People v. Sheldon

• Decision Date: 15 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. S004704,No. 25109,S004704,25109
• Citation: 771 P.2d 1330,258 Cal.Rptr. 242,48 Cal.3d 935
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 771 P.2d 1330 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jeffrey Theodore SHELDON, Defendant and Appellant. Crim.

Page 242

258 Cal.Rptr. 242

48 Cal.3d 935, 771 P.2d 1330

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jeffrey Theodore SHELDON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S004704.

Crim. No. 25109.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

May 15, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1989.

Frank O. Bell, Jr., and Harry Zall, State Public Defenders, Therene Powell and Nancy Gaynor, Deputy State Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Frederick R. Millar, Jr., Jay M. Bloom and Janelle B. Davis, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

LUCAS, Chief Justice.

Defendant Jeffrey T. Sheldon appeals from a judgment imposing the death penalty following his conviction of first degree murder (Pen.Code, § 187; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated), accompanied by three felony-murder special-circumstance findings ( § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i) (robbery-murder), (ii) (kidnap-murder), and (vii) (burglary-murder)). Additionally, with respect to the murder victim, defendant was convicted of robbery ( § 211), vehicle theft (Veh.Code, § 10851), kidnapping for ransom and extortion ( § 209, subd. (a)), and residential burglary ( § 459). Defendant was also convicted of crimes against three other victims, including kidnapping for ransom and extortion, robbery, burglary and assault with a firearm, each count accompanied by a firearm-use finding ( § 12022.5).

The jury returned special findings that the murder was deliberate and premeditated, that defendant intentionally killed the murder victim, and that he intentionally aided and abetted the murder with the specific intent to kill. The jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court denied defendant's motion to modify the sentence. As will appear, we conclude that, with the exception of the weapon-assault charge, no prejudicial error was committed, but that the judgment of death should be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on defendant's automatic application for modification of sentence ( § 190.4, subd. (e)) because of the court's failure to state the reasons supporting the denial of that application.

I. GUILT PHASE FACTS

The present offenses occurred within a three-day period in September 1983. On September 11, defendant robbed the employees (Armstrong and Davis) and owner (Malone) of the Pizza Bowl Restaurant in Lake Elsinor, confronting these men with a shotgun, and threatening to "blow your brains out." Defendant kidnapped and drove off with Malone, but later released him unharmed.

The next day, September 12, defendant asked his wife, Denise, if she knew any wealthy persons, and she named 60-year-old Norris Neblett. The couple drove to Neblett's residence and confronted him at gunpoint. According to Denise (who was granted a reduced, eight-year sentence in return for her testimony), defendant gave her a wad of money he had collected from Neblett, and thereupon drove off with the victim to a motel, where the three spent the night.

The next day, September 13, defendant and Neblett went to Neblett's bank, where Neblett cashed a check for $10,000 and gave the proceeds to defendant. Later in the day, Jack McFadden, a confederate of defendant, cashed a $2,500 check drawn on Neblett's account, and that same day tendered an $8,500 check on that account. The latter check was returned uncashed after an unsuccessful attempt to contact Neblett by phone. Soon thereafter, firemen were notified of a vehicle fire involving Neblett's 1980 BMW automobile. Investigation of Neblett's residence uncovered his body. The cause of death was strangulation; his body and face were heavily bruised. His body was found on the floor; evidently he had been smothered with a pillow weighted down by a couch and chair. His face, neck, eyebrow, lip and chin showed abrasions, his nose was smashed almost flat against his face, and his body apparently had been kicked or beaten.

On September 14, defendant and Denise flew to Michigan, taking Neblett's camera and stamp collection along with them. They disposed of the shotgun and engaged in a spending spree before being apprehended.

II. GUILT PHASE AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ISSUES

A. Failure to Provide Jury with Written Instructions

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to have written copies of the jury instructions given to the jurors for use during their deliberations at the guilt and penalty phases. Instead, the court advised the jurors that although they would not have the written instructions, "should you at any time wish to have any portion or all of the instructions read again, all you have to do is so indicate and we will do it." The jury did not request a rereading of any guilt phase instruction, although it did ask the court to repeat its penalty instructions.

