People v. Sewell, Cr. 20181

• Decision Date: 24 February 1978
• Docket Number: Cr. 20181
• Citation: 143 Cal.Rptr. 879,20 Cal.3d 639
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 574 P.2d 1231 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Henry SEWELL, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 879

143 Cal.Rptr. 879

20 Cal.3d 639, 574 P.2d 1231

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Henry SEWELL, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 20181.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Feb. 24, 1978.

Paul Arthur Turner, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., William R. Pounders and Roger W. Boren, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

This case raises the question whether by application of Penal Code section 669 multiple life sentences which have been imposed by different states merge and become concurrent sentences. (All statutory references are to the Penal Code.)

During June 1973 defendant, having escaped from the Maryland State Prison while serving a life term, drove with three other men to Los Angeles where they intended to sell stolen musical instruments in order to buy narcotics for resale on the East Coast. Their plans failed and after a week the group decided to return east with the exception of defendant who, fearing apprehension in Maryland, was to remain in Los Angeles. During the early morning hours of July 8, 1973, defendant shot and killed his three companions while they slept. He fled to Maryland that night and was later apprehended there during his commission of another crime.

Defendant was convicted in California of three counts of murder in the first degree (§ 187) for which he was sentenced to three concurrent terms of life imprisonment to be served consecutively with a life sentence which he had previously commenced serving in Maryland. Defendant, presently incarcerated in Maryland, contends that section 669 requires that his California sentences be merged and run concurrently with his Maryland sentence. We agree and will order that the judgment be so modified.

Section 669 provides in relevant part: "When any person is convicted of two or more crimes, whether in the same proceeding or court or in different proceedings or courts, and whether by judgment rendered by the same judge or by different judges, the second or other subsequent judgment shall direct whether the terms of imprisonment or any of them to which he is sentenced shall run concurrently, or (consecutively) . . . provided, however, if the punishment for any of said crimes is expressly prescribed to be life imprisonment, whether with or without possibility of parole, then the terms of imprisonment on the other convictions, whether prior or subsequent, shall be merged and run concurrently with such life term." (Italics added.)

It is clear that if defendant's first conviction resulting in a life term had occurred in California rather than in Maryland, his life sentence for the 1973 murders would merge into a single term of life imprisonment by operation of section 669. (In re Rye (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 594, 595, 313 P.2d 914 (multiple life terms merge into a single life sentence); People v. Holman (1945) 72 Cal.App.2d 75, 100, 164 P.2d 297 (defendant may not be sentenced to 22 consecutive life sentences for 22 murders; all terms merge into a single life sentence).) The central issue is whether defendant may be subjected to consecutive life sentences, despite the provisions of section 669, because his first life sentence was imposed by another state.

Initially, we note that nothing in the language of section 669 suggests that both life terms must be imposed by California courts before their merger becomes mandatory. Rather, the policy implicit in section 669 indicates that the Legislature deliberately chose to leave discretion in the California parole authorities to determine when a prisoner should be released once the minimum seven-year sentence for a single life term has been served. This legislative policy vesting discretion in the parole authorities would be defeated by an interpretation of section 669 which upholds the imposition of consecutive life sentences in the present case. The defendant, for example, may serve seven years or more in a Maryland prison and then be released by that state's authorities because he is considered rehabilitated or no longer a danger to society. If the Maryland sentence is not recognized, California prison authorities would have no choice but to imprison defendant here for an additional seven years. Parole authorities would lack discretion to release defendant until another minimum seven-year sentence had been fully served even if they concluded that further imprisonment could serve no useful purpose. This does not appear to have been the intent of the Legislature in drafting section 669.

The opposing interpretation, that defendant's California term runs concurrently with his Maryland term during his Maryland imprisonment, preserves the options of the parole authorities. If defendant is released on parole by Maryland authorities prior to serving the minimum life sentence under California law, he would be required to serve at least the balance of the minimum term in a California prison. Furthermore, even after the expiration of his minimum term, California parole authorities would retain the prerogative of continuing defendant's incarceration for such indefinite further period as they deemed necessary.

The provisions of section 3046 provide, in relevant part, that "No prisoner imprisoned under a life sentence may be paroled until he has served at least seven calendar years." This in no way suggests that the seven years must be served in a California prison. In In re Stoliker (1957) 49 Cal.2d 75, 315 P.2d 12, we held that a California prisoner had a right to be transferred from California to United States prison authorities so that he could serve his California sentence concurrently with a federal term while incarcerated in a federal penitentiary. Because the case did not involve a life prisoner the provisions of section 3046 were not directly invoked, but Stoliker is persuasive authority for the general proposition that a prisoner may serve his California term while confined in another jurisdiction. (See also In re Satterfield (1966) 64 Cal.2d 419, 421, 50 Cal.Rptr. 284, 412 P.2d 540; In re Patterson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 357, 361, 49 Cal.Rptr. 801, 411 P.2d 897; In re Harris (1960) 60 Cal.2d 878, 36 Cal.Rptr. 468, 388 P.2d 700; § 2900.)

Sections 669 and 3046 may be harmonized by analogy to Stoliker. Thus, a prisoner like defendant who is under a California life sentence while imprisoned in another jurisdiction will be eligible for parole by California authorities after he serves the seven-year minimum term in the prison of either jurisdiction. We think it fair to conclude that if the Legislature had wished it otherwise it could easily have required that the seven-year minimum term be served within a California prison. The legislative failure to do so strongly suggests that such was not its intent.

The People have argued that it would be inappropriate to apply the merger provision of section 669 to the out-of-state prison sentence because the prison facilities of another jurisdiction may be too comfortable and not sufficiently punitive. This argument ignores the fact, heretofore noted, that if upon defendant's custodial return to California, following the expiration of seven years' confinement in another jurisdiction, the California prison authorities conclude that he is not fully rehabilitated they retain full discretion to require that he serve additional time in California. Application of section 669 to the Maryland term does not reduce defendant's maximum term, but only serves to allow California parole authorities discretion, if they choose to exercise it, to release offenders earlier than the expiration of the aggregate minimums of consecutive life terms.

We, of course, are not concerned with the wisdom of sections 669 and 3046, but we do confront a problem of statutory interpretation. It seems evident that the policy behind the legislation...