People v. Scott

• Decision Date: 27 May 2021
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 18CA0332
• Citation: 494 P.3d 651,2021 COA 71
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Raheen SCOTT, Defendant-Appellant.

494 P.3d 651

2021 COA 71

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Charles Raheen SCOTT, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0332

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division V.

Announced May 27, 2021

Rehearing Denied June 17, 2021

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jacob B. McMahon, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE YUN

¶ 1 A jury has the discretionary power to acquit a defendant, even if each juror believes the defendant to be guilty according to the law and the evidence. This is called jury nullification. While appellate courts recognize that juries have this de facto power, they uniformly agree that trial courts should not encourage jury nullification. This is because this de facto power is at odds with other foundational features of the jury system: the historical allocation of responsibilities under which the court determines the law and the jury the facts; the oath that jurors take to "well and truly try the matter before the court, and render a true verdict, according to the evidence and the law"; and the court's instructions to the jury that it must follow the law even it disagrees with the law or does not understand the reasons for the law. COLJI-Crim. B:01, E:01 (2020).

¶ 2 In this case, Charles Raheen Scott, while testifying in his own defense, tried to ask the jury to exercise its nullification power and acquit him of attempting to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The district court interrupted his testimony, ordered him to stop testifying about jury nullification, and warned him that he could be held in contempt if he continued to discuss jury nullification. On appeal, Scott argues that the court's interruption violated his constitutional rights. But Scott had no constitutional right to testify about jury nullification. Nor did the court's interruption impair his constitutional rights to self-representation or to testify. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

I. Background

¶ 3 After intercepting a suspicious package, a United States postal inspector conducted a consensual "knock and talk" at the address on the package. Scott answered the door. He told the inspector that the addressee — his child's mother — was not home but that he could sign for the package. The inspector, however, told Scott that he could not sign for the package. Scott then admitted that the package was for him and that it contained cocaine. When the inspector opened the package, he found about forty-four grams of cocaine inside a stuffed animal. Fort Collins police immediately arrested Scott, and he was charged with attempted possession of a schedule I or II controlled substance with intent to manufacture or distribute, in violation of sections 18-18-405(1), 18-18-405(2)(b)(I)(A), and 18-2-101, C.R.S. 2020.

¶ 4 Scott pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial, where he represented himself. In his opening statement, Scott did not deny attempting to possess cocaine. But he denied that he committed a crime because, he explained, cocaine should be legal "for the same reason that alcohol is legal." After the prosecution rested, he testified in his own defense. He said that he is a right-leaning Libertarian and that he believes that a drug transaction between consenting adults is not a crime because it does not victimize anyone. He then started to talk about the history of jury nullification and how, during Prohibition, juries routinely decided not to punish bootleggers "despite the fact that those drug dealers were factually guilty of breaking the law."

¶ 5 Before Scott could say the words "jury nullification," however, the district court intervened:

MR. SCOTT: .... Wow. What else can I say. I'm not sure — oh, like I said earlier, there were a number of people in our history, they have voted not guilty on behalf of defendants, and those defendants have gone free despite the fact that they were factually guilty of breaking the law. And what that process is called is —

THE COURT: Just a moment. Counsel approach.

(The following proceedings were had in low tones at the bench:)

THE COURT: I'll caution you, you're about to talk to the jury about what's called jury nullification. I'm not going to allow that. It's not appropriate.

MR. SCOTT: Does inappropriate mean illegal?

THE COURT: I'm not going to allow that. You were advised of this earlier as to jury nullification.¹

MR. SCOTT: I don't understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm not allowing that. That's not appropriate. You're inviting this jury to violate their oath. I'm not going to allow you to do that.

I'm not going to allow you to do that, give you an opportunity — Mr. Scott, I will give you an opportunity later to make a record on that after the jury is done with — after you're done with your testimony. Okay? But I'm not going to allow you to invite this jury to violate their oath.

Do you have any other testimony that you want to provide?

MR. SCOTT: I don't —

THE COURT: We are not going to invite the jury to violate their oath and to discard their oath. Do you understand that? That was my order to you. I'm ordering you —

MR. SCOTT: You still haven't explained to me why it's not permissible. You said that it's inappropriate, but you're not saying that it's illegal, I do not have the right to do that. Why do I not have the right to do it?

THE COURT: Not in this courtroom, you do not have the right in this trial to violate their oath.

MR. SCOTT: If I can't do it in this courtroom, then where can I do it?

THE COURT: Mr. Scott, I will not allow — if you violate my order, this is a direct order of the Court, I will consider you to be in contempt of Court. Do you understand that?

MR. SCOTT: What does that mean?

THE COURT: In fact, Mr. Scott, I've let you go quite — what it means is that you're violating a court order and you are in contempt of Court. If you are in direct violation of a court order, I can make a determination whether or not you should be sanctioned. That sanction could be a period of time of up to six months in jail for violating a direct order of this Court. Do you understand that, sir?

MR. SCOTT: I do.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Scott, I've already let you go quite a ways in terms of information that was not directly relevant to the charges here. I've given you quite a lot of leeway. I'm not going to give you leeway to invite this jury to violate their oaths. Do you understand that you are not to testify in that regard?

MR. SCOTT: Okay.

¶ 6 During cross-examination, Scott admitted that he knew the package contained cocaine, that he had ordered the cocaine, and that he had intended to sell it.

¶ 7 The court then instructed the jury. As pertinent here, the court said,

It is my job to decide what rules of law apply to the case. While the attorneys may comment on some of these rules, you must follow the instructions I give you. Even if you disagree with or do not understand the reasons for some of the rules of law, you must follow them. No single instruction describes all the law which must be applied; the instructions must be considered together as a whole.

During the trial, you received all of the evidence that you may properly consider in deciding the case. Your decision must be made by applying the rules of law that I give you to the evidence presented at trial. Remember, you must not be influenced by sympathy, bias or prejudice in reaching your decision.

After describing the elements of attempting to possess a controlled substance, the court also told the jury that, "[a]fter considering all the evidence, if you decide the prosecution has proven each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty." Scott did not object to these instructions.

¶ 8 In his closing argument, Scott reiterated what he had said in his testimony and his opening statement: that drug laws are "immoral and also illegal" because they infringe on individual liberty. Then, while the jury deliberated, the court gave Scott a chance to make his record:

My only question is why couldn't I mention words juror nullification or make the point or allow the jury to hear that considering the fact that jury nullification, to my knowledge, is not illegal, and it's, to my knowledge, it's a part of our country's history, founding fathers used it, used throughout history, Colorado's history, to my knowledge. So I don't see why it was inappropriate, quote, unquote, for me to mention it.

The court replied, "Okay," and the prosecutor rested "on well-established law."

¶ 9 The jury found Scott guilty of attempted possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The court sentenced Scott to two years in prison plus one year on parole.

II. Analysis

¶ 10 Scott makes three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that he had a constitutional right to tell the jurors that they had the discretionary power to acquit him notwithstanding the law and the evidence. Second, he argues that the district court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial when it prevented him from testifying about jury nullification. Third, he argues that the district court violated his constitutional rights to self-representation and to testify by threatening to jail him if he revealed the jury's acquittal power. We address each contention in turn.

A. Jury Nullification

¶ 11 Scott first argues that he had a constitutional right to ask the jury to acquit him notwithstanding the law and the evidence and that the district court violated this right by preventing him from telling the jurors of their acquittal power. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 12 We review an alleged violation of constitutional rights de novo. People v. Janis , 2018 CO 89, ¶ 14, 429 P.3d 1198.

2. No Constitutional Right to Jury Nullification

¶ 13 Jury nullification is a jury's "knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to...