People v. Shroyer
| Citation | 203 Cal.App.2d 478,21 Cal.Rptr. 460 |
| Decision Date | 10 May 1962 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 1712 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jean SHROYER, aka Jean Deaton, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
Mary E. Thor, Cupertino, for appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., and William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
By two separate informations containing a total of 11 counts and alleging 4 prior felony convictions, the defendant was charged with forging or passing 11 forged checks, i. e., violations of Section 470 of the Penal Code; initially entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to each count and expressly or by silence denied the allegations setting forth the four prior convictions; thereafter, by permission of court, changed his plea from not guilty to guilty on one count, withdrew his plea of guilty by reason of insanity, and admitted the allegations as to one prior conviction; simultaneously the district attorney moved, and the court granted his motion, to dismiss all other counts and to strike the allegations respecting all other prior convictions.
It appears, although the record is not clear upon the subject, that at the time the defendant was arraigned upon the first information the court appointed the public defender to represent him, but he thereafter declined this representation and advised the court that he would act as his own counsel. When arraigned upon the second information the court offered to appoint the public defender to represent the defendant and urged him to accept this offer but it was declined. In the course of these proceedings the defendant stated that he wished to represent himself; that he wanted to interrogate the witnesses and otherwise to try his own case; that he could use the public defender to give him some advice, to do some research for him, and to serve subpoenas; but that the public defender was too busy to conduct the trial of his case in a proper manner. The public defender indicated his preference not to accept this 'errand boy' type of representation, and the court did not require him to do so. Thereupon, the defendant interrogated the trial judge, soliciting his advice concerning questions of law in the case, and was told that the court was not authorized to give him legal advice but would appoint an attorney to represent him. However, this offer was rejected. During this session the cases arising out of the two informations were consolidated for trial.
A few days later, upon the court's own motion, further proceedings with respect to the appointment of counsel were held. At this time the trial judge reviewed and related his previous offers and efforts to appoint counsel for the defendant; the defendant's refusal to accept counsel; his release of the public defender who had been appointed to defend him; the withdrawal of private counsel theretofore appearing on his behalf; the request of the defendant for advice concerning the effect of his dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity; the seriousness of the charges against him; the probability of a lengthy prison term in the event he were found guilty; the complexity of the issues raised by the dual plea and the rules of procedure and evidence applicable to the case; and the judge's opinion, based on his observations, that the defendant did not have a great deal of legal experience and should have legal counsel to continue his defense. Thereupon the court appointed a private attorney to represent the defendant and indicated that in doing so he was acting pursuant to the authority conferred and the obligations imposed by the decision in People v. Kemp, 55 Cal.2d 458, 463, 11 Cal.Rptr. 361, 359 P.2d 913. The attorney who was appointed had had 23 years of trial practice, 15 of which had been in Riverside County; formerly had been a deputy district attorney; for several years had been in private practice, handling the defense in many criminal cases; and also was actively interested in the field in mental illness and psychiatry, and its relation to the law.
A month later, the defendant, accompanied by his court-appointed attorney, appeared in court; asked permission to change his plea theretofore entered as hereinbefore indicated; had his attention specifically directed to the allegations identifying the offense charged in the count to which he wished to plead guilty; both personally and through his attorney, entered his plea of guilty, withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and admitted the allegations respecting one prior conviction; without solicitation asked and received permission to address the court; and stated: 'I was under the impression until you appointed Mr. Moss as my attorney, who has spent a great deal of time on this matter, that my position was defensible, and he pointed out certain things that I do understand and there isn't coercion or collusion and I will agree to plead guilty.' Thereupon the matter was referred to the probation officer and time for pronouncement of judgment was fixed.
In due course proceedings for pronouncement of judgment were held; the probation officer recommended that probation be denied; defendant's court-appointed counsel made a very able and persuasive argument in support of his contention that the defendant should be granted probation and that the recommendation of the probation officer should not be accepted; the court indicated its intention to follow the recommendations of the probation officer and to commit the defendant to the state penitentiary; and, thereupon, the defendant requested the court to send him to the county jail instead of to the penitentiary and, without interruption, presented his views and arguments in support of this request. The trial judge followed his previously declared intention and entered judgment imposing a sentence of imprisonment in the state prison. Forthwith the defendant personally made a further presentation; expressed general disapproval of all of the proceedings taken; and gave notice of his intention to appeal.
The foregoing oral notice of intention to appeal was followed by a written notice signed by the defendant personally and by a second written notice signed by his present attorney. It appears from the defendant's briefs on file, although only inferentially from the record, that at one stage in the proceedings prior to the filing of the second information, he was represented by present counsel who, together with the public defender theretofore appointed, withdrew because the defendant had indicated his desire to represent himself.
On appeal the defendant contends that he was denied due process of law in that he was not permitted to represent himself, and for this reason the judgment should be reversed. This contention raises the primary issue on appeal.
Every defendant in a criminal case has the constitutional right to counsel and also to represent himself if he so elects. (Cal.Const. art. I, sec. 13; People v. Harmon, 54 Cal.2d 9, 14, 4 Cal.Rptr. 161, 351 P.2d 329; People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.2d 777, 788-789, 336 P.2d 937; People v. Jackson, 186 Cal.App.2d 307, 317, 8 Cal.Rptr. 849; People v. Marcus, 133 Cal.App.2d 579, 583, 284 P.2d 848; People v. White, 115...
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... ... Page 644 ... 'We do not consider the cited case of People v. Shroyer, 203 A.C.A. 506, 510, [Cal.App.2d 478, 482] 21 Cal.Rptr. 460 (no petition for hearing in Supreme Court filed), to be authority requiring the trial judge to make the suggested inquiry at the initial stages of the ordinary case wherein there has been nothing to suggest defendant's lack of competence ... ...
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...(Gen. see People v. Maddox, 61 A.C. 658, 659, 59 Cal.Rptr. 500; In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701, 709, 108 P.2d 10; People v. Shroyer, 203 Cal.App.2d 478, 482, 21 Cal.Rptr. 460; People v. Gaither, 173 Cal.App.2d 662, 670, 343 P.2d 799.) Furthermore, a defendant does not have the right to have hi......
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People v. Floyd
...abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal. (People v. Carter, 66 Cal.2d 666, 672, 58 Cal.Rptr. 614, 427 P.2d 214; People v. Shroyer, 203 Cal.App.2d 478, 482--483, 21 Cal.Rptr. 460.) Although the defendant's right to represent himself cannot be denied simply because he is unable to 'demonstrate......
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People v. Bourland
...Cal.Rptr. 884, 886, 392 P.2d 964, 966; and see People v. Mattson (1959) 51 Cal.2d 777, 788, 336 P.2d 937; and People v. Shroyer (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 478, 482, 21 Cal.Rptr. 460.) The refusal to permit a defendant financially able to retain an attorney to be represented by counsel of his own......