, 532 P.2d 962 (1975). 68. People v. Roberts,_____ Colo. App._____, 553 P.2d 93 (1976). 69. Id. 70. People v. Schuemann,_____Colo._____,548 P.2d 911 (1976). 71. People v. Lewis, supra, note 55; See also Moeller v. People, 70 Colo. 223, 199 P. 414 (1921). (c) 1978 The Colorado Lawyer and C......
  • Admissibility of a Witness's Mental Health History for Purposes of Impeachment
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 21-7, July 1992
    • Invalid date
    ...or suffered from a severe illness, such as schizophrenia, that dramatically impaired her ability to perceive and tell the truth. 7. 548 P.2d 911 (Colo. 1976). 8. Id. at 914. 9. 624 P.2d 900 (Colo.App. 1980). 10. Id. at 904. Although a witness may testify regarding the general effects of a m......

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