People v. Sevigny

• Citation: 679 P.2d 1070
• Decision Date: 02 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83SA3,83SA3
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alan Daniel SEVIGNY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

Page 1070

679 P.2d 1070

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alan Daniel SEVIGNY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 83SA3.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

April 2, 1984.

Nolan L. Brown, Dist. Atty., Alan C. Shafner, Deputy Dist. Atty., Golden, for plaintiff-appellant.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Thomas M. Van Cleave, III, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellee.

QUINN, Justice.

In this case the People appeal from a judgment of dismissal ¹ entered on the basis of the speedy trial provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Interstate Agreement), section 24-60-501, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Repl.Vol. 10). The district court dismissed the pending criminal charges against the defendant, Alan Daniel Sevigny, because he had not been brought to trial within 180 days after he made a formal request for final disposition of the charges as required by Article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement. We affirm the judgment.

I.

The defendant was charged in the Jefferson County District Court with the crimes of first degree arson ² and second degree burglary. ³ The public defender was initially appointed to represent the defendant and a plea of not guilty was entered. The defendant later retained private counsel and, after waiving his speedy trial rights, the trial was scheduled for January 26, 1982.

On January 8, 1982, Jefferson County authorities were informed by a North Dakota detective that the defendant had been arrested in Jamestown, North Dakota, for the crimes of burglary and auto theft. The Jefferson County District Court, after being advised of the defendant's out of state incarceration, ordered an alias capias for his arrest and continued the case until April 5. Because the defendant was still incarcerated in North Dakota at that time, the case was again continued to July 26.

On April 27 the defendant commenced a two and one-half year sentence in the North Dakota state penitentiary following his conviction in that state. The Lakewood Department of Public Safety, after learning of his incarceration, lodged a detainer with the North Dakota state penitentiary on May 7 in connection with the alias warrant for the charges pending in the Jefferson County District Court. On May 10 the warden of the penitentiary, pursuant to Article III(c) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, notified the defendant in writing of the detainer and also advised him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the Jefferson County charges. ⁴ The defendant on the same day executed a written request for final disposition, ⁵ which was received by the Jefferson County District Attorney's office and the Jefferson County District Court on May 15.

When the defendant's case came before the district court on July 26, 1982, the defendant was still in the North Dakota state penitentiary. His privately retained attorney requested permission to withdraw from the case, and the court granted the request and continued the case to November 1.

Sometime during the fall of 1982 the defendant was transferred to Jefferson County authorities and was brought before the court on November 1. Because prior defense counsel had been permitted to withdraw, the court again appointed the public defender to represent the defendant. Neither the court, the deputy district attorney, nor the public defender was aware of the precise status of the case at that time. When asked by the court whether he was prepared to set the case for trial, the public defender replied:

"I am prepared to set the matter for trial, Judge. I just want to make absolutely clear on the record that by doing so I intend to in no way waive any speedy trial rights that Mr. Sevigny may or may not have. The Court is aware of the fact that before walking into the courtroom today I had no idea that I was going to be reappointed on Mr. Sevigny's case. I'm totally unfamiliar with anything that may have occurred.

"Regarding speedy trial, I think that perhaps he has served some time in another state and there may be a question of a speedy disposition of detainer.... And I specifically do not waive anything ... which we may already have or may have in the future on speedy trial rights. However, I will set the case for trial and then simply tell the Court if I can fit the date into my calendar. I have no idea when the speedy trial runs and under what conditions it runs.

"THE COURT: Yes, give them a trial date."

The district attorney, mistakenly believing that a 90 day speedy trial period was applicable to this case, requested the earliest date within the speedy trial period, without, however, providing the court with any information that might assist it in determining either the appropriate speedy trial period or the expiration of the speedy trial term. The court clerk inquired of the judge whether the trial had to be set within 90 days. The judge stated on the record that he believed that 90 days had long since passed since the defendant's request for disposition of the detainer. The court clerk then advised counsel that the available trial dates were November 30 through December 2, or December 14, 15 and 16. The People requested the November 30 trial date. The public defender, after advising the court of his intent to file a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds and his need for some time to review the past history of the case, requested the December 14 trial date. The court set the case for trial on December 14, 1982.

Prior to trial the public defender filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the 180 day speedy trial provision of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The motion was heard by the court on November 29. The public defender argued that dismissal was warranted because the limitation period had expired on November 14, although a correct computation of the speedy trial period shows that it actually expired on November 11. ⁶ The district attorney, conceding that the speedy trial period had already lapsed, contended nonetheless that docket congestion justified the delay in this case. The district court concluded that the delay was chargeable to the People, rather than to the court's docket, and dismissed the case. The People then appealed the judgment of dismissal to this court.

II.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers has been adopted as the statutory law of this state. Section 24-60-501, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Repl.Vol. 10). Its purpose is to eliminate the uncertainties surrounding outstanding criminal charges in states other than the state of incarceration, thereby fostering more effective treatment and rehabilitation of the prisoner. Simakis v. District Court, 194 Colo. 436, 439, 577 P.2d 3, 5 (1978); see also Hughes v. District Court, 197 Colo. 396, 593 P.2d 702 (1979). Section III(a) of the Agreement provides as follows:

"Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner."

A request for final disposition by the prisoner is deemed to be a waiver of extradition and a consent to the production of his person in any court where his presence is required. Section 24-60-501(III)(e), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Repl.Vol. 10). Article V(c) of the Interstate Agreement provides that in the event the indictment, information, or complaint which gave rise to the detainer is not brought to trial within the prescribed period, then "the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect." Thus, once the speedy trial period has been triggered by a proper notice from the prisoner, the burden of compliance is on the district attorney and the trial court. A failure to comply, in the absence of a waiver or the existence of good cause for continuance, requires dismissal without regard to a showing of prejudice by the prisoner. Hughes v. District Court, supra.

III.

The People, although conceding that the defendant was not brought to trial within the 180 day period mandated by Article III of the Interstate Agreement, raise three arguments in support of their claim that the district court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss. We find each argument to be without merit.

A.

The People first contend that defense counsel's failure to object to a trial date beyond the 180 day term, coupled with his request for a trial date later than that sought by the prosecution, constituted a waiver of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers are statutory rather than constitutional in origin. People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691 (Colo.1984). While a waiver of statutory speedy trial rights need...