People v. Sexton
Decision Date | 15 November 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 27504,27504 |
Citation | 194 Colo. 250,571 P.2d 1098 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny Rue SEXTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., J. Stephen Phillips, James E. Thompson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Don L. Nelson, Fort Collins, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant was convicted in the District Court of Larimer County of two counts of vehicular homicide (section 18-3-106, C.R.S.1973) 1 and two counts of vehicular assault (section 18-3-205, C.R.S.1973). 2 The judgment was affirmed by this court in People v. Sexton, Colo., 555 P.2d 1151.
Within 120 days after the affirmance of the judgment, defendant filed a motion under Crim.P. 35 to set aside the conviction, or vacate, or correct his sentence. Defendant now seeks reversal of the district court's denial of that motion. We affirm.
In support of his motion for post-conviction relief, the defendant argued that the case of People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316, required that his conviction be vacated or, in the alternative, at most, that he be resentenced under the lesser misdemeanor offense of criminally negligent homicide (section 18-3-105, C.R.S.1973). He also urged that the vehicular felony assault convictions be set aside for the reason that the statute was unconstitutional as denying equal protection of the law. He argued that the punishment for causing a "serious bodily injury" under the vehicular assault statute is more severe than that which can be imposed under the criminally negligent homicide statute where the "death of another" is involved. The district court was not persuaded by either argument, and accordingly denied his motion.
Shortly after defendant's motion for post-conviction relief was denied, this court decided People v. Hulse, Colo., 557 P.2d 1205. In Hulse, defendant was charged with vehicular homicide and criminally negligent homicide. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the felony count of vehicular homicide under the rule of Calvaresi, which holds that where conduct proscribed under two statutes is indistinguishable, the legislature may not constitutionally impose different degrees of punishment. This court reversed the dismissal, holding:
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