Defendant concedes that at the time of trial the applicable statutes and case law gave the court discretion to provide the jury with written instructions. (See former §§ 1093, subd. (6), 1137; People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 640, 51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366 [upholding denial of written instructions, despite request by jury foreman, because compliance would unduly delay trial].) In 1986, section 1093, subdivision (6), was amended to provide for written jury instructions upon request by the jury. The section continues to provide for an exercise of discretion in the absence of such a request.

Defendant observes, however, that in the present case, unlike Anderson, supra, 64 Cal.2d 633, 51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366, the trial court stated no reason for denying defendant's motion. Moreover, the instructions comprise more than 60 pages of reporter's transcript, magnifying the likelihood of jury confusion regarding the various charges. According to defendant, the trial court both abused its discretion and denied defendant his constitutional rights by failing to provide written instructions.

In essence, defendant's premise is that jurors generally are unable fully to comprehend orally delivered instructions. As he states the argument, "a jury which is forced to rely on the court's oral presentation cannot be expected to remember, understand, and apply the instructions in a rational manner consistent with the applicable law." He cites law review articles which refer to various studies confirming the difficulty jurors have in comprehending legal issues based on oral instructions, and urging the availability of written instructions in the jury room. (See also United States v. Miller (9th Cir.1976) 546 F.2d 320, 324, fn. 3.)

It does not appear that any of the studies or articles cited by defendant took into consideration the alternative of a rereading of instructions, such as was available here. Indeed, the jurors asked for a rereading of the penalty instructions, and the record contains no further indication of uncertainty or confusion on the jury's part regarding the instructions. Although numerous criminal acts were charged, no complex legal issues were involved. Indeed, the jury's guilt phase deliberations were completed in two days. The penalty phase jury announced a possible "deadlock" after deliberating for two days, but reached a verdict after two more days of deliberations. There is no indication that instructional confusion contributed to the deadlock.

We conclude that the trial court did not err, or abuse its discretion, in denying defendant's motion for written jury instructions.

B. Shackling Defendant

After the commencement of trial, a hearing was held to determine the necessity of shackling defendant with leg irons. A handcuff key had been found in the possession of defendant's confederate, McFadden. Hearsay evidence from a confidential informant, admitted without objection, indicated defendant might also have access to such a key; in addition, he had committed five assaults on other inmates, and was facing a life prison term in Nevada. The testifying officer deemed defendant a "high escape risk." The court ordered defendant shackled, after finding that the restraints probably could not be seen from the jury box.

Later, during voir dire, one of the jury panel members indicated to the court that she had viewed defendant's restraints. (Evidently, the panel was so large in number that some members were seated in the spectator section of the courtroom, where they were able to see the shackles.) Thereupon, the court stated to the assembled panel that apparently some of its members may have noted that defendant was "in custody," and admonished the panel that such "custody" had no relevance to the issue of his guilt, and should not in any way affect the verdict. Defense counsel, who had proposed a "general" admonishment of this kind, made no objection to the phrasing chosen by the court.

As defendant observes, because of its potentially prejudicial impact on the jury, shackling is to be employed only as a last resort, based on "a showing of manifest need for such restraints." (See People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1261, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115; People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-291, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; People v. Jacla (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 878, 883, 144 Cal.Rptr. 23.) According to defendant, there was no manifest need for shackling in this case. He contends that shackling cannot be justified solely on the basis of earlier prison disciplinary violations, and that the other evidence was insufficient to sustain the trial court's ruling. We disagree.

The court's shackling decision "cannot be successfully challenged on review except on a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion." (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 293, fn. 12, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1263, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115.) Here, the evidence summarized above was a sufficient basis for shackling, for it indicated a substantial risk that defendant might attempt...